The Ulm campaign, 1805

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SERIES

BY
MAI

THE ULM CAMPAIGN
1805

THE SPECIAL CAMPAIGN
SERIES

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I. SAARBRtfCK TO PARIS : THE FRANCO-
GERMAN WAR. By COL. SISSON C. PRATT,
late R.A.

II. THE RUSSO-TURKISH WAR, 1877. By

MAJOR F. MAURICE.
III. FREDERICKSBURG : A STUDY IN

WAR, 1862. By MAJOR G. W. REDWAY.
IV. THE CAMPAIGN OF MAGENTA and

SOLFERINO, 1859. By COL. H. C. WYLLY, C.B.

V. THE WATERLOO CAMPAIGN. By COL.
SISSON C. PRATT, late R.A.

VI. THE CAMPAIGN IN BOHEMIA, 1866.
By LT.-COL. G. J. R. GLUNICKE.

VII. THE LEIPZIG CAMPAIGN, 1813. By
COL. F. N. MAUDE, C.B., late R.E.

VIII. GRANT'S CAMPAIGN IN VIRGINIA,

1864 (THE WILDERNESS CAMPAIGN). By CAPT.
VAUGHAN SAWYER, Indian Army.

IX. THE JENA CAMPAIGN, 1806. By COL.
F. N. MAUDE, C.B., late R.E.

X. THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR. By
CAPT. F. R. SEDGWICK, R.F.A.

XL THE WAR OF SECESSION, 1861-1862
(BULL RUN TO MALVERN HILL). By MAJOR G. W.
REDWAY.

XII. THE ULM CAMPAIGN. By COL. F. N.
MAUDE, C.B., late R.E.

XIII. THE WAR OF SECESSION, 1863

(CHANCELLORSVILLE AND GETTYSBURG). By COL.
P. H. DALBIAC.

XIV. THE WAR OF SECESSION, 1862

(CEDAR RUN, MANASSAS, AND SHARPSBURG). By
E. W. SHEPPARD.

XV. NAPOLEON'S CAMPAIGNS IN ITALY,
1796-1797 and 1800. By LT.-COL. R. G. BURTON.

SPECIAL CAMPAIGN SERIES No. 12

THE

ULM CAMPAIGN

1805

By
COLONEL F. N. MAUDE, C.B.

(Late R.E.)

AUTHOR OF

"THE LEIPZIG CAMPAIGN," "THE JENA CAMPAIGN," ETC.

LONDON

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INTRODUCTION

A FEW words of explanation are necessary to
justify my production of the three studies :
Leipzig, Jena, Ulm, in the inverse order of their
dates.

At the time I commenced the series, it ap-
peared to me to be of the first importance to make
it clear to my fellow-students that Napoleon did
in fact possess during his latter years a fixed
method in strategy, which he invariably followed
whenever topographical conditions permitted.
This method enabled him to be absolutely
certain of accumulating at the decisive point of
the battlefield a crushing numerical superiority,
no matter what plans his opponents might have
formed ; for the vigour of his operations paralysed
their will power and compelled them to conform
to his initiative.

His calculations might indeed be destroyed
by tactical incidents on the battlefield, as they
were, both at Leipzig and Waterloo ; but the
strategic object— viz. the concentration of superior
numbers at the point of decision — was invariably
obtained, and by the simplest possible means.

The next step seemed to me to show how the
new system first came into being during the

vi INTRODUCTION

Campaign of Jena, in which the uncertainty of
the Emperor's leading gave the best possible
proof of the novelty of the weapon he was learn-
ing how to wield— in contrast to the certainty
with which he handled it thereafter.

I should probably have rested at this point
for good but for the growing tendency I have
noticed in recent strategical articles at home and
abroad, to read this Napoleonic system into every-
thing he ever did, rather suggesting that the
idea was born with him, than that it was, as I
believe, the outcome of his experience, developed
logically and step by step.

To my mind the Campaign of Ulm, which was
in fact his first essay in the conduct of a great
army, articulated in Corps and Divisions, proves
my point up to the hilt.

In Italy he followed the methods of his pre-
decessors, only departing from them in so far as
the conditions of the troops he commanded,
and their habits of living by requisition eked out
by plunder, rendered expedient. But in South
Germany all was different.

There for the first time we find a number of
Corps, each an Army in magnitude according to
the standard of the previous century, moving
under the inspiration of a single leader and need-
ing on the one hand space for subsistence, on the
other, time to ensure concentration. A Cavalry
Screen far out to the front was the first and obvious
solution, and one to which the rest of Europe

INTRODUCTION vii

has absolutely adhered until the present century.
It is the primary object of this present study to
reveal its shortcomings.

I had originally intended merely to translate
the introduction to the French Official History by
M. Colin and d'Alombert, but our points of view
differed so diametrically, especially with regard
to the ability of Mack and the conduct of the
Archduke Ferdinand, that I abandoned the
idea, and determined to unravel as far as possible
the fundamental causes which lay at the root of
the whole series of defeats the Austrians endured
at the hands of the French, from the very inception
of the French Revolution.

I have never been able to share the views of
those who imagine that every defeated General is
necessarily either an imbecile or a traitor. In
times of chronic warfare men do not easily win
the confidence of their Sovereigns and con-
temporaries, and without this confidence it is
utterly impossible for them to rise to high
positions.

Mack and his contemporaries, both in the
British, the Prussian, and his own army, were no
mere carpet knights, but men who had grown up
amongst the generation that had fought its way
through the Seven Years' War, and during their
own lifetime had spent as many years in face of
the enemy as their successors now spend weeks
at their autumn manoeuvres.

If, in spite of this practical training, they were

viii INTRODUCTION

again and again overwhelmed by defeat, the pre-
sumption is strong that they were in reality face
to face with fresh and, to them, unknown causes,
whose introduction into the problems they en-
countered entirely vitiated all previous practice.
The time in which this practice was first evolved
had been in fact the highest development of ^ the
Art of War as defined by von Moltke— viz. " to
make the best practicable use of the means at
hand to the attainment of the object in view."

No one has ever, to my knowledge, turned the
problem around and endeavoured to apply the
Napoleonic methods to the conditions of Frederick
the Great's day — had they done so, the explana-
tion would have stared them in the face.

Frederick's men needed no " lozenge " forma-
tions, not merely because his armies were small
in number, but because it was an economic
necessity of his period to win by individual
efficiency and not by sheer weight of numbers.

Men so highly drilled that they could stand up
to fifty per cent, of loss, still loading and firing at
the rate of five rounds a minute, needed no heavy
reserves to support them in an attack. Their
fire swept the ground in front of them like the
very scythe of death, and, after three or four
volleys, there was no enemy left to meet the
shock of the bayonet charge. The same was the
case with their Cavalry ; charging knee to knee,
without even squadron intervals, the longest
front was bound to overwhelm all opponents,

INTRODUCTION ix

hence again there was no need to keep material
reserves in hand.

But when, at the outbreak of the French Re-
volution, men with far less drill and steadiness
than our present day Territorials, had to be led
against a well-trained enemy, new methods had
to be found to overcome that enemy's resistance,
and only when these were fixed by experiment,
did the motive for concentration of numbers on
the decisive point spring into prominence. For
the present the concentration of superior numbers
still holds the field, though it is quite conceivable
that in the future some other modification may
become necessary. But in any case the Com-
mander will find himself compelled to " reconcile
the pairs of opposites " involved, first in extend-
ing sufficiently to ensure concentration of fire ;
secondly, in massing reserves enough to maintain
the combat ; and his success will depend from day
to day on the skill he displays in adapting his
means to the ever- varying conditions of conflict.

In the immediate future the modern French doc-
trine seems destined to hold the field, not only for
the reasons given in the text, but because the de-
velopment of aerial reconnaisance has enormously
increased the advantages already claimed for it.

Watched by these new scouts from above, no
concealment of objection is possible to the army
moving " in line of corps abreast." The first
suggestion of an envelopment can be seen and
reported ; but however well informed his adversary

xii TABLE OF CONTENTS

PAGE

The best paying investments — Tact in employment
of troops — Discipline : rights and properties of
individuals ..... 8

Reason for insisting on this point — Instance of
Austrian troops in 1785 — Occupation of Nether-
lands— Siege of Mayence, 1793 . . 9

Necessity of ready money — Attitude of civil popula-
tion in Central Europe in eighteenth century . 10

Value of fighting men to civilians — Effect on
womenfolk — Root evil of Continental Socialism
— Hindrances to an active strategy — Necessity
for studying civil history of the period . . 1 1

Reasons for tactical defensive . . . 12

Blindness of younger generation — Frederick the
Great and the Austrians and Russians — Results
of Prussian assaults on the Allies — Reason for
" fundamental theory of the defensive " . 13

Terrible consequences when this idea dominates a

mass of men ..... 14

Success in the attack .... 15

Bad effects of retreat and defeat . . . 15-16

Reasons for inherent weakness in Austrian regiments

from 1793-1805 • . . . 16

Weakness of would-be reformers— Hampered

Austrian Army— Paralleled in South Africa . 17

Another disadvantage of Austrians . T$

Difficulties of Train and Supply Service — Cause of

corruption in same ... I9

Conditions and limitation of Austrian strategical

methods . . . 2o

Austrians at Stokach in 1800— Deployment of small

columns by Mack and Weyreuther . 2I

Sketch of Karl Mack's career . . [ 22

Mack at Maestricht-Passage of the Roer .

Mack's comment on same— Relief of Maestricht—

TABLE OF CONTENTS xiii

PAGE

Testimony of Archduke Charles to Mack's

ability, etc. ..... 26

Letter of Archduke Charles to Mack . . 26-27

Battle of Neerwinden . . . . 27

Mack's illness and refusal to retreat . . 27-28

Fatal negotiations with Dumouriez — Their effects . 28

Archduke Charles's letters to Kaiser on behalf of

Mack — Mack's resignation ... 29

Correspondence of Coburg and Graf Mercy . 29-30

Mack at battle of Famars — Is invalided and given
colonelcy of " Jacquemin " Regiment — Mack's
disastrous friendship with Field-Marshal Lacy 30

Hohenlohe replaces Coburg — Letters of Archduke
Charles to Austrian Kaiser, 4th January 1794 —
Difficulty with Mack . . . . 31

His return to Vienna before receipt of letter —
Policy of Austrian Cabinet under Thugut — Mack
in Brussels, January 1794 — Conference there, 4th
February 1794 — Mack's demands for offensive 32

Mack's departure for London — His return to
Netherlands, February 1794 — His mistake with
regard to negotiations — Opening of campaign ;
illness — Counsels retreat on conditions . 33

Intrigues — Goes to Vienna with Emperor — British
contingent ask to have him back at front —
Retirement in 1794 until 1796 — Recalled by
Napoleon's success in Italy — Intrigues of
Thugut — Mack is made Chief of Staff, Army of
Interior — Collision with Archduke Charles —
Goes to Naples in summer of 1798 . . 34

Commands Neapolitan Army, gth October 1778 —
Nelson's opinion of Mack — Premature advance
against Championnet — Arrest by Bonaparte at
Bologna — Escape from Paris in 1800 — Thugut 's
animosity . . . . 35

xvi TABLE OF CONTENTS

PAGB

Pressure of conscription on nation .

Cause of downfall in i87o-French War Office in
Revolutionary period and later— Confusion and
evolution of Napoleonic Army . •

Uniformity of commanding officers in Imperial

Army 58'59

Important note as to reasons of their excellence-
Napoleon's punishment of Hussar brigade-
Bravery of French Army— Its lack of " polish "

—Survival of the fittest

Fault of long-service Armies— Wise system of
training— Learning to enforce obedience-
Facilities offered by our Territorial system-
Formation of French " Division " and " Army
Corps" ... .60

Best working bond between officers and men-
Practice of French Army— Practice of Austrian
Generals during Revolutionary War, regarding
orders— French practice regarding same . 61

Captain Colin's " Education Militaire de Napoleon "
—Colonel Camon's study of Napoleon's cam-
paigns as Emperor — General Bonnal's and
General Foch's criticisms on value of Napoleonic
Memoirs, evidence 64

Napoleon's " real " plan of campaign . . 64-65

His military " requisition " procedure — Napoleon's
qualifications for victory — Reason for failure
at Marengo — Causes him to invent " Cavalry
Screen "....• 66

Campaign of Ulm, 1805 — Napoleon's discovery of
cavalry limitations — Insoluble problem revealed
— Tactics of Army under Napoleon
Anticipates Moltke's definition of " Art of War " —
The French and Prussian drill books ; mistakes
in their adoption .... 68

TABLE OF CONTENTS xvii

PAGE

Prussian idea of spirit of French Infantry — Prussian

authors on this subject ... 69

Effect of Austrian Light Infantry on French Army

evolution — Characteristics of " Voltigeurs " 70

Readjustment of Army forced on Napoleon —

Napoleon at Castiglione . . . 71

Summing-up of Chapter .... 71-72

CHAPTER III

POLITICAL FACTORS INFLUENCING AUSTRIAN
OPERATIONS

At the outbreak of Revolutionary Wars — Geo-
graphical considerations ... 74
Importance of Ulm — Value of Bavaria — Re-
entrant frontiers — Napoleon at Milan — Mack
at Ulm — Had Mack had a free hand — Imaginary
dangers, their mystery 75
Napoleon's warning to Austria — Russia approaches

Austria ..... 76

Archduke Charles's memoir on the subject . . 76-79

Reason for Mack's being restored to favour . 80-8 1

Comment on Archduke's memoir . . . 81-82

Clausewitz's opinion of Austrian line of action —
Mistaken scorn — C. von B. K.'s vindication of
Austrian line of action ... 82

Value of Switzerland to Austrians . . . 82-83

Communication with France over Swiss roads . 83

Mack's grasp of value of Switzerland — Mack is mis-
led as to strength of French troops — Contract
of alliance between Austria and Russia, 4th
November 1804 .... 84

Composition of " Contract " . . . 84-85

b

xviii TABLE OF CONTENTS

PAGE

General Stutterheim's " memoir " of 6th April 1805

He takes " Contract " to Emperor of Russia —

Response of Russian General Staff — Substance
of Stutterheim's " memoir " . . 85

Russian alliance with Great Britain, nth April 1805
— Indignation in Vienna thereat — Delay in
reply to Russia by Austria — Russian note, 2gth
June 1805, sent to Austria — Archduke
Charles's policy ... 86

Testimony of General Duka . . . 86-87

Result of Duka's statistics — Cobenzl and Mack —
Mack's advice to adhere to Russian proposals —
Is blamed by authors of the French Official
History, " Campaign of Ulm," therefor . 87

Comment on this condemnation . . . 87-88

Continuation of French Official Historians' opinion

of Mack's policy . . . . 89

Continuation of comment thereon, 7th to i6th July

1805 ...... 89-90

Agreement on latter date — Composition of Allied
Annies — Treaty between Russia and Austria on
9th August 1805 .... 90

Protest of Archduke Charles . . . 90-91

Mack's preparations for war — Tries to " swop horses
when crossing the stream " — Principal change,
its causes of failure . . . . 91

Comment on same ..... 91-92

Important fact as to failure of Mack's reforms . 92

Mack becomes virtual dictator— His note of I5th
August to Austrian Emperor— Necessity of his
doing so ..... 93

Difficulties of Austrian Emperor's assuming com-
mand of Army— Appointment of Archduke
Ferdinand (Footnote on his services) — Council of
war at Hetzendorf, 2oth August 1805 — Arch-

TABLE OF CONTENTS xix

PAGE

duke Ferdinand and Mack's incompatibility of
disposition . .... 94

Archduke Charles's plan of campaign discussed . 94~95
Mack opposes it ..... 95

Comment on Council of War . . . 95~96

Plan of Archduke Charles adopted . . 96

Enumeration of strength of Austrian Army — Plan

of active operations .... 97

Quotation from Archduke Charles . . . 97-9$

One underlined sentence is Mack's . . . 97~98

Mack takes command, 2nd September 1805, at Wels
— His first move towards the Inn — Klenau's
command ..... 98

Jellacid's movements — Enumeration of movements

of Austrian commands and their strength . 99

Effect of Mack's Army orders on Archduke Charles . 99-100
Important lesson learnt from Archduke's note to
Austrian Emperor — Austria breaks off negotia-
tions with France, 3rd September 1805 —
Schwartzenberg is sent to Bavaria, 6th Sep-
tember 1805 — Conferences with Elector —
Elector slips away toward Wiirzburg — Schwart-
zenberg deceived, rides back to Mack, gth Sep-
tember 1805 — Mack sends flying columns to
pursue Bavarians .... 100

Main bodies ordered to reach Iller on igth Sep-
tember— Mack reaches Iller, I5th September —
Archduke Ferdinand assumes command of
army — His orders to Mack and the Army —
Mack's reception of order . . . 101

Mack's letter to Archduke .... 101-102
Mack's letter to Emperor of Austria — The Em-
peror's answer — Meeting of Emperor, Arch-
duke Ferdinand, and Mack, 2ist September
1805, at Landsberg .... 102

xx TABLE OF CONTENTS

PAGE

Arrangements of 23rd September— Orders to Kien-

mayer's Corps .

Disposition of Austrian forces on 3rd October 1805 . 103-104
Comment on this disposition • 105-106

Mack's answer to reprimand as to hardships of this

march. ... . 106-107

Parallel drawn between Mack at Ulm, 1805, and

Napoleon at Dresden in 1813 . . . 107

Comment . .... 107-108

CHAPTER IV

THE MARCH FROM BOULOGNE TO THE RHINE

Napoleon wakes up to significance of Austria's attitude 109
Selfishness of the old diplomacy — Opposition of

Austrian and Prussian interests . . no

French negotiations \\ith Prussia after seizure of
Hanover — Napoleon's remark to Prussian Am-
bassador (November 1803) in Paris — Attitude
of King of Prussia . . . . in

His correspondence with Austria and Russia . 111-112

La Rochefoucauld's letter to Napoleon — Letter of
Emperor of Austria regarding La Rochefou-
cauld's report . . . . . 112
Letter of Napoleon regarding Italian republics . 112-113
Dates of this correspondence : December 1803,
January 1804 — Its effects on peace party — War
party's predicament — Effects of Napoleon's
coronation at Milan — The seizure of Genoa —
Napoleon's designs on England . . 113
Their effect on his Continental policy . . 113-114
His precautionary correspondence with Bavaria and
Wurtemberg— His first idea of Bavarian co-

TABLE OF CONTENTS xxi

PAGE

operation — Final result of his negotiations with
Bavarians . . . . .114

Relies on Prussian Alliance being purchasable — Mis-
takes the King of Prussia's attitude — Receives
reports between I2th-2ist August 1805 — De-
cides war against Austria — Despatches Duroc to
sign alliance with Prussia . . . 115

Letter of Napoleon's taken by Duroc in original

French ..... 115-116

Translation in footnote .... 116-119

Writes to Dejean, Minister of Administration for

War ...... 118

Orders for rations — Orders for rolling material —
Orders to Marmont and Bernadotte — Berthier
issues instructions on 24th August . . 1 19

Berthier's letter to Marmont — Orders for Cuirassiers

and Dragoons, 24th August . . . 120

Their organisation modified — Oudinot's Grenadiers
warned to march ; their destination —
Napoleon's instructions to Murat and Bertrand 121

His orders for the 26th August 1805 — His letter of
28th August — New dispositions of Davout,
Soult and Ney — Positions of Advance Guard . 122

Savary's reconnaissance .... 122-123

Explanation of change in Napoleon's dispositions
— Opinion of French Official History — Comment
on this opinion — Napoleon becomes aware of
Austrian and Russian preparedness . . 123

His revised orders ..... 124

DESCRIPTION OF GRAND ARMY

Its great weakness ..... 124

Composition of Army — Returns of the year XIII.,
showing service of troops — viz. Sappers, Light
Cavalry, Infantry , . . . 125

XX11

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PAGE

Men over ten years' service. • I25 126^

Officers and non-coms.— Survivors of Old Royal

Army Hussars— Marbot's description of them . 126

State of the other arms . . • 126-127

Desertions— Furlough— Physical development of

recruits . I27

Composition of officers (Grand Army)— Their

number and ages . • • 127-128

The picked men— Sub- lieutenants— Lieutenants —
Captains — Quotation regarding training and
discipline

Comment on above — Cavalry mounts . 129

Artillery and Engineers . . .129-130

Analysis of age and service of the 141 General
Officers— The crying need of the Army — viz.
horses .... 130

Comment on this need — State of Grand Army when

it crossed the Rhine . . . . 13 I

Lack of time and money to ensure adequate prepara-
tion— Attitude of civilians to Army — Davout's
measures taken at Lille — At Vitry — Roads in
the Ardennes . . . . .132

Sufferings of horses .... 132-133

Sufferings of Artillery — Soult's report — Davout's
predicament — Transport available — Lack of
necessities of equipment . . . 133

Pay of troops ..... 133-134

State of Army transport — Soult's report of its diffi-
culties— Attitude of inhabitants to requisitions
— Marmont march from Holland to the Rhine . 134

Bernadotte in Hanover — His request to Elector —
Elector's indecision — Bernadotte 's difficulties
near Frankfort . . . . 135

Reaches Wiirtzberg — Napoleon's dissatisfaction at
Strassburg (25th September) — Duroc's move-

TABLE OF CONTENTS xxiii

PAGE

ments — Diplomatic difficulties — His letter of

8th September 1805 is of special interest 136

Is received by Napoleon, iyth September — Com-
ment on Napoleon's anger . . . 137

His decision in letter to Bernadotte . . 137-138

Comment on letters to above, to Talleyrand, Murat,

Otto ...... 138

Optimism of Napoleon .... 138-139

CHAPTER V

FROM THE RHINE TO THE DANUBE

Grand Army, geographical conditions of — March

— Weather ..... 140

Fezensac's description of short campaign . . 141-142

Comment on above .... 142

Napoleon's order of 7th October 1805 — General

Bouvier's letter of gth October . . . 143

Suchet's report of same day — Vandamme's letter —

Marmont's letter of same date . . 144

Marmont's letter of loth October to Berthier . 144-145

Napoleon's answer to complaints through Berthier —

Napoleon's " driving force " . . 145

M. Colin's comment on the situation . . 145-146

Danger of extreme privation — Davout to Berthier,

nth October — Comment on this letter . 146

Napoleon's attitude towards marauders . . 147

Comment on same ..... 147-148
First itinerary for march from Rhine to Danube
(loth September) — Arrangements for re-
quisitions and bivouacs . . . 148
Austrian advance to Ulm and Tiler — Directions to
Murat and Ney — Date of basic order of cam-
paign— Disposition of troops according to this
document at beginning of Ulm campaign . 149

xxiv TABLE OF CONTENTS

PAGE

Murat's movements— Lannes' movements— Ney's

movements .
Friction between Corps Commanders and Berthier—

Berthier's contradictory orders

Murat's letter to Berthier . . .151-152

Berthier's reply

Napoleon's letter to Murat • 152-153

Comment on this letter ... *53

Napoleon's difficulties with his Generals . . 153-154

Provision for contingency of Austrian offensive . 154

Positions of 3rd October (Grand Army) . . 154-^55

Comment on above .... i55~I56

Napoleon's letter to Soult (3rd October) . .156-157

4th October. Corps movements — Enemy's move-
ments— Murat's search for prisoners . 157
Bernadotte at Ansbach — Comment on above in-
cident ..... I58
French spies — Reports of 4th October . . 159
Napoleon's orders to Murat — Napoleon's orders to

Bourcier . . . . .160

Napoleon's covering letter with above orders . 160-161

Napoleon prepares to cross Danube — Napoleon's

orders to Soult . . . .161

Napoleon's orders to Davout — Murat's Cavalry

Screen ..... 162

Morning of 7th October .... 162-163

CHAPTER VI

AUSTRIAN OPERATIONS FROM THE PASSAGE OF THE
DANUBE TO THE BATTLE OF ELCHINGEN

Austrian movements from 3rd October — Mack's

plans after reports of spies . . . 164

Mack's new order of battle , . , 164-165

TABLE OF CONTENTS xxv

PAGE

Comment on above — Vandamme (on 6th October)
and Liechtenstein Hussars at Harburg — Bridge
demolished over Danube by battalion of Col-
loredo ...... 165

Collision with Soult and Murat at above place —
Kienmayer's retreat on Aichach — Mack at
Gunzberg (yth October) — News of Donau-
worth and Ansbach . . . .166

Comment on Mack's idea of trying to rejoin Kien-

mayer . . . . . 166-167

Mack's letter to Kutusov (8th October) — Its im-
portance (comment) .... 167

Quotation from Mack's justification of his conduct . 167-172

8th October 1805. Aufenberg at Wertingen —
Orders sent to him cancelling previous instruc-
tions— Situation at Wertingen . . . 172

News of French at Pfaffenhofen — Composition of
Aufenberg's detachment to meet French force —
Defeat of detachment at Thierheim and
Frauenstetten — Aufenberg's preparations before
Gunzberg gate and Augsberg's gate at Wertin-
gen .. . 173

Arrival of French at Wertingen — Defeat of Aufen-
berg— Estimate of Austrian losses . . 174

Comment on action and losses . . . 174-175

Mack on the gth October at Gunzberg receives news
of defeat — Conflict of opinion with his coun-
sellors regarding it . . . 175

Decides to cross the Danube and threatens French

communications .... 175-176

Orders to Jellacic, to Klenau, Gottesheim and
Weraeck — French attack on d'Aspre — French
resisted in Gunzberg — Mack's command appears
from Burgau . . . . .176

French capture the bridge at Gunzberg — Austrian

XXVI

TABLE OF CONTENTS

losses, gth October 1805— Archduke Ferdinand's
proposed retreat— Mack's decision to enter Ulm
—Seizure of bridge at Elchingen by the French
Extract from Mack's justification .
Night of the loth October. Austrians retire to Ulm
Comment on situation and " Diary of an Austrian
Staff Officer" on spirit of Austrian Army-
Redistribution of regiments by Mack — Comment
on this procedure

Reasons for Mack's action— Letter of Austrian Em-
peror to Archduke Ferdinand . .180
Differences between Archduke and Mack— Con-
versation between Mack and F. M. Giulay . 181
Archduke's acknowledgment of Emperor's letter —
Mack's account of night of loth October —
Comment .... 182

nth October. Mack submits draft of his proposed

organisation to Archduke — Terms of draft . 183

Comment — Disposition of Austrians on morning of
nth October — Engagement at Haslach — Com-
ment ...... 184

Important capture of Ney's orders by Austrians . 185

Mack's account in " Justification " of failure to

profit by information gained . . . 185-186

Comment ...... 186

Further extract from " Justification," I2th October 187-188
Extract from Mack's " Justification " . . 188-190

Effect of Werneck's refusal to march on his troops —

He marches on I3th October . . . 190

Disposition of Austrian forces . . . 190-191

Readj ustment of " order of battle ". . . 191

State of roads between Ulm and Elchingen . . 191-192

Affairs of French outposts at Elchingen — Werneck's
position — Mack in Ulm — Reports of French
advance ..... 192.

TABLE OF CONTENTS xxvii

PAGE

Mack is mystified — News of i^th October regarding
England and France — Mack's deduction from
report ...... 193

Mack's general order to troops at Ulm . . 194

Mack's mistake ..... 194-195

Comment — i4th October. Austrians on night of

I3th-i4th October . . . .195

•French repair blunders of staff and arrive at Ried-
heim — Leipheim — Ney at Elchingen — Dis-
positions of Riesch, when line of Danube fell . 196
French take Austrians in flank — Austrian losses . 197
Positions of Riesch — Schwartzenberg — Werneck —

Jellacic .... ;. . 197-198

CHAPTER VII

FRENCH MOVEMENTS FROM THE 6TH OCTOBER TO
THE BATTLE OF ELCHINGEN

7th October. Disposition of Soult — Murat —
Vandamme — Affair of bridge at Donauworth —
Affair of bridge at Rain — Arrival of Emperor at
Donauworth . . . . .199

Ney ordered against Ulm — Disposition of French on
night of 7th October — Vandamme — Legrand —
St Hilaire — Suchet — Imperial Guard — V. Corps
— Bourcier — Baraguey - D'Hilliers — Davout —
Marmont — Bernadotte — Available information
regarding Austrians .... 200

Napoleon's need of information . . . 200-201

Napoleon dictates letter to Ney, 7th-8th October . 201-202
Napoleon's personal letter to Ney — Orders to 2nd,

3rd, 4th and 5th Corps . . . 202

Comment ...... 202-203

xxviii TABLE OF CONTENTS

PAGE

Failure of French troops to reach assigned destina-
tions—Bivouacs of French Corps on night of 8th
October .... 2°4

Murat's and Lannes's combat at Wertingen . 204-205

Summary of day's marching and position of Corps —
Baron Thiebault on execution of orders in
Grand Army .... 2O5

Baron Thiebault's account of contradictory orders

to St Hilaire ... • 205-208

Napoleon's letter to St Hilaire . . 206

9th October ..... 208-209

Emperor Napoleon's misconception of Mack's move-
ments— His orders to Corps — Soult, Davout,
Larmes — Marmont — Bernadotte — Ney -
Berthier's letter of 8th-gth October to Ney . 209

Ney's opinion of situation ; orders to his command —

Berthier's second letter to Ney (9th October) . 210

Ney's engagement at Giinzberg — His news regarding
Ulm — Ney's report hi consequence of news —
Napoleon and Berthier refuse to credit informa-
tion regarding Ulm . . . . 211

Napoleon's caution to Murat . . . 211-212

Orders to Lannes and Soult — Positions of Soult
— Davout — Marmont — Bernadotte. loth
October. Napoleon on gth-ioth October —
His opinion of general situation — His decision
to divide the Grand Army . . . 212

His own movements — Orders to Murat — Instruc-
tions for Ney's operations against Ulm — Ber-
thier's draft of same . . . .213

Comment (Grouping of French Army) — Comment

(Cavalry screen) . . . .214

First idea of " fixed point " — Gazan's Division on

nth October — nth October . . . 215

Ney's orders on evening of i ith ; Letter to Dupont 215-216

TABLE OF CONTENTS xxix

PAGE

Ney's further orders to Dupont — Corps orders (Bara-

guey-D'Hilliers) . . . .216

Staff Officers' instructions, and ride to Stotzingen . 217

Comment ...... 217-218

Dupont, execution of orders — Dupont, number of his

force — Dupont engages Austrians at Haslach . 218

Result of Prince Ferdinand's obstructiveness — 6th

Corps at Haslach — Comment . . . 219

Napoleon and Ney's reports, loth-nth October —

Berthier to Lannes (Napoleon's dictation) . 220

Napoleon to Murat ..... 220-221

Movements of Lannes and Murat — Napoleon's hesita-
tion with regard to Ulm — Dispositions of Mar-
mont, etc., round Augsberg . . . 221

Bernadotte's destination .... 221-222

Soult's report from Landsberg — Bernadotte's report
from Munich — Napoleon's order to Davout —
Napoleon's order to Cuirassier Division. i2th
October. Murat and Ney at Giinzberg — Delay
of their orders to Dupont . . . 222

Panic among Dupont's men ; retreat . . 222-223

Orders follow Dupont to Brenz — Murat's movements
on line of Iller — Austrian Army on I3th
October — Napoleon's counter-instructions . 223

Napoleon's letter to Murat . . . 223-224

Dictates to Berthier letter to Davout — Austrian
numerical force — Comment — Remnants of
Napoleon's false hypothesis . . . 224

Berthier to Bernadotte .... 224-225

Last traces of Napoleon's indecision — Instructions

to Murat to repair bridges practically useless . 225

Berthier to Bernadotte on Napoleon's plans and

orders ...... 225-227

1 3th October. Marshal Lannes' important letter to

Murat — The Emperor's false conception . 227-228

xxx TABLE OF CONTENTS

PAGE

Murat's mistaken comment on Lannes' dispatch . 228-229
Napoleon at Giinzberg— Position of Ney— Loison—

Malher— Dupont . 229

Napoleon's orders to Lannes • 229-230

Napoleon's orders to Marmont— News of Dupont on
the Brenz— News of 6th Corps— Napoleon's anger
with Ney— Napoleon's orders to Ney for I4th
October — Dupont's report . 230

Positions of troops on night of I3th-i4th October.
i4th October. Napoleon's orders for I4th
October— Berthier to Ney— Dupont's move-
ments on 1 4th October . 231
Ney's movements on I4th October . . 231-232
A typical French Revolutionary attack . 232
Loison's Division .... 233

CHAPTER VIII

FROM THE BATTLE OF ELCHINGEN TO THE CAPITULA-
TION OF ULM

French account of operations, i4th October . 234

Archduke Ferdinand's attempt to evacuate Ulm . 234-235
Mack's refusal to follow the Archduke — Archduke's

retreat from Ulm .... 235

Position of Werneck .... 235-236

Numbers of his troops — Werneck reaches Neren-

stetten . . . . .236

Werneck's further movements — Order from Mack to

Werneck — Order from Archduke to Werneck . 237

Second order from Archduke to Werneck — State of

Austrian troops . . . . 238

TABLE OF CONTENTS xxxi

PAGE

Surrender of Werneck — Archduke Ferdinand at
Oettingen — Archduke Ferdinand's letter to
Austrian Emperor .... 239

Movements of the French Army (i4th October) . 239-240
I5th October. Napoleon's dispositions, I4th-i5th

October ..... 240

Attack of Suchet's Division on Michelsberg and Geis-
berg — Dupont's movements ; attacks Austrians
at Herbrechtingen — Is attacked in flank . 241

Bivouacs of French troops, I5th-i6th October . 241-242

1 6th October. Napoleon's anxiety on night of I5th-

i6th October ..... 242

Orders General Morton to Dupont — Calls up Murat
for verbal instructions — Orders to Divisions
Rivaud-Dumonceau — Spirit of French troops —
Mack after Archduke's desertion . . 243

Mack's courage — Number of troops at his disposal . 243-244
Refuses to surrender Ulm — Mack's Proclamation at

Ulm — Comment on same, and on Ulm . . 244

Comment on general situation . . . 245

Mack's recalcitrant Staff ; their insubordinate letter 245-246
Liechtenstein sent to negotiate with Ney . . 246

Emperor's reply to Liechtenstein . . . 246-247

Emperor's final ultimatum — Skirmishing at Ulm —
" Parlementaire " — Napoleon invites Liechten-
stein to negotiate .... 247
French accounts of interview — Terms of surrender

of Ulm . . . . .248

Mack's delay of eight days on conditions — Confusion
after French take Stuttgart gate of Ulm — Final
surrender of Ulm .... 249

Details of prisoners taken at Ulm — Wertingen —
Memmingen — Giinzberg — Elchingen — Haslach
— Comment on armistice and surrender . 250

Napoleon's movements after surrender of Ulm . 250-251

xxxii TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER IX

CONCLUSION

PAGE

Doctrine of re-entrant and salient frontiers —

Napoleon's value of same . . . 252

Mack's views — Napoleon's enforced sweeping

movements ..... 253

Napoleon's ignorance of Mack's work of reorganisa-
tion— Mack's conduct after reconnaissance at
Wertingen . . . . .254

His views in letter to Austrian Emperor . . 254-255

Obstacles of ground — Archduke's misconduct . 255

Difficulties of bad weather .... 256-257

Marching of Austrians . . . . 257

Reference to Geological Chart . . . 257-259

Strategy ...... 259-262

Strategy — Value of 5th element . . . 262-263

Strategy — First condition of victory . . 264

M. E. M.

THE ULM CAMPAIGN

CHAPTER I

THE AUSTRIAN ARMY

THE evolution of the Austrian Army deserves far
closer attention than it has hitherto received in
this country, because in no other one belonging
to the Western nations can the process of growth
under uniform conditions be more thoroughly
studied. The British Army has rarely fought
twice within the same theatre of war during a
generation of a soldier's life — say twenty-five
years ; the French fighting organisation has twice
been rent from end to end and reconstructed —
once in the absolute presence of overwhelming
enemies — and once at least the Prussians have
had to undergo the same experience. But in
Austria, even after the misfortunes of 1805
and 1809, no -violent break with the past ever
took place, until after Sadowa. Even then,
though the methods of filling the ranks and the
term of service within them were profoundly
modified, the regiments essentially remained, and

A I

2 THE AUSTRIAN ARMY

one can trace their gradual evolution by suc-
cessive small adaptations to the changes in their
environment, from the days of Wallenstein and
Tilly, and even earlier amongst the freebooters
and condottieri of Sir John Hawkwood's time.

Essentially the defence of her frontiers rested,
as in all feudal countries, upon the duty of every
able-bodied man to serve, under his immediate
overlord, in emergencies. But in the days when
War was a chronic condition of existence, and the
trade of handling weapons one which required
almost a lifetime to master, the system, except on
the frontiers adjacent to her less civilised neigh-
bour, had fallen, as in other countries, almost
completely into abeyance, and the levies it pro-
vided had been replaced by a professional force
of regulars, which, having begun by being purely
" mercenary," as the skilled labour employed by
contractors to-day is also mercenary, had gradu-
ally, as the tradition of the regiments evolved
itself, grown into a voluntary Army,1 much as
our own Army still remains in spite of our
shorter service.

1 On the close of the Seven Years' War much attention was
devoted to improving the system of keeping up the numerical
strength of the Army. By an order dated gth May 1763, conscrip-
tion with substitutes was introduced, the term of service being
indefinite, practically for life. This proved unsatisfactory, and in
1770 the Prussian "Canton" system was introduced. In this the
country was divided into regimental districts or "cantons," each

THE AUSTRIAN ARMY 3

Originally the several commands had been
raised by the " contract " system. The Monarch
applied to some well-known soldier of fortune to
raise a certain number of men, and to command
them in the field for a specified purpose and rate
of remuneration ; then by a process of survival
certain leaders and their followers acquired an
established reputation. The chiefs were rewarded
by grants of land, then settling the pick of their
men around them, the commands gradually
struck root into the country and became identified
with specific territorial districts. The sons of
these men grew up in the traditions of the regi-
ments and in due time came forward as willing
recruits, whilst there was always a fairly constant
interchange between the men on the frontiers,
who hankered after the regular service, and the
bolder spirits of the plains who longed to get
out into the world. The frontiersmen of Austria
were, in fact, to the Austrian Army, very much

bound to find a given number of troops with recourse to the ballot
if necessary, and each district kept a reserve of 640 men on in-
definite furlough at call. The Cavalry appear to have relied on
voluntary enlistment. In 1792 Mack spoke of the Austrian system
in the following terms : "No recruit is taken whose service is
wanted for productive labours j on the other hand, no able-bodied
man escapes who can be spared from them," an ideal perhaps
rarely attained. Max Jahns states " the annual wastage was small,
only 20 per cent." According to this the death-rate must have
been about three times as high as in the pre- Mutiny days in India,
when it stood at 6 per cent. See "Geschichte der Kriegswissen-
schaften," vol. iii. p. 2295.

4 THE AUSTRIAN ARMY

what the Pathans and Afridis are to the Indian
Army at the present day. The presence of these
wilder spirits necessitated a stern discipline.
This welded the units into admirable machines for
the old linear form of fighting, but it destroyed
the individuality of the men.

Continuity of tradition, the semi-feudal type of
command, and territorial connection, all these
tended to make the Army exceedingly conserva-
tive and susceptible of restraint ; but it was
precisely this docility which handicapped it most
when it came into collision with the new methods
of the French Revolution.

It is necessary here to go back a long way to
establish what the old methods of Continental
armies really were, and how they had arisen, for
the British Army — by whose traditions English
writers are naturally disposed to judge all military
events — from the nature of its service, never
fought long enough in any one district to become
thoroughly saturated with its local conditions.
India and America were always there to correct
any wide departure from the primitive principles
vpf War, and our failure to realise Continental
standpoints has sterilised nine-tenths of the
efforts of our critics and historians, more particu-
larly as regards the period now before us. Now
without this basis of knowledge it is quite impos-

THE AUSTRIAN ARMY 5

sible to estimate fairly the difficulties with which
all ranks of the Austrian Army had to contend,
and the very real skill which some of their leaders
showed in their endeavours to master them.

The keynote of the whole situation lay in
the hold which the so-called " Laws of
Warfare " had obtained over the minds of all
classes during the eighteenth century, and these
laws originated in the following manner.
Before the horrors of the Thirty Years' War
had reached their culminating point, a strong
reaction against pushing the principles of War to
their utmost logical conclusion had already set in
amongst all the higher intellects of Europe, and
many protests had been published. The chief
of these sprang from the pen of Grotius, a learned
Dutch jurist, and was entitled " De Bello ac
Pace." Its object was to mitigate the suffering of
War, both for combatants and non-combatants, by
mutual agreement between belligerents, and ever
since then it has formed the foundation of exist-
ing codes of International Law. It met with con-
siderable support, but the devils of cruelty and
rapacity in the combatants had been thoroughly
roused, and being now no longer restrained by the
old custom of holding prisoners to ransom, it
needed the accumulation of suffering which the
next fifteen years so abundantly provided before

6 THE AUSTRIAN ARMY

"expediency," not "humanity," stepped in and
compelled moderation.

By this time the whole of Central Europe had
become such a desert that normal operations of
War were practically impossible. Only fast-
moving bodies could find subsistence along their
lines of march, while the need of rapid mobility
practically compelled the abandonment of the
heavy artillery and siege material which alone
could ensure the reduction of fortresses. Hence
every hamlet and chateau developed walls and
ramparts, and at the first sign of an approaching
command the peasants — everywhere against the
combatants — drove off what cattle they had
to the forests, and for themselves took refuge
within the walled towns which soon grew up
under the shelter of the older castles.

Organised operations thus became an im-
possibility, and the War died of sheer inanition.
Then began the process of reconstruction, and the
first thing needed was the erection of an armed
police, capable of dealing with the hordes of
deserters and disbanded marauders who preyed
on everyone alike. This police force was con-
stituted from the most loyal and disciplined men
of the old armies, and as long as the necessity of
their services was felt the civil population not only
co-operated with them gratefully, but were even

THE AUSTRIAN ARMY 7

thankful for the protection which they afforded.
But peace settled down again, and as usual —

" God was neglected and the soldier slighted."

The people kicked against the cost of their pro-
tectors, and their rulers were hard put to it to
scrape up the revenue needed for their mainten-
ance. For the time being, civil law was in
abeyance, and there ensued a struggle for survival
amongst the independent princes and knights.
Each strove to rectify his frontier at the expense
of his neighbour, and the simplest expedient was
found to be the occupation of a rival's territory
with armed troops, in an entirely peaceable
manner, for there was literally no possibility on
either side of proceeding to the extremes of active
hostilities. There was not sufficient vitality
remaining to appeal to the final arbitrament of
battle, for, on the first hint of such intention,
the cattle would have disappeared again in the
forests and the people have taken cover within
their walled towns to make common cause against
both forces.

A prince's revenue in those days depended
principally upon the numbers of his people.
The addition of a million souls practically meant
so much more to his rent-roll, and, the cost of an
Army remaining relatively a fixed quantity, an
augmentation of territory rendered it possible

8 THE AUSTRIAN ARMY

either to lighten the taxation of his original
subjects or to save up more money to pay for
additional troops.

The latter course was that most usually
favoured, because — there being no field for the
profitable investment of capital in banks, or
industries, etc. — the best-paying investments were
trained and armed men who could be employed in
settling disputes about land with one's neighbour.

But this employment of troops needed
enormous tact in its application, for it was not
only necessary, as pointed out above, to prevent
the civil population turning against both sides,
but it was also most desirable to make it apparent
to the inhabitants of the occupied territory, that
life under the protection of King Log was prefer-
able to their previous existence under King Stork.
Hence arose, not only the need for rigid discipline
within the armies themselves, but for the most
extreme consideration for the rights and property
of individuals; because, if actual war resulted,
supplies would immediately disappear unless the
conduct of the troops beforehand had been so
excellent that the country people continued
willing to bring their cattle and food to the market-
places. It was also found that everywhere ready-
money payments proved the best commissariat
officers.

THE AUSTRIAN ARMY 9

It is necessary to insist on this point because,
without a tolerably complete knowledge of all
that it entails, it is impossible to understand the
conditions which hampered all regular forces
during the latter years of the eighteenth century,
and alone rendered the strategy of the French
Revolutionary forces practicable.

A few illustrations may serve to drive the lesson
home. In 1785 the Austrian troops, being on the
march against the Turks, the ferrymen on the
Save struck for higher pay and the unfortunate
commander had to write to Vienna for authority
and the money to comply with their requirements.

During the Austrian occupation of the Nether-
lands, and whilst hostilities were actually raging
with the French, the Austrian commanders were
compelled not only to pay ready money for all
supplies but to pay rent for their camping grounds
and soldiers' quarters, and when this rent was not
forthcoming, for some sick and wounded left
behind on the line of march, the miserable men
were thrown out into the streets, and would have
perished but for the humanity of the Catholic
priests and their institutions. Finally, in 1793,
during the siege of Mayence, when the French
were actually entering the city, a battalion
of Austrian infantry could find no boatmen to
take them across the river to Kastel, because the

io THE AUSTRIAN ARMY

officer commanding had unfortunately no money
in his pocket for their fares, and the boatmen
insisted on payment in advance. The battalion
accordingly laid down its arms ! l

Practically, therefore, an Austrian, or indeed
any, commander's hands, other than those in the
French Army, were as much tied by custom and
tradition as were our own during manoeuvres in
England twenty years ago. The troops might be
— indeed as units they were — admirable in smart-
ness, drill and efficiency, but if the provision
waggons did not arrive in time the men went
supperless to sleep in the open. This was a con-
dition of things for which the regular soldier of
those days had not bargained, and if repeated too
often he was apt to hold that it relieved him of
his oath of allegiance, consequently he took the
first opportunity of deserting.

So thoroughly indeed had the troops assimi-
lated this teaching that the civil population in
Central Europe had become almost indifferent to
their presence. Trade went on in the same way
whether their country was at peace or at war,
and as long as this happened to be the case they
cared little what colour of coat the soldiers about

1 For these and many similar instances see " Geist und
Stoff," by C. von B-K ; and the " Mitheilungen aus-dem
K, K. Archive," Vols. IV. and V',

THE AUSTRIAN ARMY 11

them might wear. Either fighting man was
equally good for trade purposes, and would have
been welcomed everywhere, but for the fatal
havoc their uniforms and good temper wrought
amongst the womenfolk. This the civilian never
has been able to condone in any age, and it still
forms the root evil from which Continental social-
ism has sprung in almost every instance. Again
this particular condition of affairs must be seri-
ously grasped, as otherwise it is impossible to
account for the general apathy with which the
French invasion of southern Germany was so
long regarded, and for the failure of the inhabi-
tants to assist, even by information, the Austrians
who in 1805 at least might reasonably have been
accepted not only as compatriots but as
deliverers.

It is difficult for us in these days of intensified
nationalism to assign their full value to these
many hindrances to an active strategy, and the
sneer at a commander's lethargy is apt to spring
too readily to our lips. But, in fairness to the
generals who bore the brunt and burden of those
anxious days, the attempt to understand these
difficulties should be made before we venture to
criticise them, and I would most earnestly impress
upon everyone who wishes to deduce useful lessons
for his own guidance from the study of the French

12 THE AUSTRIAN ARMY

— and in particular the Napoleonic — campaigns,
to saturate his mind thoroughly with the civil
history of the period first of all. Then he will
be able to picture the difficulties with which
Napoleon's opponents were compelled to grapple.
We did not appreciate the criticisms so freely
lavished on us for our slowness and apparent in-
capacity during the Boer War. Let us at least
not fall into the same error of judgment when
trying to understand the evolution of other
armies.

To resume, all these factors acted and reacted
on one another to cause difficulties in supply,
which in turn developed slowness in the execution
of strategical designs, which again of necessity
developed a predilection on the part of the higher
commands for the tactical defensive, and unfortun-
ately the whole evolution of the fighting spirit of
the Army had tended in the same direction.
Generally the defensive had been forced upon
them by their long struggle against the aggres-
sion of the Turks, but more particularly by the
closing years of the Seven Years' War, in which,
time and again, as at Hochkirch, Torgau, and
many lesser encounters, the older officers, and even
many of the men still serving at the outbreak of
the Revolutionary wars, had seen the Prussian in-
fantry hurl themselves recklessly upon their abattis

THE AUSTRIAN ARMY 13

and field entrenchments only to be beaten back with
most crushing punishment. With these concrete
lessons before their eyes the younger generation
lost sight altogether of the deeper conditions which
alone had enabled them to find time for this
preparation of their positions.

As long as Frederick the Great had only the
Austrians to deal with, his rapid manoeuvres
never gave them time for serious entrenchment,
but when Russia joined the Austrians and each
maintained an Army numerically equivalent to
the Prussian, the time the latter spent in march-
ing from enemy to enemy, could be utilised by
the one not immediately under fire to dig itself
in to the eyes behind earthworks and obstacles
which the shell power of those days was quite
inadequate to cope with. The results of the
desperate assaults delivered by the Prussians re-
mained burnt in upon the brains of the Allies
whilst the deeper causes, which alone had
rendered their positions impregnable, never ap-
pealed to their imaginations at all. The older
men, who did in fact know the cause and sequence
of events, had died out long before the French
wars began, and the younger ones, those who had
been subalterns during the great campaigns, now
took the field thoroughly saturated with the
fundamental theory of the defensive.

I4 THE AUSTRIAN ARMY

It is difficult to make clear in a few words the
terrible consequences that ensue when once this
idea becomes dominant in a mass of men. When
ordered to attack, instead of feeling within them-
selves the sense of the irresistible fury of their
onslaught, each sees in imagination his opposite
number on the enemy's side comfortably behind
his parapet, and thinks how easily he himself, if
the situation were reversed, could shoot the other
down. He cannot visualise the actual reality
opposed to him — viz. the bullet-swept trench,
choked with dead and wounded, the consequence
of some unseen enfilading fire skilfully contrived
by his own commander, and from which the sur-
vivors are furtively slipping under cover of the
smoke and dust — while the commander himself
has no time to send down short tactical essays on
the situation, to be read at the head of each com-
pany before it advances. The whole line hesitates,
moves forward a few paces, then the thought-
wave of the crowd overpowers the resolution of
the individual, and the whole crowd halts, blazes
aimlessly away towards their enemy, and no power
on earth except fresh reinforcements will suffice to
drive it forward again. Meanwhile the enemy in
turn brings up his reinforcements and, if at last a
forward impulse is secured, the opportunity has
passed, and the denser line meets with double and

THE AUSTRIAN ARMY 15

treble the punishment it would have encountered
had it obeyed more promptly. " The longer you
are out in the rain, the wetter you get."

So it is now, and so it was then — for death is
the ultimate factor, and the distance at which it
meets a man matters nothing.

Success in the attack rests on a mutual contract
between the men and their leader in which in
effect the latter says : " Obey my orders im-
plicitly and I will place you in such a position
relatively to your enemy that you cannot fail to
beat him," and if he is a man of experience, and
has again and again led them to victory — never
giving them a task beyond their power to perform
—the men give him their obedience readily, and
will spring forward with alacrity to seize the
opportunity they know that his skill and judg-
ment have already secured for them. Under such
a leader an Army soon becomes irresistible. But
in an Army which has never experienced the joy
of victory, with its logical corollary of pursuit,
but only the tempered satisfaction of having
escaped annihilation, things go from bad to worse.
This is particularly the case with troops in
which the esprit de corps is concentrated in the
regimental unit. The defence fails generally
only at a single point, and through this gap the
enemy pour in, outflanking in succession all the

16 THE AUSTRIAN ARMY

remaining elements of the line, most of whom,
having ample warning, get away in good order —
colours flying and ranks well closed. When later,
round the camp fires, praise and blame are duly
apportioned everyone agrees that but for the

disgraceful conduct of the regiment such

misfortune would ^never have arisen, but that the
disgrace is amply made up for by the admirable
courage with which the remainder made good
their retreat ; and since there are usually but

few survivors of the th left to contest

this verdict it passes into tradition, and no one
looks further for a deeper cause of the debacle.
But in an Army with many regiments it takes
time to ring all the changes and give to each its
turn, hence if now and again victory shines
locally on a regiment here and there, years may
elapse before the inherent weakness of the whole
organisation is exposed. This, in fact, is what
actually happened to the Austrian regiments in the
years from 1793 to 1805. Though generally un-
successful in the greater battles, they were as
constantly successful in " not getting beaten "
in small commands ; and even after Marengo
the confidence of the regimental leaders in their
methods and their men was very far from being
thoroughly shaken.

Not that there were wanting, as in every Army,

THE AUSTRIAN ARMY 17

hundreds of would-be reformers ready to reform
everything from the standpoint of the individual
soldier and the advantages of an intact skin.
But these destructionists, though sufficiently
numerous to cause an ill-defined feeling of in-
feriority to the French throughout the Austrian
mass, were still powerless to induce the responsible
commanders to introduce a root-and-branch recon-
struction such as that which the Prussian Army
underwent after 1806, and those responsible were
right to hold their hands, for the passions of the
people were as yet not nearly sufficiently aroused
to supply the driving force which the French
methods required.1

We must therefore picture the Austrian Army
as a number of units, faultlessly turned out, slow,
precise and methodic — perfect to take advantage
of a tactical situation that gave them suitable
targets against which to develop their fire power,
but so hampered by conditions beyond the direct
control of their leaders that, in practice, the latter
were never able to contrive the strategic situations
which would have justified the traditional tactical
methods.

Since then this has been precisely paralleled in
South Africa. The British regular troops were

1 Yorck's Landwehr at Wartenburg and at Mockern (1813).
See Campaign, " Leipzig " (by the Author).

1 8 THE AUSTRIAN ARMY

at least as superior to the Boer commandos, as
fighting units, as were the Austrians to the first
French levies — and with equal mobility our men
would have swept their opponents off the field,
as both Austrians, Prussians and British had
exterminated the French when they were fortunate
enough to catch them in positions which gave
the advantage to the inherent power of coherent
action, which is the birthright of regular troops ;
but as in 1793 so in South Africa, the absence of
mobility, due to causes far beyond the control of
our executive commanders, never allowed us the
chance of demonstrating once for all the funda-
mental difference between an army and a rabble,
however brave and skilful the individuals com-
posing the latter might happen to be.

But the Austrian commanders laboured under
yet another disadvantage from which, in 1899,
we were at least free. Not only were they
fighting some 800 miles away from their original
base (and 800 miles of land transport over the
roads then existing was a more serious hindrance
than 10,000 miles of rail and sea), but they were
immeasurably more at the mercy of fraudulent
contractors than we perhaps have ever been,
and from the nature of their organisation they
were less able to protect themselves from this
most pernicious scourge than were other Western

THE AUSTRIAN ARMY 19

armies. Their Army being officered exclusively
from the Austrian aristocracy and the rank and file
drawn from the country, there was no middle class
of men available to officer the Train and Supply
Service generally and thus to stand between the
men and the contractor. This is always and
everywhere a problem most difficult of solution,
for the men of birth naturally strive to get for-
ward into the fighting line — and men promoted for
Train service from the ranks of an Army recruited
almost exclusively from the peasantry, have
neither education nor imagination enough to cope
with the wiles of the contractor.

The cause of the corruption which hitherto has
always prevailed in the rear of the fighting line is
not, as is usually assumed, the innate wickedness
of individuals who care nothing for the lives of
their comrades at the front if only their own
pockets are sufficiently well lined (though a few
such men no doubt are always to be found), it is
far rather due to the sum of infinitesimal lapses
from the letter of the law, brought about by that
form of careless and stupid good-nature, that fails
to trace the connection between cause and effect.
The individual sees no harm in accepting a drink
for overlooking some minor irregularity seemingly
unimportant in itself, but when millions of such
irregularities are allowed to pass unnoticed the

20 THE AUSTRIAN ARMY

cumulative effect at the front becomes dis-
astrous.

In this respect the Austrians were in worse case
than either the French or Prussian armies. The
former, having little, if any, organised Supply
Service, dealt with the peasant direct, through the
medium of the stick ; and in the latter the spirit
of duty, the outcome of the Thirty Years' War,
had taken far firmer root than amongst the more
genial and care-free inhabitants of the south, the
bulk of whom had in fact escaped the ravages of
that most calamitous struggle. Hence it followed
that everywhere — beyond the immediate ken of
the combatant Austrian officers at the front —
hospitals and sick wards were crowded with
uncared-for cripples and invalids. Moreover,
diseases due to insanitary conditions were chronic,
and reinforcements, half starved already by
neglect of the commissariat, fell victims by
thousands on their way to the front, whilst the
survivors often required weeks of nursing before
they were really fit for the ranks.

Under these conditions and limitations the
Austrian strategical methods slowly developed
themselves. Being strictly tied to their heavy
supply columns they could only march by good
roads, and such roads being few in number it
followed that they advanced on a broad front,

THE AUSTRIAN ARMY 21

needing many hours to close in to a line of battle.
Between the gaps which thus arose, the lightly
equipped independent French levies poured in,
attacking individual columns like hornets, and
thus breaking down all the elaborate time calcula-
tions of the Austrian Staff, which were as ingenious
in design as were our own recent efforts to entrap
de Wet and his comrades in South Africa.

As the disciplined Austrian soldiery simply
despised the sans-culotte rabble, and when on the
defensive felt themselves a match for any odds,
the columns on the roads diminished in strength,
and the men thus made available were sent out
to guard the flanks, till, when a general action
did at last ensue, the proportion of muskets
available per yard of front sank almost as low as
in some of our own engagements in recent years.
Thus at Stokach in 1800 the Austrians with some
25,000 combatants held a line at least thirty miles
long, and this is typical of many similar engage-
ments. Indeed, until Napoleon appeared on the
scene, local conditions compelled the French to
adhere to a similar rule of dispersion. It was in
planning these simultaneous deployments of many
small columns over a very long front that Mack
and Weyreuther, together with many more
fortunate Staff companions, attained the heights
of virtuosity, and this brings us to the evolution

22 THE AUSTRIAN ARMY

of the man whose reputation has so long suffered

in the shadow of misfortune.

Few characters could be more difficult to
portray, and it will be best to let the facts speak
for themselves before attempting to appraise him.

Karl Mack was born on the 25th August 1752 at
Neunslingen, in Bavaria. His father was a minor
official and a Protestant, consequently he was as
devoid of powerful protection as a man could
well be. An uncle on his mother's side, Ritt-
meister Leiberich of the 2nd Carabiniers, took
Karl back with him to his regiment, and in that he
enlisted on the i6th January 1770, at the age of
eighteen. His rise was by no means rapid ; he
got his first stripe on ist May 1771, and on the
ist July 1773 became regimental adjutant — a
rank for which we have no exact equivalent—
but of far less importance than our modern
sergeant-major — chief orderly-room clerk would
be nearer the mark. Not till ist April 1777 did
he obtain his first commission, but then his pro-
gress became more rapid, for in February 1778
Field-Marshal Graf Lacy, Honorary Colonel of
the 2nd Carabiniers, sent to the regiment for a
smart young officer, a good writer and draughts-
man,to accompany him and the Emperor Joseph in
an inspection of the Bohemian frontiers which they
were undertaking in view of strained relations with

THE AUSTRIAN ARMY 23

Prussia. Mack was selected and had to note down
all the remarks made by the Emperor during the
day's march, and read them out in the evening, add-
ing the Field-Marshal's comments, and then enter
them up in a special journal. On the outbreak
of hostilities later in the year, Lacy retained Mack
as secretary, and on the 8th July 1778 he was
promoted First Lieutenant, and returned to his
regiment, whence he was transferred to the
Q.M.G.'s department as Captain on the 3rd
November 1783.

He was now employed in the Emperor's military
cabinet, accompanying him in his annual inspec-
tion, winning Lacy's esteem and praise for his
ceaseless energy and devotion to duty. In 1786,
in view of the war then pending with the Turks,
he was transferred to the Hungarian command,
and served with headquarters throughout the
following campaign. Most of the mobilisation
work was done by him, and he was warmly
praised by the Emperor, Lacy, Hadik and
Kin sky, receiving as his reward promotion to
Major, 24th May 1788, and the appointment of
A.D.C. to the Emperor.

On the 25th January 1789 he was made Lieu-
tenant-Colonel, and for a time his luck appeared
to change, for F.M. Loudon, who took over the
command in July 1789, received him coldly

24 THE AUSTRIAN ARMY

Mack asked to be transferred, stating that he felt
he could not do useful work unless fully trusted.
The straightforwardness of his attack, and man-
ner of making it, so pleased the Field-Marshal
that he took him into favour for the time being.
But fresh trouble arose when Mack vehemently
urged upon his Chief to attack Belgrade, and
refused to transmit London's objections to the
Kaiser. For this he was severely reprimanded.
But he soon regained his former position and
on the iQth October 1789 was made Colonel,
receiving the much-coveted Maria Theresa Order.
At the close of the year he returned with Loudon
to Vienna and was employed on the mobilisation
plans against Prussia ; but his health had suffered
so severely during the campaign that he was
compelled to resign his appointment on the
personal staff of the Emperor, and to take a pro-
longed furlough. He was quite unable to sit a
horse, or to write, except lying down. However,
he appears to have made at least a partial recovery,
for in December 1790 he was given the command
of the 3rd Chevaux Legers, but he remained
during the winter in Vienna and lectured to the
Archdukes Charles and Josef, winning the friend-
ship and esteem of the former, which he retained
for the next ten years.
In 1791 he rejoined his regiment and was with

THE AUSTRIAN ARMY 25

it when the war against the French Revolution
broke out in April 1792. The command of the
Field Army was at first given to F.M. the Duke of
Sachsen-Teschen, but he was relieved the following
year by F.M. Prince Josias of Sachsen-Coburg,
whose name is still remembered in the British
army as the General to whom the well-known
cavalry inspection march " Die Coburger " was
dedicated. The Prince begged for Mack as his
Q.M.G., and Mack went with him under protest
as he was still suffering from the illness con-
tracted in the Turkish campaign.

The immediate object of the campaign was the
relief of Maestricht. The two opposing forces
were still in winter quarters and since secrecy
was of the first importance the Prince remained
in Coblentz, sending Mack on to the front to
concert measures with Clerfayt, the temporary
commander of the Austrian forces. Clerfayt was
most averse to the idea of an immediate advance,
as he wished to wait for reinforcements, but Mack
by his energy overcame all his objections, winning
for himself thereby the unstinted praise of Graf
Tauenzien, the Prussian Military Commissioner
with the Austrian headquarters, and in due
course arrangements were made to force the
passage of the Roer, which were brilliantly carried
through on the ist March 1793.

26 THE AUSTRIAN ARMY

With reference to this operation Mack subse-
quently wrote : " The man who despises his
enemy is a fool ; the man who fears him — a
shirker. I could not see in these new republican
Frenchmen the heroes of antiquity that many
of my comrades saw. I did not believe that all
their gunners were young Jupiters, throwing
their thunderbolts with unerring aim, and I did
not compare their numbers to the sands of the
sea. Since after due reflection I concluded it
would be cowardly to fear them, I advised the
Prince — indeed I implored him — to attack, and
thus arose this ist March which surely deserves
to be numbered in the list of eventful days."

As already mentioned, the attack succeeded,
and during the next few days Maestricht was
relieved and the French driven back behind
Louvain. Writing to the Emperor, the Archduke
Charles said : " It is to Colonel Mack that we all
owe our thanks — he has distinguished himself
everywhere by his energy, ability and courage " —
testimony which he again repeated in a second
letter dated a few days later ; and two years
later, when Mack himself wrote to Coburg to
congratulate the Prince on the anniversary of
the battle — the latter replied in the following
very remarkable terms : —

" No ; the ist March is your day. It is you we

THE AUSTRIAN ARMY 27

have to thank that the line of the Roer was not
abandoned. It was thanks to you that the
decision was come to, to cross the river. You
alone drew up and carried out the admirable dis-
positions for the operation which remain a model
for all time. In fact but for you the opinion of
others, who held the enemy's position as un-
assailable, would have prevailed, and we should
have retired with nothing accomplished."
Surely higher testimony as to Mack's value at
the time could hardly be desired.

Political influences of the usual nature now
arrested the Austrian advance, and the French,
having rallied, were led back to the attack by
Dumouriez on the i8th March. There ensued
the battle of Neerwinden, a long and indecisive
struggle very characteristic of the period. The
right wing of the Austrians gained some slight
advantage, but the left, under Clerfayt, only with
difficulty held its own. In the middle >f cthf
afternoon Mack collapsed completely tfider one
of his attacks of illness and was carrie'd irit^a
neighbouring house. Here during the course of
the evening he was found by Coburg, who came
to tell him of the decision arrived at in his absence,
to retreat. This news stung Mack back into
sudden life. With all his energy he urged the
Prince to attack again immediately, and that

28 THE AUSTRIAN ARMY

night, or in the early morning, Coburg consented,
and rode off to give the orders. But Clerfayt in
particular brought forward such strong grounds
for inaction — it is always so easy to find them —
that the Prince once more hesitated and rode back
to Mack to announce his fresh intention to retreat.
Mack was now thoroughly roused. He urged the
Prince " for God's sake don't think of retreat, it
would be a disgrace," and poured forth such a
torrent of speech that the group of waverers
again hesitated, and finally, the Archduke Charles
strongly supporting Mack, it was decided to act
on the offensive at dawn. Long before the
appointed time Mack pulled himself together
and was lifted on to his horse by two orderlies and
rode out to supervise the proceedings. Reaching
the rendezvous, where the troops were already
forming up, he learnt from the returning patrols
that the enemy had already decamped.
~*C<s' m political influences intervened to prevent
everywMiate pursuit. Then followed the fatal
te^'jiations with Dumouriez, in which Mack
went far beyond his instructions, and both he
and his Commander were not only severely repri-
manded, but experienced the added misfortune of
incurring the enmity of the Minister Thugut, who
was just then beginning to make his name.
No rewards were given to the Army and,

THE AUSTRIAN ARMY 29

naturally enough under the circumstances, none
to Mack. But the Archduke Charles took up
their common cause, and in a letter to the Kaiser
pleaded for Mack with all his force. After point-
ing out the succession of advantages secured by
the discipline and endurance of the troops, he
continued, " but all this good work must be
attributed to Mack who, suffering most pitifully
from ill health, gave himself with all his remain-
ing energy to the cause, working literally day and
night. In short, the whole Army loves and
honours him and looks up to him as the originator
of all its victories."

Prince himself had recommended Mack for
cion after Neerwinden, and in a subsequent
to the Emperor he wrote : "If the services
of this officer are overlooked it will have a most
serious effect on the spirit of the Army, while he
will feel himself humiliated, and will probably
resign."

On receipt of this the Emperor accorded Mack
a money grant and promised further promotion
in due course ; but it never came and Mack, worn
out by illness, as well as deeply hurt at this
neglect, asked to be relieved of his appointment.
Coburg too was so annoyed that he also asked to
be allowed to resign, and again applied for Mack's
promotion in the name of the whole Army. A

30 THE AUSTRIAN ARMY

letter from Graf Mercy, who was attached to the
Prince in a diplomatic capacity, was also written
in support of Mack :

" I have never in my life seen Herr von Mack,
but I gathered at once on my arrival that he was
the life and soul of all the military operations ;
that he possesses the confidence of the whole
Army, and that it would be difficult to replace
him."

Whilst this correspondence was still in progress
Mack himself was wounded somewhat severely in
the battle of Famars (23rd and 24th May 1793),
the plan for which engagement he had drawn up.
Thus his return on sick leave became imperative.
The Emperor gave him the colonelcy of the
Cuirassier Regiment " Jacquemin " but still no
step in rank.

In June he was sufficiently recovered to travel,
and passing through Vienna went back to a
small property he had recently acquired near
Iglau.

It would seem that his well-known friendship
with Lacy was the underlying cause of his many
disappointments. Lacy had always been against
the War, and had never underrated the strength
of the French resistance ; but the heads of the
Army throughout all this time were purposely
kept in ignorance of the secret aims of the

THE AUSTRIAN ARMY 31

Imperial policy by Thugut, who did not want to
win the Netherlands by fighting, but wished to
make the other parties to the alliance pull the
chestnuts out of the fire for Austria's benefit ;
and of course Mack's vigorous fighting policy, in
which he was encouraged by Lacy, proved sadly
disconcerting to his designs.

Meanwhile Hohenlohe had replaced Coburg at
the front, and a series of disasters set in. On the
4th January 1794 the Archduke Charles again
wrote to the Emperor : " Since Mack has left us
all has gone wrong. ... I can tell you much
more when we meet. If only you were here and
could see for yourself. Even the Hungarian
Grenadiers say that things have gone from bad
to worse since they no longer see ' the man with
the white mantle ' riding about amongst them.
If Mack were fit to serve — and perhaps he will
be ere this reaches you — he is above all the man
for the Q.M. Generalship of this command. The
whole Army agrees in this, and longs for his
return — and it would be well to build a ' golden
bridge ' to induce him to accept the post and
come back to us."

Actually before this letter arrived, the golden
bridge had already been built, but it took some
trouble to get Mack to cross it, for he declined at
first altogether, and only consented when he

32 THE AUSTRIAN ARMY

learnt that the Emperor was going to the front
in person. Assured of this he lost no time in
returning to Vienna, which he reached on the 26th
December 1793. He at once proceeded to urge
a most vigorous forward policy on the Cabinet,
dwelling particularly on the need of retaining
Prussian support, and in all this he was fully
backed up by Lacy and the principal military
authorities. But so tortuous was the policy of
the Cabinet under Thugut that he was allowed to
leave for the front without any knowledge of the
fact that, in consequence of the partition of
Poland, the Prussian Alliance was not only already
at an end, but Prussia was actually inclining
towards an agreement with France.

In January 1794 he reached Brussels, where he
was received " as a Messiah," and at a conference
held on the 4th February, at which the Archduke
Charles, the Duke of Coburg, Duke of York, Crown
Prince of Orange, Graf Mercy and the British
Ambassador Lord Elgin, were present, the plan
of campaign for the coming year was decided
upon. Essentially it was all Mack's work, but
the details need not delay us. He urged a
vigorous offensive and demanded 340,000 men, of
whom 140,000 were to be left on the Rhine — the
remaining 200,000 were to attack the Netherlands.
But to raise this number needed the co-operation

THE AUSTRIAN ARMY 33

of all the Allies, and even now he seems to have
been unaware that Prussia had decided to with-
draw her contingent. For himself, he immediately
started for London where he was most cordially
received. The King presented him with a
jewelled sword of honour, and laden with promises
of support he returned to the Netherlands on the
igth February, and rode down his line of outposts
to Trier, where he expected to find his final instruc-
tions. These, however, had not arrived, and in
an evil moment he stepped outside his purely
military duties and undertook negotiations with
the enemy direct. This gave Thugut and his
party the handle they needed. His recall was
decided on, but while Thugut was in Vienna the
Emperor was with headquarters, and, whilst
letters were on the road, Mack had so firmlv
ingratiated himself with his Sovereign that his
position for the moment was unassailable.

The opening of the campaign, in spite of the
withdrawal of the Prussians, was all in his favour,
but again he found himself confronted with a
web of intrigue, his health once more broke down,
and utterly worn out he at length belied his whole
previous record by counselling retreat unless
another 40,000 men could be guaranteed him at
once. So great was his ascendency — though still
only Quartermaster-General — that it was felt

34 THE AUSTRIAN ARMY

necessary to secure his removal in some way, and
since Mack would not serve except under the eyes
of the Emperor, reasons had to be given which
made the return of the Monarch to the capital un-
avoidable, and unsuspiciously Mack went with him.
Thugut and his friends naturally attributed all
the misfortunes of the war to Mack, but this was
manifestly so unjust that all his soldier friends
rallied round him, and the British at the front
clamoured to have him back again. Coburg
himself begged him to return, or at least to send
him advice. But Mack for the time being was
too ill for service anywhere, and remained in
retirement until the middle of 1796.

Bonaparte's progress in Italy, however, called
him into action again, and it was proposed to send
him as Staff Officer to the Archduke Charles,
but Thugut defeated this proposition and tried to
get him to accept the command of the Portuguese
Army which had been offered him. This Mack
declined with thanks, and he was then made
Chief of the Staff to the Army of the Interior, and
in this capacity was called on for his advice on
all possible points. This brought him into
collision with the Archduke Charles and thus the
long friendship between the two was undermined.
In the summer of 1798, at the particular re-
quest of Queen Caroline of Naples, backed by the

THE AUSTRIAN ARMY 35

Emperor himself, he accepted the command of
the Neapolitan Army and joined at Caserta on
the gth October 1778. Here he was received
with open arms and seemed to have won the Army
at first sight. Even Nelson, *who at first was
inclined to think little of him, became a convert
in a few days, and cordially praised his activity
and general capacity. But Mack failed to compre-
hend the Neapolitan character ; deceived by the
smart appearance of the men on parade — they
were said to be the best turned-out troops in
Europe — he allowed himself to be goaded into a
premature advance against Championnet, and
having designed a manoeuvre in five columns
(well within the capacity of his old Netherland
veterans) he had the mortification to witness
the hopeless collapse of his Army, which turned
upon him and ultimately compelled him to seek
safety in the lines of his enemy. General
Championnet received him with all honour and
gave him a safe-conduct back to his own country,
but he was arrested by Bonaparte's order in
Bologna, and taken to Paris, whence, after many
attempts to secure an exchange, he escaped in
disguise and reached Austrian territory in safety
in April 1800. Again Thugut's animosity de-
feated its own object. Clearly Mack was not to
blame for the gross misconduct of his command,

36 THE AUSTRIAN ARMY

and when, in January 1801, Thugut's ministry
came to an end the way was open to Mack's
re-employment, but, as the sequel will show, this
soon brought him into collision with the Arch-
duke Charles for the second time. Here for the
moment we will leave him, only asking the
reader to focus his attention on the salient points
of Mack's character — his unexampled rise from
obscurity ; the singular strength of affection and
esteem he succeeded in inspiring in his command-
ing officers, all of whom were of the highest
aristocracy ; and the devotion of his troops ;
his great personal courage, and his devouring
energy and determination, which only faltered
once, under a weight of suffering both mental
and physical that would have killed a weaker
man. In his defence I shall have more to say in
the final summing-up of the campaign ; meanwhile
it will be sufficient to beg the reader to preserve
an attitude of impartial and suspended judg-
ment, until the final chapters of this most re-
markable career have been laid before him.

Taking now the three arms and their accessories
more in detail, the chief strength of the Austrian
Army lay in its Light Infantry, which in fact had
always been the model for the rest of Western
Europe. Recruited primarily amongst the
frontier races and reinforced by selected men

THE AUSTRIAN ARMY 37

from the more regular provinces, they had been
trained by generations of warfare with the Turks,
and had proved their superiority against Christian
opponents, more especially during the Seven
Years' War. In fact they may claim to have
given the original impetus to the transformation
of all infantry into individual fighters, for it was
to meet them that in 1792 the French raised their
first regular battalions of Voltigeurs, whose ex-
ample ultimately dominated the trend of French
infantry tactics, which in turn set the example
for the modern German school. The French
were, of course, helped in this process of trans-
mutation by the numbers of their soldiers who
had returned from the great struggle for dominion
in Canada and the United States, but had it not
been for the necessity forced upon them by the
Austrian light infantry the old school of the Line
tacticians would hardly have been so rapidly and
so thoroughly converted. Their regulations would
stand almost without modification even at the
present day, and they were not only letter-perfect
in their knowledge of them, but they retained the
real Light Infantry spirit, without which regula-
tions, however perfect, are of little or no avail.

The regular infantry was modelled almost
entirely on the same lines as the Prussian, but,
as already pointed out, it lacked the offensive

38 THE AUSTRIAN ARMY

spirit characteristic of the latter, and probably
for that very reason never attempted to emulate
its prototype in rapidity of fire : for defence rests
essentially on accuracy of fire, whilst the success
of an attack has always been determined by the
weight of metal thrown in a given time. It is
not so much the object of the assailant to hit his
adversary, but rather to create such conditions —
smoke, dust, bullets and so forth — as shall make it
difficult or impossible for the covered antagonist
to take adequate aim, and this holds good whatever
the nature of the weapons employed.

Its regimental Transport was also, as in Prussia,
carefully organised, and each regiment or battalion
could be readily detached for independent opera-
tions.

The Cavalry also had endeavoured to imitate
their former adversaries ; but here, too, the
"Man," on whom in the long run cavalry effi-
ciency invariably depends, had not been found
to bring home to all ranks the simple bed-rock
principles on which the success of the charge of a
cavalry mass always ultimately hinges, and to
teach them to deliver a knee-to-knee charge in
two clear and well-defined ranks ; for in 1789 we
find Mack reporting that there were few, if any,
squadrons which could gallop a couple of hundred
yards without falling into confusion, and on such

THE AUSTRIAN ARMY 39

points Mack could speak with full authority.
Actually, in spite of its immense superiority in
numbers and material over its opponents, in the
wars of the Revolution, it achieved nothing
worthy of special mention, even when large bodies
fifty squadrons and upwards were available for
employment on the field.

The Artillery, also as a consequence of the trend
of events during the latter portion of the Seven
Years' War, was relatively wanting in mobility,
and, as M. Colin and other French authorities
have shown, was handicapped by a gun, weight
for weight intrinsically inferior to that in use in
the French Army. Though the change from
battalion guns to batteries had commenced
during the Italian campaign, the spirit of the
change had not really got hold of the arm, and
the true Battery Commander had yet to be created
— precisely as was the case in England at the same
time.

The most serious delect of the whole Army,
however, lay in the want of organised units higher
than the regiment or battalion. Though in time
of war it had always been the custom, as in other
armies, to form detachments of all arms for special
purposes, the units of which they were composed
retained their organic independence, and were, so
to speak, only lent to the detachment Commander

40 THE AUSTRIAN ARMY

by Army Headquarters for temporary tactical pur-
poses, resuming their place in the Army as a whole
when this temporary connection was brought to a
close. The idea of decentralisation, in fact, had
not even begun to dawn upon the Austrian Staff,
and though bodies of troopsmight fight as brigades,
and even divisions, Field Army Headquarters still
sent out orders in detail to each unit in the
command. The evil of superfluous correspond-
ence which this involved had long been felt, but the
only idea that presented itself to the harassed de-
tachment Commanders to minimise it appears to
have been the assignment of more clerical assist-
ance to their Headquarters, not, as in France,
the elimination of the evil itself by adequate
methods of delegation of responsibility. Thus
in the Prince of Hohenzollern's diary of the
Marengo campaign, published about 1896 by
the Austrian General Staff,1 we find Generals
writing to Vienna complaining of their endless
copying tasks and petitioning for more clerks to
be sent for their assistance. Later, we shall find
Mack justifying the delay in the issue of orders
that was the primary cause of the defeat of
Elchingen on the ground that his operation

1 The book has been lost from the Library I have been
using, hence I am unable to give the exact reference. The
date, however, will be sufficient guidance,

THE AUSTRIAN ARMY 41

orders necessitated the writing of fourteen
sheets of foolscap in which " there was not one
superfluous word."

Fundamentally this was the essential cause of
all Austrian defeats during the Revolutionary
wars and indeed for long afterwards. The French
owed their successes primarily to superior mobility,
but there is no reason to suppose that the
well - drilled, long-service battalions of Austria
were actually slower marchers than their op-
ponents— indeed, the contrary would seem to
be the more reasonable supposition, and there is
some evidence to prove it. The real cause lay in
the hopeless over-centralisation of affairs in the
Field Headquarters, which rendered it impossible
to get out orders in time to meet a sudden emerg-
ency.

Such a want of system paralysed the individual
efforts of even the best Staff Officers, and judged
by contemporary standards the Austrian Staff
actually were very highly trained. On paper,
their curriculum would compare very favourably
indeed with that of our own Staff College not
twenty years ago. There is ample proof of the
zeal and industry with which they threw them-
selves into their work, and the appalling intricacy
of the detail and methods which they succeeded
in committing to memory ; but in War, time is

42 THE AUSTRIAN ARMY

always the essence of the contract, and no amount
of science can reduce the actual time limit re-
quired to copy so and so many sheets of paper
and despatch them by orderlies on dark nights
over rough and often unknown country.

A final cause of inferiority inherent in the
Austrian Army, as compared with the French,
lay in the fact that from the nature of the whole
Austrian constitution it was impossible — practic-
ally speaking — for the Sovereign to accompany
his Armies in the field, hence all questions in-
volving the policy of the State as a whole had to be
referred to the Chancellery in Vienna for decision.
Now since these were constantly arising, owing
to the multiplicity of interests, of Allies, of de-
pendencies, etc., involved in the very wide
sphere of operations, it was impossible to give the
Commanders of Armies and detachments the free
hand that is so essential for immediate decisions.
Hence the necessity of the " Hofkriegsrath " to
which we generally give the name of the " Aulic
Council." This body has earned an evil notoriety,
which, in fact, it scarcely seems to have deserved,
for having once laid down the objects for which
each Command was to work, it forbore altogether
to tie the hands of the Commander as to the
employment of the means given into his hand for
the specific purpose.

THE AUSTRIAN ARMY 43

The real fault lay in this, that owing to the
length of the lines of communication, as measured
by time and space, the relative importance of the
objects indicated had often changed altogether
before the Army had reached its destination.
Hence constant cross-references, out of which
arose the habit of postponing decisions, which
culminated in a positive disease of irresolution in
all ranks, both on the march and in actual pre-
sence of the enemy.1

To sum up the whole situation, the Austrian
Army from 1792 to 1805 was superior at every
point but one to its enemy, and proved itself to
be so when, during the Italian campaign of 1799,
this one point, this fatal vice of irresolution in its
commanders, was temporarily removed by the
extraordinary personal magnetism of Suvaroff.
But once this influence was withdrawn the fatal
habit again reasserted itself, and the conservative
spirit inherent in the bulk of the Army — its self-
respect again restored by the succession of
victories it had won under his command — asserted
itself again, and fatally hampered the efforts
towards rational reform which men like Mack,
and others, attempted to introduce.

1 Actually the worst interference with the action of com-
manders in the field is to be traced to the influence of one
man — the minister Thugut — and this particularly in the case
of Suvaroff in Italy, 1799. Vide " Geist und Stoff."

CHAPTER II

THE FRENCH ARMY

DURING the past century, practically all strategi-
cal discussion has turned on the question of
numbers — essentially numbers, whether they
were enumerated by battalions, squadrons and
batteries or merely by men only — the assumption
always being that 150,000 men would beat 100,000
under whatever conditions the two forces might
encounter one another.

It is curious to notice that in the previous
century no such significance was attached to
the question of numerical superiority at all,
efficiency of the units being assigned a far more
important place. If the skill of the leader and
the manoeuvring power of the units he com-
manded rendered it possible for him to throw his
whole force against a salient or flank of his enemy,
the question of numbers mattered very little
indeed. In fact the smaller army had the
advantage, because, its internal resistance being
less, it could manoeuvre faster and with greater
certainty. The problem the generals of the French
Revolutionary Army had to solve in face of the

44

THE FRENCH ARMY 45

enemy was to find some means by which the ad-
vantage of superior efficiency could be neutralised
and the brute force of sheer numbers be given a
fuller scope. The full solution was not arrived
at until the new Army, after many disastrous ex-
periences, had evolved a leader free from all
traditions of the past, the very personification of
the relentless spirit of the whole nation which the
French Revolution had evolved.

It was the spirit of the French nation primarily
which conditioned the whole growth and develop-
ment of Napoleon's methods, both strategical and
tactical, and without a firm grasp of this funda-
mental proposition the study of his campaigns
will always remain a barren expenditure of energy.

The steps in this evolution were threefold. In
the first place, the French nation being caught in
almost defenceless condition, its representatives
were compelled to get back to the very bed-rock
conditions of primitive warfare, and, as far as lay
in their power, to compel every man, woman and
child to contribute at least its share of uncomplain-
ing endurance to the national defence.

One may smile at the inflated bombast of the
many proclamations issued,1 but the spirit of
defence a outrance breathed in them, and they re-
flected sufficiently the great psychologic wave of

1 Of these Barere's may serve as the fullest expression, see p. 53.

46 THE FRENCH ARMY

emotion which swept over France and enabled
individuals to endure hardship and tyranny many
times worse than anything they had experienced
in the past. I have said " individuals " because it
is necessary to keep the sequence of cause and
effect clearly before one's mind. The wave of
emotion swept over fully two-thirds of the race,
and made everyone realise very fully the absolute
obligation laid upon his neighbour to die for the
State. But in the beginning it was only individuals
who responded personally to this national de-
mand, and not till the new Army had evolved its
own soul did the men in the actual fighting line
become other than volunteers.

The old Army with its traditions amalgamated
the new levies, receiving in the process a new
spirit. Subsequently, when the new Army had
acquired solidity and traditions of its own, it be-
came strong enough to assimilate even unwilling
conscripts and induce them to fight with loyalty
and spirit for their leader and the cause he
embodied, which after all they felt to be the cause
of their country first.

Previously to the outbreak of the Revolution,
the Royal Army of France had been identical
with the royal armies of all other Western
kingdoms, a body of long-service mercenaries
representing only a small fraction of the nation,

THE FRENCH ARMY 47

and living as a caste apart. But during the fifty
years of peace, or relative peace, that had followed
after Roszbach, being strictly localised, they had
gradually fused with the civilians and developed the
sentiment of nationality, side by side with that of
loyalty to their salt. When the break came, by far
the larger half of those remaining with the colours
elected to side with the nation, and the nucleus
thus left proved in fact sufficient to assimilate the
successive drafts of volunteers and conscripts
which the nation subsequently brooded. During
the first years of the War the Regular Army was
recruited side by side with the Volunteers, and
never fought with more than fifty per cent, of
recruits in the ranks. In the first instance men
came forward far more readily for the Volunteer
battalions, but as these latter melted away for
want of proper officers to feed and care for them
at the front, the best of them, seeing the advan-
tages of belonging to a real regimental family,
joined the regulars and brought with them that
individual knowledge of the advantages of dis-
cipline which no one appreciates better than the
man who has suffered the consequences which its
absence invariably entails.

The final fusion, the " Amalgam " it was called,
between the Line and the Volunteers thus came
about quite naturally as the survival of the fittest ;

48 THE FRENCH ARMY

the Volunteers were tired of the licence their
relative liberty procured, and the Line were alto-
gether sick of fighting shoulder to shoulder with
battalions whose discipline could not be relied on.

At the outbreak of the Revolution the Army
numbered 79 French and 23 Foreign Infantry
Regiments ; 12 battalions of Chasseurs, 7 Artillery
Regiments, 26 Regiments of Heavy Cavalry,
18 Dragoons, 6 of Hussars, and 12 of Chasseurs
a cheval (Mounted Light Infantry), totalling in all
175,000 men. Behind them stood a Militia of
55,000 to 70,000 men, and, as a kind of reservoir
upon which to draw, 2,571,700 " National Guards,"
without any organisation or even arms, who in
obedience to a proclamation had enrolled them-
selves voluntarily, to escape the danger of being
forcibly pressed for the front. Here and there a
few battalions had organised themselves to protect
their own property from the violence of the
mob. These organisations, according to Thiebault,
became fairly efficient units, and formed useful
schools of arms, from which later many good
officers were derived.

A proposal to introduce a stringent law of com-
pulsory service had been rejected by a large
majority of the Chambers, as out of harmony with
the principles for which the Revolution was con-
tending ; hence, when in 1791 the war clouds

THE FRENCH ARMY 49

*
burst over it, the Government of the moment had

to help itself by a series of expedients from day to
day.

Though, as pointed out above, the Regiments as
a whole stood firm in their allegiance to the country,
each Regiment had to undergo a little revolution
within itself to adapt itself to its new situation.
Needless to say, these readjustments were not
carried out without much suffering and many
instances of personal hardships ; yet about two-
thirds of the whole seem to have held together and
formed a sufficiently strong nucleus to digest their
new recruits.

These, however, were at first difficult to find.
Instead of expanding existing "cadres" in a
normal manner, the Assembly decreed in July,
1791, the formation of 169 Volunteer battalions,
recruited from the enrolled National Guards.
This decree was received with enthusiasm in Paris,
and in a few days no less than three battalions were
formed, but then the enthusiasm began to flicker
out, and by September 25 only sixty were avail-
able for service, and very few of these appear to
have reached the front. These men, however,
were only called upon to serve for the " Cam-
paign " which, according to the custom of the
period, was held to terminate, quite irrespective of
the enemy's ideas, on December i ; and as they
D

50 THE FRENCH ARMY

also received while enrolled a higher rate of pay
than the Line, the latter found themselves deprived
of their supply of recruits and dwindled away
visibly.

The confusion and want of discipline in this
first levy were appalling. The generals at the
front were loud in their denunciation of these
armed bandits, who robbed the inhabitants of
their own country, setting the worst kind of
examples to the Regular troops, and they
clamoured for their withdrawal and replacement
by troops of the Line. But the Committee of
Public Safety saw in their unanimity a subtle
design against the Revolution. Instead of stem-
ming the evil, they aggravated it by decreeing the
formation of a further 45 battalions, additional to
the original 169, only 60 of which were in actual
existence (May 5, 1792), all of the 214 to be
brought up to a strength of 800 men.

On June i, 1792, the Regular Army numbered
178,000 men, of whom 90,000 stood in face of the
enemy. Of the Volunteers there appear to have
been altogether 84,000 under arms, but these were
the best, who had resisted the temptations to
desert, or having tried the remedy had found it
worse than the disease and returned to the colours,
resigned to make the best of things. But these
numbers were entirely inadequate to confront

THE FRENCH ARMY 51

the gathering hosts of the Coalition. On July
ii the celebrated declaration, " La patrie en
danger/' was issued, which called upon all men
of an age to bear arms to consider themselves
"mobilised/' and to choose from their own districts
those men who were to march first against the
enemy.

These men were not to be known as
" Volunteers " but were designated " Federes/'
because the battalions in which they were to march
had no longer any territorial connection. They
were put together from several departments, and
were destined to recruit the Line and the Volunteers
already at the front, to complete those units most
advanced in formation, etc. A number of " Free
Companies " of Chasseurs were also to be formed.

The result, however, was disappointing. Up to
September 20 this proclamation brought in only
60,000 men, of whom not half reached the front,
barely sufficient to make good the ordinary
wastage. Yet it was with troops formed under
such dispiriting conditions that Dumouriez won
the battle of Jemappes. And the reason is not far
to seek : only the best had survived their ordeals
and reached the front.

In face of this state of affairs, and the addition
of Great Britain to the ranks of the enemy, the
National Convention was compelled to abandon

52 THE PRENCtt ARMY

the idea of voluntary service. On February 20,
1793, it decreed a compulsory levy of 300,000 men,
distributed over the several communes, each of
which was to issue an appeal for men to make up
its quota, and if in three days the number was
incomplete, the balance was to be made good by
recourse to the ballot urn.

All unmarried National Guards between the ages
of eighteen and forty were held liable for service.

At the same time, to put an end to the friction
which had existed between the soldiers of the
Regular Army and the Volunteers, the old white
coat was taken away from the former, and all alike
were compelled to wear the dark blue of the
National Guard. A new unit was instituted,
the " demi-brigade," which consisted of a Regular
battalion and one or two Volunteer battalions,
both retaining their own special peculiarities, other
than the colour of their coats.

Yet the French Army survived even this extra-
ordinary measure, It was with troops brigaded
together in this wise that Napoleon won his
victories in Italy in 1796 — for the order by which
the final " amalgam," as it was called, of Line
and Volunteers was put into execution during the
course of the campaign. In fact it only reached
the Army of Italy a few days before he assumed
the command.

THE FRENCH ARMY 53

This, however, in anticipation, and in the mean-
while French recruiting had many vicissitudes to
endure. The proclamation was meeting with little
success, and when the news of Dumouriez's defeat
at Neerwinden (March 18, 1793) was received,
a perfect panic of terror seized the nation. The
" Committee of Public Safety " was elected, and
forthwith proceeded to most drastic steps. Decree
after decree was issued, each wilder than the other,
until, on March 23, Barere's suggestions became
law1 and hundreds of thousands of men were
driven to arms and despatched towards the
frontier.

The internal paralysation of France was now
complete, for these men robbed and plundered

1 The preamble of the celebrated decree of August 23, 1793,
drawn up by Barere, is as follows : —

" Jusqu'au moment ou les ennemis auront ete chasses du
territoire de la Republique, tous les J^rai^ais sont en requisi-
tion permanente pour le service des armees — Les jeunes gens
iront au combat ; les hommes maries forgeront les armes et
transporteront les subsistances ; les femmes feront des tentes,
des habits, et serviront dans les hopitaux ; les enfants mettront
le vieux lings en charpie ; les vieillards se feront porter sur les
places publiques pour exciter le courage des guerriers, la haine
des rois et le devouement de la Republique. Les maisons
nationales seront convertis en casernes ; la sol des caves sera
lessive pour en extraire le salpetre," etc., etc., and articles 8, 9,
laid down, " Nul ne pourra se faire remplacer dans le service
pour lequel il sera requis ; les fonctionaires publics resteront
a leur postes — La Levte sera generale, les citoyens non maries
ou veufs sans enfants de 18 a 25 marcherent les premiere,"
but nothing is said as to when they return. Assuming,

54 THE FRENCH ARMY

wherever they appeared, and deserted by tens of
thousands. In a few months the desolation of the
country was so complete that absolutely no other
refuge for a man remained, where he could be
reasonably secure against denunciation and hunger,
except at the front. Then the tide turned and the
Army began to receive a healthier and better type
of recruit, men who, having had their fill of freedom,
recognised at last the value of discipline and order
and henceforward submitted with reasonable will-
ingness to necessaW restraint.

The degree to which desertion in these levies
attained can be Estimated from the following
letter addressed by La Coste to the Convention,
dated Nancy, August 31, 1792 : — " More than
140,000 armed citizens organised in battalions, with

however, that the population of France at that date was in
round numbers 30,000 "too, then the annual contingent would
be 300,000 men, of vvhon 200,000 would be physically fit to
bear arms. If the duration of service be taken as from 18 to
60 years of age, then, in a population whose average death-
rate would be, say, 40 per thousand, the normal death-rate
of healthy males between these ages would not exceed 15 per
thousand. That is to say, there should have been in France
about 6,000,000 men available to answer this appeal. Actually
it appears that on January i, 1794, not more than 770,000
were present under arms, and there was one official at home
for every two soldiers at the front. The estimates for 1793,
which were, in fact, largely exceeded, make the average cost
of these soldiers 1800 francs, an enormous figure for those
days, principally accounted for by cost of new arms and
equipment and leakage.

THE FRENCH ARMY 55

several companies of Cavalry, Grenadiers, guns and
gunners are on the march to Weissenburg," but
nothing was heard of their arrival until on the
loth September the Adjutant-General of the Army
of the Rhine writes reporting the arrival of 1200
agriculturists with many weapons, but no soldiers.
This was all that arrived out of the great column.1
Such were the materials out of which the troops
Mack encountered in the Netherlands had been
formed — and one can hardly wonder at the low
estimate he put upon the fighting value of the
French Army. Our own officers in the Duke of
York's command fully shared it. But in the follow-
ing years the good- will of the few who withstood the
temptation to desert, and the ruthless energy dis-
played by the Representatives of the People
in enforcing discipline and order, together with the
ceaseless practice in minor warfare which went on
between the outposts, soon began to evolve a very
different degree of efficiency. Already in 1794
the Austrians found them very much more difficult
to beat, though their staying power in a campaign
was of a very low order. They were still quite
incapable of carrying through any operation
involving more than a few days' march into the
enemy's territory. Under the temptations of free
quarters and plunder they simply disbanded
1 See Rousset : " Les Volontaires de 1791-4."

56 THE FRENCH ARMY

themselves, and every advance came to an end
by sheer want of numbers to go any farther.

The final fusion of the Regulars and Volunteers
was the turning point of the whole evolution,
and though carried out during the spring of the
year, and in face of the enemy, the results
soon showed themselves both in Germany
and in Italy. Certainly in the former theatre of
operations this newly acquired cohesion had
almost given out before the Archduke Charles
turned upon the French at Wiirzburg and
Neresheim. But though the Austrians in this
campaign proved ultimately victorious, the idea
began to spread, particularly amongst the senior
officers, that the French Army at last had become
an actually superior fighting force taken unit by
unit. In Italy, of course, those who had fought
against Napoleon entertained no doubt on the
subject at all, for essentially all Napoleon's
victories during that campaign were due to the
superior vigour and tenacity of the French
soldiers, for whom no marches were too long,
no numbers too formidable. But Mack had seen
nothing of this transformation and naturally dis-
counted the lugubrious stories he heard from the
beaten generals.

As the period of extreme terror and tension
relaxed, the defects in the drafting of this decree of

THE FRENCH ARMY 57

1793 became more and more evident, and the whole
subject of Army Reform occupied again and again
the attention of the succeeding Governments.
Finally the whole was recast and submitted to
the Council of Five Hundred by General Jourdan,
and it was decreed (September 5, 1798) that
every Frenchman was liable to military service
from the twentieth to twenty-fifth year, and to the
men thus liable the term " defenseurs consents "
is applied for the first time.

How many of these men were to be called out and
for how long depended on circumstances — whether
the country was at war or not. There was no
fixed term of service qualifying for dismissal to the
Reserves. Apparently there was no intention of
forming any, and since for the next seventeen
years the country was never at peace for more
than three consecutive years, it would seem that
the term of service was practically fixed by the
man's ability to bear arms, and by nothing else.
As the deaths during these years actually exceeded
one million (though by how many it is impossible
to state), it is evident that even a moderate rate of
invaliding would have barely kept pace with the
supply. It will be seen that this law permitted no
exemption except from physical causes, and its
operation pressed so intolerably upon the people
in their shattered condition that, in the following

58 THE FRENCH ARMY

year (1800), the provision of a paid substitute was
sanctioned. This continued in force until 1870,
when it proved one of the principal causes of the
French downfall, as in practice it allowed the bulk
of the middle classes to escape service, thus throw-
ing the burden of defence on the upper and lower,
" the froth and the dregs," to use an expression
often applied to it by the opponents of the system.

In the space at my disposal it is utterly im-
possible to convey any adequate picture of the
administrative work which fell upon the French
War Office during this period in which Minister
after Minister succeeded one another in rapid suc-
cession, and only Carnot, a Captain of Engineers,
remained permanent.

I have alluded above to the creation of the
" Demi-brigades/' and the " Amalgam " in which
Regulars and Volunteers were brigaded side by
side, and ultimately fused altogether. Each of
these steps entailed the disruption of hundreds of
Volunteer units, and the absorption of thousands
of officers, who, it is hardly necessary to add,
resented their supersession or removal almost in
proportion to their original unfitness for their
posts. But the step gave the authorities the much-
needed power of selection, which they seem to have
exercised with considerable discretion, judging
from the uniform excellence of the commanders

THE FRENCH ARMY 59

whom Napoleon took over when he became
Emperor. Theirs was, indeed, a case of the
" survival of the fittest " in a terribly hard
school of selection, for not only had they been
compelled to justify themselves by their acts in the
face of the enemy, but to maintain control over
their men, in spite of all risks of secret denunciation
and political animosity.

Only born leaders of men could have survived
such an ordeal. They may have been, indeed
they often were, illiterate, rapacious, jealous and
vindictive, but they all possessed that power which
defies all examinations to elicit — viz. the power to
get the last ounce of exertion and self-sacrifice out
of the men under them, without recourse to legal
formalities, or the application of authorised force.

In a word, they were " crowd leaders," men who
knew instinctively in each successive rank how to
keep the dominant sentiment of the mass upon
their side. When, for instance, at a later period
Napoleon kept a whole Hussar brigade out under a
heavy artillery fire as a punishment for unsteadi-
ness in a previous action, he knew he was safe in
doing so, because the majority of the Army
strongly disapproved of cowardice under fire.
But he would have been quite powerless to com-
pel the same Hussars to groom their horses up to
the Prussian standard, because the whole weight of

60 THE FRENCH ARMY

opinion in the Service was against such a practice,
and this tendency ran through every grade of the
whole Army, and in itself constituted a moral
factor sufficient to account almost entirely for
its numerous successes.

In long-service Armies, trained in peace time,
this " art of command " is generally absent, for
nothing over occurs to compel a young officer to
exert the spark of it which in varying degrees we
all possess. In a wise system of training, things
would be so arranged that such opportunities
would have to be faced, but this is difficult, as
they are always unpopular to all except the " elect,"
who rejoice in them. Still in our own case, with
the facilities our Territorial system presents, it
would be easy to arrange for such an interchange
of officers from time to time amongst the several
battalions, that all should find an opportunity
of learning how to enforce obedience without re-
course to authority, and in that way we might
find a compensation for many defects in our
organisation when it is compared with the machine-
like exactitude of other nations.

It was out of these difficult circumstances by
which the French officers were surrounded that the
system of decentralisation of command which led
to the formation, first, of the " Division," ultimately
to that of the " Army Corps " developed.

THE FRENCH ARMY 61

Since without ingrained respect for the " rank "
mutual personal knowledge between men and
officers was the only bond which could be relied
upon, it became the custom to keep the General
who had won the confidence of his men at the head
of the same units as long as possible, and then to
give him the freest possible hand in their command.
It had, of course, long been the practice to place
Generals at the heads of detachments of the three
Arms, which were, in fact, Corps, but these de-
tachments were only formed ad hoc, and generally
melted away into the Army when they rejoined
Headquarters. There was no distinct bond of con-
nection between the units and their Commander,
and above all, no staff mechanism for the circula-
tion of orders to units. During the early years
of the Revolutionary Wars, when an Austrian
General wished to order an operation, he had to
write, or cause to be written by his clerks, separate
orders in detail to each of the units in his com-
mand, a process in which so much time was lost
that the orders almost invariably arrived too
late.1

The French Corps Commander had merely to
send an order to each of his three or four units,

1See two complaints, one by Beaulieu in 1796, the other by
Mack in 1805, both clamouring for more clerks, in the Austrian
Krugs Archive.

62 THE FRENCH ARMY

who then passed on the essential portion of each to
the Brigades, and so forth, according to the system
of the present day, and in this lay the chief secret
of their superior mobility. There is nothing to
show that a Prussian or Austrian battalion could
not march as fast and as far along a highroad as a
French one — indeed, the presumption is that both
in physique and in training the latter were
inferior to the longer service men of other nations ;
but the fact remains that, whereas French Army
Corps could average twenty miles a day, and could
be pushed to thirty-five, their enemies, owing to
this vicious want of system in the circulation of
orders, could rarely manage ten miles a day, and
often fell as low as six and seven.

This was the essential secret of French mobility
on which in turn Napoleon's strategy depended,
and in no campaign is its advantage more apparent
than in the one under consideration, for had the
French averaged five miles a day less, the whole
combination of Jena would have been impossible.

Lastly, we must call attention to an innovation
in the conduct of War, due to Carnot's genius,
which, though in advance of the means at his dis-
posal, formed the stepping-stone for Napoleon's
progress. We have seen that it had been the
custom to form detachments of all arms for special
missions in all countries, but it had never occurred

THE FRENCH ARMY 63

to anyone to use these detachments in combina-
tion for a special offensive. When, for instance,
Frederick the Great projected an offensive, he
united his whole Army for the purpose, only
leaving behind such detachments as were necessary
for purely defensive purposes — they might within
their own sphere operate offensively — for the attack
was generally admitted as the soundest form of
defence — but their movement was never combined
with the main Army on an ulterior objective.

Carnot initiated the idea of combining the opera-
tions of several Armies, two or more, in an ad-
vance on a single objective, such as Vienna in
1796, in which the Armies of Jourdan from the
lower Rhine, of Moreau from the middle Rhine,
and of Napoleon in Italy were all directed upon
Vienna. As already stated, the idea was beyond
the means of execution available — wireless
telegraphy alone would have justified the risk — but
it formed the point of departure for Napoleon's
principle of combining his Army Corps upon the
battlefield to which all his subsequent successes
were due.

It is now time to turn to the specific develop-
ment of the latter's methods and to trace step by
step how these evolved themselves into a definite
system, the essence of which was, that no matter
what the enemy did, or did not do, Napoleon was

64 THE FRENCH ARMY

certain to unite a numerical superiority against
him.

In his "Education Militaire de Napoleon,"
Captain Colin of the French General Staff has traced
for us the gradual evolution of Napoleon's executive
talent up to the Campaign of 1796, showing us
the books he read and the type of mind with
which he was brought into contact. Colonel
Camon of the French Engineers has given us an
admirable study of the spirit of the Emperor's
Campaigns as derived from his own orders and
correspondence ; and we have in addition the
admirable investigations of General Bonnal and
General Foch, all from the standpoint of modern
criticism, and based on the material found in the
Archives of the French War Ministry.

These studies throw an entirely new light on the
working of Napoleon's mind from day to day, and
more especially enable us to discount the
" evidential " value of his own Memoirs written at
St Helena, also those of his Marshals and other
contemporaries.

We no longer see him making plans of campaign
complete to the smallest detail, far in advance
of events ; we are now able to follow him from
day to day, with a great objective undeniably
before him, but working for it by fresh resolutions
conceived from hour to hour, as the reports of the

THE FRENCH ARMY 65

enemy's movements come to hand ; and meeting
each emergency as it arises with an intuitive
perception which at times seems little short of
miraculous.

In his first Italian campaigns we find him still
practising the precepts of his masters, which were
indeed time-honoured and accepted by all his
contemporaries in theory ; but whereas they were
tied and bound by practical considerations of
supply and responsibility, he was relatively free
from these restrictions. Hence he was able to
apply them with a vigour and boldness to which the
eighteenth century could afford no parallel. Con-
centration on the decisive point was no novelty ;
every other general of the period would gladly
have anticipated his example had they been
able to do so, but because of the utter want of
system for circulating information and orders
which prevailed in their armies, Napoleon's con-
centrations were always finished before their own.

Nor was there a general in Europe who was not
equally well aware of the advantage to be gained
by threatening an enemy's communications ;
most of them knew only too well from bitter
experience how fatally demoralising to the troops
was the mere rumour of danger to their liries of
supply and retreat. But they knew, as practical
men, that the threat at their enemy's communica-
E

66 THE FRENCH ARMY

tion involved the exposure of their own, and that
as opposed to Napoleon they had the most to lose.

For the French had been forced by circum-
stances to learn to do without luxuries, and dragged
no interminable train behind them. If the enemy
captured their bivouac grounds, they were no
better off than before, for the Republican troops
left no supplies behind them, whereas if their
enemy succeeded in manoeuvring them out of their
positions, it was in practice impossible to prevent
their finding food, arms, equipment and am-
munition. If they failed in their undertakings,
they had an outraged King and Cabinet to face
and an established position to lose. If Napoleon
failed he risked only his head, and heads sat lightly
on French shoulders during those first terrible
years.

The conditions, therefore, were quite unequal,
and it needed only audacity and the driving energy
of an almost superhuman character to carry the
French Army to victory. It was this need that
Napoleon abundantly supplied, but it was a very
risky game to play ; and when at Marengo his
concentration failed, for the reason that he had
allowed his enemy time to concentrate first, he set his
mind to work to find some safer basis for his pro-
jects, and found it for the moment in the training
of his Cavalry to form the " Cavalry Screen."

THE FRENCH ARMY 67

It was in reliance on this system that he entered
upon the Campaign of Ulm in 1805. Covered by a
Cavalry screen a couple of days' march in front of
his Infantry columns, he adapted his manoeuvres
to the movements of his enemy quite in the manner
of the modern German school, whose practice in
1870 shows no advance upon his original concept-
tion. But Napoleon soon found out that though
Cavalry could observe, it possessed in itself no power
to hold ; and it was quickly evident to him
that the presence of an enemy at a given spot on a
given date was no sure indication of where that
enemy might happen to be forty-eight hours later.

The problem is, in fact, insoluble a priori,
for only the other side can be aware of all the
factors which enter into the decision, and even
then no two minds are likely to appreciate these
several factors at the same valuation.

With regard to the tactics of the Army Napoleon
employed to gain his strategic ends they may best
be visualised as the survival of the fittest under
the new conditions which had been evolved from
the social chaos '>f the French Revolution. This
does not imply tiiat they were ideal solutions in
themselves, better than any that had gone before
them (which in fact they certainly were not), but
that they represented the best use to which the
available raw material could be applied for the

68 THE FRENCH ARMY

attainment of the purpose in view. This is only
another way of stating Moltke's definition of the
Art of War.1

The French had entered upon the great Re-
volutionary Wars with drill-books copied exactly
from the original Prussian model. But their raw
levies were quite incapable of the accurate
manoeuvring under fire which had distinguished
the long-service soldiers of Frederick the Great, the
topographical conditions differed widely, and the
fundamental condition which alone made possible
the long advances of twenty and thirty battalions
in line (viz. acquired cavalry superiority on the
Prussian side), was entirely wanting.

A single deployed line of these raw soldiers could
not endure the inevitable losses which the attempt
to close in to decisive range without firing in-
variably entailed. Hence arrangements had to be
made for a succession of lines, each intended to
carry the one in front forward when once it had
halted to fire — the same idea is current in all Armies
nowadays. But if the first line failed to stand and
broke back upon its followers, th* result was gener-
ally a rapid retreat of the whok; mass. Hence, to
guard against this danger, gaps had to be left in the

1 Moltke's definition runs as follows :— "The art of war consists
in making the best practical use of ?;he means at hand for the
attainment of the object in view."

THE FRENCH ARMY 69

following lines which could be rapidly closed by
deployment, when the necessity arose, and a line
of small columns (weak battalions of perhaps
400 men) soon established itself as the most
practical solution.

Seen from the enemy's side, such an attack gave
an exact replica of the normal advances practised
throughout Europe after 1870 and incidentally
explains their origin. The enemy — say the
Prussians — seeing a ragged, badly dressed crowd
of men approaching them, with further little
clumps following behind, never supposed for a
moment that these were in any way an imitation
of their own " proud and beautiful line." They
assumed that the French had discovered a new
secret of victory — the advance of the individual
fighter as distinguished from the true skirmisher,
whose use they fully understood. Hence, when
disaster ultimately overtook their own more per-
fect formations, the whole Army conceived the
conviction that in some way or other the crowded
ragged firing line, with the little company columns
following on behind it, contained in itself the spirit
of the French Infantry. This picture remained
in their minds through all the years of reform that
followed after Jena, and first found full literary ex-
pression in the works of May, Boguslowski, Tellen-
bach and countless other less remembered names.

;o THE FRENCH ARMY

As pointed out in the previous chapter, the skill
of the Austrian Light Infantry over broken
ground had from the very first compelled the
French to evolve a similar type, the Voltigeurs,
to encounter them.

These troops, profiting also by the experience
gained in American and Canadian warfare, very
soon equalled, if they did not surpass, their original
model. Hence they soon became the idols of the
Army, and instinctively the Line battalions sought
to emulate their example, with the consequence
that the regular Infantry soon threw off the
excessive pedantry of the original Prussian model,
and the whole Infantry, even before Napoleon
came to handle it, had became an exceedingly
supple and powerful weapon ready to his hands.
It was equally capable of holding its own in forest
or mountain, and of changing its formations
rapidly and accurately to meet the ever-varying
conditions of long-protracted battles. On the
other hand, while careful at all times to be ready
to meet a charge of Cavalry or a temporary reverse
to the other troops around them, they had as firm
a faith in the volleys and file fire of the deployed
line (" en bataille," as they called it) as was
possessed by either the British or the Prussians
before them.

But in all these years the French Army had

THE FRENCH ARMY 71

never reached the point at which it could be fought
in battle as a whole ; that was to come afterwards
when the gradual deterioration of the Infantry,
the improvement in the mobility of the Field
Artillery forced a complete readjustment upon the
Emperor. At Castiglione Napoleon had indeed
handled a corps as a unit and made full use of the
powers of a small Artillery reserve, but in general
the combats against the Allies and Austrians had
been combats of detachments. Division fought
against Division, in which the sum of the results,
good or bad, decided the ultimate retreat of one
side or the other, and when the day was over there
was no available mass of reserves on either side to
give the final decision and initiate a true pursuit.

Neither the great Artillery Commander or the
Cavalry Leader had as yet appeared, and though
in his pursuit of Werneck Murat showed the
promise of his future achievement after Jena, the
campaign of Ulm was singularly destitute of
lessons of tactical importance.

To sum up the whole chapter, let us picture
to ourselves a Light Infantry as tenacious and
conscious of mastery in their own special branch
as the Rifles and Jagers of modern armies, a Line
Infantry trained on much the same lines, but still
adhering to the slower and more deliberate
methods of the old "decision-compelling" advance;

72 THE FRENCH ARMY

a Cavalry capable of daring and brilliant actions by
squadrons, but far too little trained in equitation
to be susceptible of employment in great masses ;
and an Artillery mobile and alert to seize chances
by batteries, but, like the Cavalry, still without
the uniformity of training which can alone render
it possible to transfer " masses " of 100 guns and
upwards rapidly and certainly from point to point
of the battlefield. These movements are not
essentially conditioned by the weapons in use (for
death remains the same, however inflicted, and
a man's life was worth fewer hours of purchase
then than it is nowadays) but depend finally, with
all mounted Arms, on the thoroughness with
which the troops have been trained beforehand,
and the character of the Man who commands
them. How Senarmont would have smiled at the
butcher's bills in his own Arm of the Service of the
present day.

CHAPTER III

POLITICAL FACTORS INFLUENCING AUSTRIAN
OPERATIONS

THE simplest way in which an English student
can obtain a firm grasp of the principles under-
lying military action on the continent of Europe
at the close of the Eighteenth Century is to
picture to himself the Kings and Princes then
in power as so many English county families,
possessing the same " earth hunger," but instead
of the old-established firms of solicitors, the
recognised instruments by which our landowners
sought to extend or round off their estates, the
various Royalties employed equally carefully
selected diplomatists and politicians, with an
ultimate appeal to armed force, whereas in
England the law of the land compelled the final
decision. In all these intrigues, having the ex-
tension of their estates as an object, the wishes of
the inhabitants were as little considered as they are
nowadays in this country when a great property
changes hands. War on one frontier hardly
interrupted for a moment the course of absorp-
tion on another, and generally the object of
73

74 POLITICAL FACTORS INFLUENCING

further acquisitions, either by marriage, barter
or force, was kept steadily in view from generation
to generation.

At the outbreak of the French revolutionary
wars this process was in full operation over the
whole extent of South Germany, and Austria
and Prussia had already acquired, by one
means or another, large outlying properties
which interfered very materially with the
political frontiers of the South German estates,
and modified most essentially the conduct of
military operations.

A glance at the map will make this clearer than
many pages of description. It will be seen how
entirely the Prussian possession of Ansbach
hampered a French offensive from the north, and
in the south it will be noticed that an almost
continuous belt of Austrian outlying territory
extends from the Inn to the banks of the Rhine
about Freiburg and Breisach.

The possession of these districts, and the
neutrality of Ansbach were vitally important
to the Austrian Empire, and dictated time after
time the main lines of any operations against
France, because in all these districts in which
Austria possessed particular interest her troops
could move as in the home countries, and
magazines could be accumulated and contracts

AUSTRIAN OPERATIONS 75

issued with a freedom impossible in the terri-
tories of other reigning princes.

The fortress of Ulm thus became of para-
mount importance under all circumstances, for
if Bavaria threw in her interests with the empire
it closed all the great avenues of approach, as
long as the neutrality of Ansbach was respected ;
while if Bavaria remained neutral, or joined the
French, a force based upon Ulm possessed in their
extremest form all the advantages usually ac-
corded to a re-entrant line of frontier. Napoleon
at Milan in 1800 held a position intrinsically far
less secure than did Mack at Ulm in 1805, for
whereas the former could not count either on his
communications over the St Gothard Pass or his
magazines about Zurich, for one hour longer than
his flag was in the ascendant, Mack could, and
no doubt would, had he been an independent
Monarch, have accumulated stores and reserves
all along the northern shores of Lake Constance
and drawn reinforcements over the Alps to
his assistance through relatively friendly terri-
tories. Unfortunately for Austria, Mack was
not a reigning Sovereign, and the attention of her
statesmen was concentrated on dangers other
than those which actually arose.

How this happened must always remain a
mystery, for Napoleon had, in fact, in 1803, given

76 POLITICAL FACTORS INFLUENCING

the Austrian Court ample warning l of the direction
of attack which he intended to select. It was in
October 1803 that Russia first approached Austria
with a view to the formation of a fresh coalition,
and in December of the same year offered to
mobilise within eight days a force of 170,000
men, half to operate either with or against the
Prussians, half with the Austrians, and these
proposals were at once submitted to the Archduke
Charles for consideration and report.

The Archduke was intensely set against war,
for no one knew better than he the shortcomings
of the Army, the poverty of the Treasury or the
unreliability of Russian promises. It was on
the 3rd March 1804 that he submitted a memoir
on the whole subject from which the following
extracts are taken : —

" Our financial situation is ' detestable/ It
is impossible to re-establish the equilibrium be-
tween expenditure and receipts even in peace.
At least 80 million florins are necessary to place
the army on a war footing, 33 millions a year to
keep it up, and 150 millions at least for each year's
active operations. This would spell bankruptcy
at very short notice, for so much paper money
has already been issued, and our credit is so low

1 See " Napoleon to Luchesini," 2yth Nov. 1803. Vol. i.
P-73-

AUSTRIAN OPERATIONS 77

that it is impossible to get further loans taken
up. No doubt there will be subsidies from
England, but we must not exaggerate their im-
portance. They only diminish, they do not
annul the expenses of the war. In fact, the
amount indicated, 37 millions [florins], is a mere
fraction of the total expense, and Great Britain
will take care to recoup herself first for sums still
due on previous advances.

" Our resources in men are almost equally in-
adequate. We have only 25 millions of population
to oppose to the 40 millions under French
dominion — viz. 25 millions in France, the balance
in her new acquisitions, and the conscription so
far has hardly touched the people in these latter
at all. In the Hereditary States of the Empire,
cases of exemption are very numerous, and previous
levies have already made serious inroads on the
remainder. Altogether we should need 108,598
men to bring the army to war establishments,
and the last census only traced out 83,159. Hence
it is not even possible to complete the Army, still
less to recruit it to supply the waste of active
operations, and finally if we take up these 83,000
men, it will give the death-blow to our agriculture
and commerce, which are already in very evil case.1

1 Before the war was over, many times 83,000 men had been
found, and commerce and agriculture still continued.

78 POLITICAL FACTORS INFLUENCING

4 ' Hence hostilities should be avoided at all
costs. We can only contemplate it as a possibility
if we have Allies, and who will these Allies be ?
There are only the Russians — who have uniformly
urged Austria on to fight and never moved at all
until in 1798, they knew Bonaparte was safely
locked up in Egypt — and who can trust them ?
Who can tell on what trumpery pretext, differences
of opinion between commanders, etc., the promised
support may not be withdrawn. Finally, in any
case, Austria will have to bear the first shock of
the campaign, and perhaps the invaders will be
in possession of her Capital before the Russians
can arrive.

"It is said that War is inevitable, perhaps so,
but we can at least avoid anything to hasten it,
and every year will improve our relative position."

The French Official Account, whose abbreviated
version of the original I am here following, adds
in a note that in another report the Archduke
advises that Austria should under no circum-
stances interfere with Napoleon's projected in-
vasion of England, in the success of which he did
not believe, but which in any case must cripple
French offensive power for many years to come.
This conviction must be borne in mind in
estimating the value of the whole of the previous
report, and its marked pessimistic tendency.

AUSTRIAN OPERATIONS 79

"If by misfortune the War nevertheless does
break out," he continues, " let us see what will
be the consequences, and this brings us to examine
the plan of operations to be pursued.

" The front upon which the struggle will be
waged extends from the Austro-Italian frontiers to
Lake Constance ; it is from thence that we shall
advance if we take the offensive, or stand to fight
if we decide to await the attack. It seems quite
indisputable that the bulk of our forces should be
allotted to the Italian theatre of operations. On our
side, because it is only in that direction that we
can look for an acquisition [of territory under-
stood] of any sufficient value, and because it is
from that side that the danger to the Monarchy
is both greatest and nearest ; finally because it is
only by taking the offensive or by maintaining
our position in Italy that we can save the
Hereditary States from invasion.

" On the part of the French, because their
Government has the greatest interest in preserving
the Italian Republic ; because also it is from
them that the French Armies can by their first
movements most injure our Empire, attaining by
a single victory across an unfortified frontier,
the very heart and Capital of the Nation ; finally
because in such an advance, the enemy would
have its resources immediately behind its front

8o POLITICAL FACTORS INFLUENCING

on the borders of Italy and Switzerland, and will
be nearer to its points of support and reinforce-
ments ; whereas, by marching on Vienna by
Suabia and Bavaria, their armies would have
much further to go before striking a decisive
blow. This consideration is of importance because
of the desirability of achieving a result before the
Russians can intervene. Hence it is on the
Adige that we must expect the first and principal
operations, and it is there that the Austrian Armies
should assume the offensive."

Then follows a long catalogue of topographical
difficulties discussed with all the verbosity current
at that period, which we can afford to disregard,
and the memoir then continues :

"To support the operations of the Austrian
Army of Italy, and to keep the enemy out of
Tyrol, it will be necessary to oppose a second
Army, much less numerous, to the force which
the French will probably send from Strassburg, by
the shortest line to Vienna through Suabia. This
should strive to anticipate the enemy upon the Iller.
However one or several victories gained on this side
would have no other result than to drive the enemy
back upon the Rhine, where he possesses lines of
fortresses within which it would be disastrous to

AUSTRIAN OPERATIONS 81

attempt to follow him . . . such an idea could not
enter the head of any reasonable tactician.

" Hence nothing can be done in Germany until
the Army of Italy has crossed the Adda as the
consequence of a victorious engagement — one
can only choose a good defensive position which
will cover the Tyrol against the enemy's incur-
sions, and prevent a French Army from entering
Austria down the valley of the Danube."

I have given this singular document at some
length, as to my mind it serves to clear up the
fundamental mystery why Mack so suddenly
sprang again into favour over the head of the
Archduke Charles, the victor of 1796. What
possible use could any Government, knowing
itself to be compelled to fight, find for such a
persistent pessimist, and what would any reason-
able statesman or diplomatist make of such an
incoherent, loosely reasoned, badly supported
piece of work, the outcome apparently of some
six months' study ?

It will be noted that the Archduke begins by
fixing the limits of the theatre of operations as
between the Austro-Italian frontier and Lake
Constance, and then never refers to this district
again. Probably this was only done to note his
general adherence to the line of action long before

F

82 POLITICAL FACTORS INFLUENCING

thought out by the Austrian Headquarters in 1796,
1798 and 1799, and with which Clausewitz dealt
so scathingly throughout his works. Clausewitz
imagined that the Austrian School of War pinned
its faith on the possession of commanding
ground owing to some fancied analogy between
the action of water running down hill and the
flood of invasion sweeping down on the plains
similarly accelerated by the force of gravity.
This, however, is one of the cases in which
Clausewitz's judgment became obscured by the
contempt with which Austrian dilatoriness during
the latter campaigns of the Great War had filled
him. In fact the Austrians, as C. von B. K. has
shown at length, had very substantial grounds
indeed for their attitude on this subject, and it is
a pity for them that they did not adhere to this
portion of their doctrine consistently, and prepare
the country within their own frontier to give
effect to it. Actually the possession of Switzer-
land was of transcendent importance to the
Austrians, on the assumption, which they had
every reasonable right to make, that their
battalions and Light Infantry were still, unit
for unit, superior to the French levies.

The exit from the mountain passes into the
Italian plains could always be forced in those
days by disciplined troops prepared to stand up

AUSTRIAN OPERATIONS 83

to heavy punishment without risk of panic ; and
the north of Switzerland gave them not only good
through roads from Chur and along the left bank
of Lake Constance and down the Rhine to
Schaffhausen, but it afforded them also the
advantage of water communication from Bregenz,
through the Lake and down the river to the same
place. Thirty miles of this at least could not be
interfered with, and the remaining fifty could
easily be guarded by a few squadrons of horse
hovering to the northward in the plains about
Donaueschingen.

Austrian troops had again and again marched
over the same districts, and armies had crossed
the Rhine repeatedly between Constance and
Schaffhausen, and these districts still remained,
as in 1798 and 1799, the shortest and most direct
way to the heart of the French territory. As
for means of communication on the water, and
roads over the mountains into the Valley of the
Inn, abundant resources lay to their hands had
they thought about utilising them during the year's
respite that still lay before them. Whether any-
thing to improve these communications through
the Voralgebirge was actually accomplished I
have been unable to ascertain, and would only
note in passing that, judging from Indian frontier
road-making experience, no serious obstacles to

84 POLITICAL FACTORS INFLUENCING

such improvements existed at any point. Mean-
while the impression remains strong in my mind,
from several incidents in Mack's subsequent
movements, that he had fully grasped the in-
trinsic value of Switzerland as a base, and did in
fact strive to have the roads improved, and more
boats put on the lake. He would have taken
full advantage of all the facilities Switzerland
afforded had he not been fatally misled as to the
strength of the troops arrayed against him, and
thereby led to persist in offensive operations
long after all reasonable chances for success had
disappeared.

Be this as it may, the fact remains that this
lugubrious prophecy of the Archduke's did not
prevent the signature of a contract of alliance
between Austria and Russia on the 4th November
1804, and the military Cabinets immediately pro-
ceeded to draw up a plan of combined operations.

This was transmitted to St Petersburg on the
i3th March 1805, and seems to have been the
work of a " paste and scissors " committee. Most
of the long-winded, loosely reasoned passages
of the archduke are reproduced, while other
paragraphs calculated to relieve their despond-
ency are intercalated, which seem to breathe the
spirit of Mack, and the only material departure
from the original lies in the selection of the line of

AUSTRIAN OPERATIONS 85

the " Lech " for the deployment of the army of
Southern Germany, a line which was certainly
not the selection either of Mack or the Arch-
duke, and indicates that whoever was responsible
for its insertion had not f grasped the spirit
of the original doctrine of the importance of
Switzerland, although this point is treated at
considerable length in the document.

This plan was submitted to the Emperor of
Russia by General Stutterheim with another long
memoir of his own dated 6th April, to which the
Russian General Staff responded, promising
90,000 men to act in Germany (and 25,000 for
the kingdom of Naples) to be divided into two
Armies — Army Corps we should call them now-
adays. These were both to operate on the left
bank of the Danube. The memoir also approved,
in general, of the Austrian proposals, only pro-
testing against the very pessimistic attitude
assumed by the Court of Vienna as to its resources
compared with those of France. It pointed out,
what was undoubtedly true, that Bonaparte
himself was in equally desperate straits for want
of ready money, and that his resources in men
were not nearly as great as the Austrians imagined
them to be.

Whilst these negotiations were in progress, the
Russians signed a treaty of alliance with Great

86 POLITICAL FACTORS INFLUENCING

Britain (nth April) in which the contingents to
be furnished by Austria, and the amount of
subsidies she was to receive, were regulated
precisely as if that Power had been a consenting
party to the deed. The news of this high-handed
action caused lively emotion at Vienna, but so
great appeared the risks that two months were
allowed to elapse before a reply was sent to
St Petersburg. The Russians now, by a note
dated 2gth June, called on Austria to state
definitely whether she would adhere to her
declarations of the 4th November. They further
announced that not only had the orders to
mobilise 180,000 men in Russia been issued, but
that they counted on obtaining another 100,000
from Prussia, Saxony and Denmark, and that
Sweden had already consented to find 16,000.
Austria on her side must now mobilise 250,000 —
i.e. the number stipulated in the above-mentioned
declaration of ttye 4th November.

The Archduke and his party nevertheless con-
tinued to urge upon the Emperor the policy of
peace at any price, insisting as before on the
unreliability of Russian promises, and the
certainty that Austria would have to stand up
to the first blows of the French unsupported ;
while, either to strengthen his hands, or from
sheer conviction on his own part, General Duka,

AUSTRIAN OPERATIONS 87

the Q.M.G. of the Army, showed that there were
only 39,635 men with 3398 horses present with
the Colours, and that when all the men on
furlough had been recalled the Army would still
be 41,767 men short even of its peace establish-
ment. For this despondent view of the situation,
he was promptly removed to the command of the
district of Temesvar, about the furthest point
from the threatened frontier that could be found.
(Angeli, " Ulm and Austerlitz," p. 423). Cobenzl,
who had succeeded Thugut, now brought forward
Mack, on whose optimism he could rely, to en-
courage the Emperor to adhere to the Russian
proposals, and Mack, who had imbibed the true
essence of the French national spirit, was not
slow in availing himself of his opportunity.

For this he is roundly blamed by the authors
of the French Official History of the campaign1
(p. 118), whose account I am here following, but
in doing this I submit they are judging after the
event. Surely Mack as a soldier, and personally
of exceptional courage, can hardly be condemned
for believing, after his years of experience against
the French revolutionary armies, that the strength
of a nation depends far more on the will to fight in
the individual soldier than on the precision in

1 Which account was based on the Austrian documents
and canards promulgated by Mack's enemies.

88 POLITICAL FACTORS INFLUENCING

drill and perfection of turnout in the organised
units which together go to make up the Army ?
He believed, and not without reason, that the
secret of French successes lay primarily in
mobility, next in the personality of the leader, and
finally in the cause for which the Nation was fighting.
Moreover, there was nothing in the facts, as far
as they were known to him at the time, to lead
him to believe that in any one of these qualifica-
tions he himself and his countrymen were inferior
to their opponents. Napoleon, it is true, had
beaten his old superior officers out of Italy twice
over, but he knew these men well and their
limitations, and in view of his own rapid and un-
paralleled rise in the most aristocratic and caste-
ridden service in the world, and the astounding
influence which his presence in the field had again
and again exerted over the troops, who can blame
him if he felt fairly competent to cross swords
with the leader whose reputation came to him
only through highly coloured accounts ? In brief,
he trusted his men, and he trusted himself ; he
only failed to realise the disloyalty of his immediate
instruments — viz. the band of courtiers who
surrounded his Chief. It is necessary to insist on
this point of view at the outset, for if the study of
the campaign is undertaken under the influence of
the glamour which has since accumulated around

AUSTRIAN OPERATIONS 89

the Napoleonic legend, no useful lesson can
possibly be derived from its study.

The French authors continue : "We should
deceive ourselves greatly if we imagine that Mack
was an object of admiration to the whole Austrian
Army — his false science deceived no one except
the politicians." But who in the Austrian army
of that day was qualified to decide whether
Mack's ' science ' was false or not ? Were not
his Austrian critics the very men who accused
Napoleon of having defeated them because he
did not even realise the accepted rules of civilised
War ? There were many first-rate fighting men
still in the French Army, and for many years
afterwards, who agreed essentially with these
Austrian commanders in this. But the merit
which the Austrian statesmen saw in Mack was
precisely this — that he never made difficulties,
and that he recognised that in War the object is to
beat the enemy, not merely to avoid being beaten.

That this view is at least defensible is evident
from the first steps Mack took on his appoint-
ment— viz. to decree that the army should live,
like the French, on the country, and that the
Transport Services should at once hand over all
their best horses to the Artillery ; this at least
showed that he had grasped one of the chief
factors of French successes — mobility.

90 POLITICAL FACTORS INFLUENCING

On the yth July the courier bearing the definite
adherence of Austria to the new coalition left
Vienna, and on the i6th July, Mack, Schwartzen-
berg and Winzingerode met to arrange details of
co-operation. It was agreed that the Russians
should form three Armies. The first, commanded
by Kutusow and comprising 54,918 men, 7900
horses and 200 guns, was timed to reach Braunau
on the Inn on the i6th October. The troops were
to have one day's rest in four, and no daily march
was to exceed twenty miles. This is important
in view of the delays which ultimately took place
which could not have been foreseen by Mack.
Kutusow was to be subordinate to the Emperor
and the Archduke Charles, but was not to receive
orders from any other Austrian generals.

The second Army under Benningsen (39
battalions, 85 squadrons, and 24 guns) was to
follow closely on the heels of the first, unless
called on to support the third. This Army, under
Buxhoewden, 33 battalions, and 35 squadrons (no
artillery mentioned), was to move by Bohemia
into Franconia, keeping an eye upon Prussia,
whose attitude was still equivocal. On this basis
a definite treaty between Russia and Austria
was signed on the 9th August 1805, and this
notwithstanding the vehement protests of the
Archduke Charles, who pointed out the many

AUSTRIAN OPERATIONS 91

difficulties in the way of provisioning the Russians
— the want of peas, haricots, lentils, etc. , which were
not grown in the districts traversed. Yet armies
have lived without these necessaries in other
climates, and the Russian moujik was never a
particularly delicate feeder.

Already in the month of May, Mack had been
at work, with as much secrecy as possible, pre-
paring the Army for hostilities. In addition to
the transfer of horses from the Train to the
Artillery, already referred to, men had been
called to the colours on various pretexts, horses
had been bought, provisions stored, and camps
had been formed at Pettau and in Illyria. Un-
fortunately he had not stopped at this, but had
endeavoured to introduce many reforms in
organisation, which, though sound in principle,
upset existing regulations just when continuity
of practice was most necessary.

With regard to the principal change — viz.
acceptance of the methods of requisition in place
of the former plan of supply by magazines — it is
difficult to see how mobility and artillery power
could have been provided by any other method.
Both of these measures were essential to his
designs, but in practice the attempt failed from
causes which Mack and his contemporaries were
not psychologists enough to foresee. You cannot

92 POLITICAL FACTORS INFLUENCING

by the stroke of a pen alter the deep-rooted
sentiments of a long-service Army, indeed of any
Army at all. It was all very well to order the
troops to live on the country — i.e. to turn
themselves into hordes of licensed freebooters —
but the whole tradition of this wholesale foraging
had died out since the time of the Thirty Years'
War, and neither men nor officers knew how to
adapt themselves to their new riles. They
might have done better in an enemy's country ;
our own troops in Afghanistan learnt such pro-
cedure quite readily from the Sikhs and
Ghoorkhas. But Mack's misfortune was, that
the South German people, speaking the same
language, were not enemies at all. The troops
would persist in regarding them as irresponsible
victims of very cruel circumstances, and it was
this attitude of mind which primarily contributed
to Napoleon's successes by rendering it possible
for his soldiers (who were thoroughly at home
in this phase of the struggle for the survival
of the fittest) to find food enough to exist upon in
the very same districts in which the Austrians had
already nearly starved. This fact requires to be
underlined, and to be particularly remembered.1

1 Almost identically the same thing happened to the
Germans in 1870 — when their armies were ordered to live
on the country. See Studien zur Kriegsgeschichte und
Taktik, Vol. III., Generalstab, Berlin.

AUSTRIAN OPERATIONS 93

Mack's zeal and activity in pushing on all these
changes, and his obstinate determination to over-
come all difficulties, contrasted so markedly with
the pessimism of the Archduke Charles and his
particular clique that he completely conquered
the Emperor's confidence, and for the time became
the virtual dictator of the whole military situa-
tion. Thus on the I5th August he submitted a
note to the Emperor demanding — ist, that the
Archduke Charles should at once take up the
command of the Army in Italy ; 2nd, that the
Emperor himself should forthwith assume the
command-in-chief, appointing Mack as his Q.M.G.
with power to correspond directly with the other
Q.M.G.'s ; 3rd, that the Corps in the district
around Trent should be placed under the orders
of the Archduke John, who commanded in the
Tyrol ; 4th, that Bavaria should be invaded in
the early days of September in order to facilitate
the absorption of the Bavarian army — to all of
which the Imperial sanction was at once forth-
coming.

With the Archduke Charles in Italy, the
assumption of the chief command by the Emperor
became a necessity, since, according to the pro-
tocol with the Russians, their commanders could
only take orders from the Monarch himself.
Pending the Russian arrival, there was practic-

94 POLITICAL FACTORS INFLUENCING

ally no command for the Emperor to assume, and
hence no duties for his Q.M.G., it was therefore
decided to give the command of the wing of the
Army destined to act in Germany to the young
Archduke Ferdinand, and to send Mack with him
nominally as his Chief of the Staff, trusting that
the young Prince would loyally carry out Mack's
intentions, which indeed he was strictly enjoined
to do by the Emperor himself. Unfortunately,
the Prince developed too much character and too
little intelligence, as the sequel will presently
show.1

The incompatibility of disposition between these
two men, the Archduke Ferdinand and Mack,
destined so unfortunately to run in double harness,
was not long in disclosing itself. At a council of
war held at Hetzendorf, 20th August, at which
the plan of campaign drawn up by the Archduke
Charles was read and discussed, the Prince ob-
served that Napoleon would be at Munich with
150,000 men before the Russians could arrive on

1 Though the Prince was only in his twenty-fifth year, he had
already seen much service. In 1799 he had distinguished
himself at Pfullendorf and Stokach and in 1800 he had com-
manded a Light Brigade under Kray, and had done good
service, notably at Biberach, for which he received the Maria
Theresa Order and had been made General of Cavalry in
1805. The rank of Field Marshal had also been conferred
on him, to give him the necessary superiority of rank for
his present command.

AUSTRIAN OPERATIONS 95

the Inn, and he advised, in consequence, that only
a corps of observation, some 30,000 to 40,000
strong, should be sent into Bavaria, with orders
merely to reconnoitre and requisition, retreating,
if necessary, before the enemy's advance. In this
advice the Archduke Charles and Feldzeugmeister
Zach concurred, even the Emperor momentarily
assenting also. But Mack had no difficulty with
his flow of persuasive eloquence in establishing
that Napoleon could not pass the Rhine with
more than 70,000 men, as he had certainly
20,000 in his hospitals, and must leave 30,000
to 40,000 more on the coast demonstrating
against the British, while 20,000 must keep
order in Paris, and Mack being supported by
Cobenzl, the Emperor finally came round to
this opinion.

One would like to have further details of the
discussion in order to decide whether the young
Prince's figures, which so closely accorded with
the subsequent event, were the result of a lucky
guess only, or of reasoned conviction. Looking
at the facts as far as they were known at the time,
the presumption is in favour of the guess guided
by the pessimism prevailing amongst the Arch-
duke Charles' surroundings. The young Prince
saw in his imagination the whole of Napoleon's
Army singling out his command for its undivided

96 POLITICAL FACTORS INFLUENCING

attentions, and did not see how completely this
assumption struck at the root of the whole plan of
campaign before him, whilst he could not be
aware of Napoleon's intended violation of the
neutrality of Ansbach, on which, ultimately,
Napoleon's arrival at Munich about the specified
date actually depended. Finally, the mere idea
of moving even 150,000 men from the shores of
the English Channel to Munich, within the time
limit that the Prince's prognostication carried
with it, would, under any other circumstances,
have been laughed out of court at once by any
assemblage of Staff College graduates of any other
country but France at that period, for nothing
of the kind had ever been attempted or thought
of until Napoleon actually accomplished it.
Had it been otherwise, the feat itself would hardly
have caused such universal amazement. We can
readily picture Mack, the past master in the
logistics of his period, crumbling into pieces the
pessimistic predictions of his youthful Com-
mander, and also how the after consequences,
when the happy guess of the younger man was so
singularly confirmed by the event, would be all
the greater in proportion to the thoroughness and
efficiency with which the teacher had performed
his task. Ultimately, however, the Archduke
Charles' plan was definitely adopted, subject to

AUSTRIAN OPERATIONS 97

slight alterations due to the actual situation of
the units of the whole Army.

There were at this moment 171 battalions and
95 squadrons (94,600 men) in Italy, and in the
district around Trent, 28 battalions and 6
squadrons (12,100 men) — in all, 106,700 men. The
Archduke John had 22,000 men in the Tyrol, and
the " Army of Germany," as Prince Ferdinand's
command was designated, comprised 88 battalions
and 48 squadrons, say 60,000 men ; whilst 35
battalions and 18 squadrons remained behind in
the interior of the Monarchy.

Active operations were to commence in Italy
by the capture of Mantua and Peschiera as pre-
liminaries to acquiring the country round Milan.
There would then be a temporary halt until the
Army of Germany, united with the Russians, had
established themselves firmly in Suabia.

The Army of Germany was to penetrate into
Bavaria, following the roads along the foot-hills of
the Alps, so as to gain ground as quickly as
possible, carrying the war into the enemy's
country, capturing his Army and securing the
outlets from the Tyrol.

" If the French, operating on the left bank of

the Danube, threatened Ulm or Regensburg, a

position was to be taken up about Munich facing

towards the river, or the river itself was to be crossed

G

98 POLITICAL FACTORS INFLUENCING

higher up to threaten the enemy's communications,
until the arrival of reinforcements rendered it
possible to fight a decisive battle."

The plan then goes on to specify what should
be done after all the fortresses had been captured,
and all the battles won, and is perhaps one of the
best examples of selling the bear's skin before the
animal has been caught which history has
preserved.

The sentence underlined indicates without
doubt Mack's contribution, the rest is the un-
diluted wisdom of the Eighteenth-Century school,
to which the Archduke had again reverted after
his momentary emancipation in 1796.

On the 2nd September Mack took over the
command of the troops already assembled at
the Camp of Wels, pending the arrival of the
young Archduke, and immediately he despatched
the available force in two columns towards the
Inn, which they were to cross on the 8th, their
ultimate destination being Parsdorf and Freising
respectively, which they were to reach on the
1 3th September. The northern column under
Klenau consisted of 15 battalions, 16 squadrons ;
the southern one under Gottesheim of 15 battalions,
15 squadrons ; in both cases, the guns accompany-
ing the troops forming part of the regimental
establishments are not given. At the same time

AUSTRIAN OPERATIONS 99

Jellacic's command in the Tyrol moved up in
support of an advance guard under Wolfskeel
from Bregenz to Ravensburg and Waldsee, thence
to Biberach and the upper Danube, whilst the
main body concentrated about Feldkirch on the
Rhine above Lake Constance.

Behind this first echelon, there followed on the
northern road, vid Braunau, Riesch's Column
of 12 battalions, 16 squadrons, and i heavy
battery due at Braunau I7th September ; and on
the southern road Kienmayer's command of 13
battalions, 16 squadrons, i battery, due at
Scharding on the Inn, I3th September ; and
behind both was Gyulai at Salzburg with 8
battalions, 16 squadrons, i battery — in all 60
battalions, 78 squadrons in Bavaria, with 21
battalions, 6 squadrons in the Tyrol under
Jellacic, with a total strength of 51,000 men.
These were to be followed immediately by 39
battalions and 52 squadrons moving up to the
frontier from the interior (another 30,000) giv-
ing in round figures 80,000 for the whole
command.

The orders by which Mack set this Army in
motion have not been published ; fortunately,
however, their issue threw the Archduke Charles
into such a fury that he addressed a special
report to the Emperor calling attention to the in-

ioo POLITICAL FACTORS INFLUENCING

numerable instances in which Mack had exceeded
both his powers and the customs of the Austrian
Army. From this report we get some insight into
the absolute fearlessness with which Mack accepted
all responsibility, and the determination he showed
in getting things done. The Archduke's biographer
would have been wiser had he suppressed this
letter.

Meanwhile, on the 3rd September, Austria broke
off diplomatic negotiations with France, and
Prince Schwartzenberg was sent to the Elector of
Bavaria at Munich to announce the coming War,
and to solicit the Elector's support. He reached
the Bavarian Court on the 6th, and the Elector
assured him verbally of his intention to stand by
the Austrians, referring him to the Minister for
Foreign Affairs, Montgelas, for further details.
Conferences accordingly took place on the two
succeeding days, but on the night of the 8th the
Elector himself slipped away towards Wiirzburg,
and the Bavarian Army followed him, part to-
wards Wiirzburg, part towards Bamberg. Finding
that he had been deceived, Schwartzenberg rode
back to Mack on the Qth inst., and the latter at
once sent off flying columns, both to pursue the
Bavarians and to cut off and seize supplies and
stores, and break up all centres of mobilisation.
These flying columns, of all arms, formed an

AUSTRIAN OPERATIONS 101

advance screen of observation. The main bodies
were also ordered to increase their marches and
were timed now to reach the Iller, between
Memmingen and Ulm, on the igth September.

Mack himself reached the Iller on the I5th,
and immediately commenced laying out works
for the defence of the whole river line, concen-
trating particularly on Memmingen and Ulm,
both needing but little to place them in security
against a surprise attack. His activity was
ceaseless, and we find him also at work about
Ravensburg and Lindau, evidently seeing per-
sonally to his supply arrangements and communi-
cations with the Tyrol.

On the igth September the Archduke Ferdinand
assumed command of the Army and signalised
the event by ordering Kienmayer, Gyulai, and
Riesch to halt, and the Advance Guard to keep
behind the Iller. At the same time he wrote to
Mack to rejoin at Headquarters. Mack seems
to have ignored this invitation, going on to
Kempten, part of his tour of inspection, but
he wrote to the Prince, adjuring him not to
interfere with the orders already issued, and
also to the Emperor, who had reached the
front. This letter is so characteristic of Mack's
attitude that it is reproduced practically in
full:—

102 POLITICAL FACTORS INFLUENCING

iqthSept. 1805.
"To H. M. THE EMPEROR.

" All except perhaps 10,000 to 12,000 men who
remain to guard the coasts and southern frontier
of France are moving on the Rhine, and soon two
great French Armies will cross that river; one
probably between Huningen and Strassburg,
the other between Mannhein and Mayence :
the former against your Majesty's Army on the
Iller, the latter by Wiirzburg against the Russians
coming from Bohemia. I entreat your Majesty
most earnestly to approve the measures indicated
in the project which accompanies this note," etc.,
etc.

To this appeal the Emperor proved amenable,
and the troops were allowed to proceed to the
destinations to which Mack had assigned them.

On the 2ist September the Emperor and the
Archduke went to Landsberg where they met
Mack, and during the following two days the situa-
tion was fully discussed, especially the question
of the possible violation of Ansbach, a question
primarily for the Foreign Office and the Emperor,
not for Mack in command of a Field Force. In
his " Justification," subsequently published, Mack
claims that neither the Emperor nor his advisers
considered it within the limits of probability, in

AUSTRIAN OPERATIONS 103

view of the declarations they had received from the
Prussian Court.

Mack's mind being thus at rest as to the direction
from which alone serious danger might threaten
him, the following arrangements were agreed to
on the 23rd September : —

A Flank Guard consisting of Kienmayer's
Corps of 16 battalions, 24 squadrons, to be formed
at Neuburg on the Danube to watch Bernadotte
and the Bavarians about Bamberg ; a flying
column of 4 battalions, 2 squadrons, then moving
from Bohemia on Amberg was to act as vanguard
to the chief command. Kienmayer's Corps had
been delayed on the way, but was now ordered to
bring up the troops on country carriages1 and ac-
celerate its movement by every means in its
power.

All the troops in Tyrol were ordered in to Bavaria,
and steps were actually taken to transfer 20,000
men from the Army of Italy to Mack's command ;
these however were never carried out, and other
orders were issued, which brought the Austrian
forces on the 3rd October into the following
positions : —

Jellacic's Corps. — Wolfkeel's Brigade, 5 bat-

1 Napoleon's expedient of sending the Imperial Guard to
the front in horsed carriages in 1806 iyas therefore antici
pated by Macl$.

104 POLITICAL FACTORS INFLUENCING

talions, 6 squadrons (3000 men), at Lindau,
Tettnang, Buchhorn, Merseburg ; Richter's
Brigade, 7 battalions (3500), Achberg, Wangen,
Isny, and towards Kempten ; the remainder
gathering at Feldkirch.

Schwartzenberg's Corps. — Main body (Gottes-
heim) at Ravensburg, Men gen, to Sigmaringen,
Markdorf (8600).

Klenau's Command — Advance Guard and
Reserve. — Advance guard, I battalion rifles, 14
squadrons at Pfullendorf-Stokach, Engen and
Radolfzell ; Reserve, 8 squadrons (Mack's) Cuiras-
siers at Wurzach, and 4 battalions Grenadiers
at Biberach and Waldsee (5000 men).

Riesch's Corps. — Headquarters Weissenhorn,
and generally distributed between the Iller and
Lech. Gyulai, Kerpen and Hesse-Homburg
along the Danube, with Auffenberg on the march
from the Tyrol between Memmingen-Wertingen
and Burgau (30,000 men).

Werneck's Corps. — Headquarters Turkheim.
Hohenzollerns' Division, Buchloe, Turkheim-
Mindelheim (6500).

Kienmayer's Corps. — i battalion and Head-
quarters Munich ; 3 at Neuburg, 3 battalions and
16 squadrons Ingolstadt, 8 squadrons Eichstadt,
4 squadrons near Ellwangen, 2 squadrons towards
Amberg with reserves still on the march.

AUSTRIAN OPERATIONS 105

As a preparatory deployment, the enemy being
supposed still at a distance, and cantonments
being largely conditioned by positions of magazines
in Austrian enclaves, it is not easy to find fault
with this distribution. The troops covered a
rectangle, about 100 miles by 60 square, and
could be concentrated for action without forced
marching, facing either west or north within about
seventy-two hours, and, the neutrality of Ansbach
being assumed, it will be seen that the Austrians
were in a position to turn with their whole force on
either of the enemy's columns as best might suit
their purpose. In fact they were on "interior
lines " to the French Columns, as they had a right
to believe these columns to be moving. They could
leave a retaining force behind field entrenchments
on the Iller to gain time against the main French
columns, and then turn upon Bernadotte and the
Bavarians, or vice versa detain Bernadotte whilst
turning on Napoleon.

Whatever reason those who had fought against
the French in 1796, in the same theatre of war,
might have to fear the consequence of an encounter
against a numerically superior force, Mack himself
with the memories of his victories in Belgium had
no particular reason to flinch from such a venture.

Moreover, he was not there pledged to win a
decisive battle or perish, but merely to gain

106 POLITICAL FACTORS INFLUENCING

time and to hold the French until the Russians
could reach the Inn, and the wider he made his
zone of manoeuvres obviously the more oppo-
tunities he would find for delaying his enemy.

That Napoleon's columns could outmarch him
by nearly two miles to one was an idea that could
not in reason have entered his head. Nothing in
previous experience existed to justify such an
assumption, and if the idea did perhaps for a
moment flash across his mind, the results of his
own experiment in forcing men beyond the normal
rate of movement could only cause him hope that
his enemy would be so ill advised as to make the
attempt ; for in this rapid advance to the Iller,
the Austrian Army, hastily got together, had
fallen into lamentable disarray. Half-trained
horses had died by the dozen, ill-fitting harness
had used up many more, stragglers had multi-
plied exceedingly, and the whole Army was sorely
in need of the rest it now expected to get, but of
which it was so soon to be robbed.

After the event, all the hardships of this march
were remembered against Mack, and he was
asked why he had hurried them on so remorse-
lessly. His answer, however, was conclusive, and
may as well be cited at once : " The Lech could
be turned as easily as the Iller, the line of the Isar
was untenable, hence only the Inn remained, and

AUSTRIAN OPERATIONS 107

if this had been held half the Army would have
been needed to close the roads through the Tyrol.
But some 30,000 men would have been altogether
too few to stop the united onset of the whole
French Army, and from the Inn to Vienna there
is not room enough to gain time. Hence the
Austrians would be beaten, and the French reach
Vienna before the Russians could come to its
assistance."

There remained thus only the district between
the Iller and Lech as a zone for concentration, and
orders having been given to accumulate magazines
at Ulm, Memmingen, and elsewhere, Mack really
was as well justified in selecting Ulm as atemporary
base as was Napoleon in choosing Dresden for the
same purpose in 1813. Indeed he was more so ;
for if the enemy closed in on him as the Allies did
on Dresden, he could always march out across his
communications on the left bank of the Danube
and join the Russians ; whilst if they pressed on
him from the north he could retire on any point
of his base, which extended from the Inn along
the Tyrolese frontier, and was extended by Lake
Constance and the Rhine at least as far as Schaff-
hausen.

The ultimate cause of his downfall must be
looked for far deeper than in the man or the Army
alone. It wa$ fundamentally the want of a real

io8 POLITICAL FACTORS

national spirit as driving force to the Army which
was lacking. Had there been representatives of
the people with guillotines on travelling carriages
to enforce obedience to Mack's orders — those
orders to which the Archduke Charles took twenty
foolscap pages of exception — the result of the
campaign might have been very different.

CHAPTER IV

THE MARCH FROM BOULOGNE TO THE RHINE

IN the previous chapter I have sketched out the
manner in which Austria was gradually inveigled
into a fighting coalition against the French, and
the nature of her preparations to meet the first
shocks of the coming war.

Few of these details escaped the notice of
Napoleon's secret agents, but for want of the key
to their inner significance he paid little attention
to them until the beginning of August 1805,
when, in view of the dilatoriness and want of
enterprise of his Admirals and his Spanish Allies,
it became apparent to him that his chances of
being allowed by the Continent of Europe to
carry through his projected invasion of England
were becoming exceedingly precarious.

From the moment of rupture of the Treaty of
Amiens he had of course anticipated that Great
Britain would exert every conceivable means of
raising the Continent against him, but had con-
sidered himself safeguarded against such en-
deavours primarily by the factor of " Time," and
secondly by the seizure of Hanover, and the use he
109

no THE MARCH FROM

intended to make of its possession in his dealings
with Prussia.

He had by this time thoroughly grasped the
innate selfishness of the old diplomacy, based,
as I have before explained, on the view then
held by all kings and princes by divine right,
that the land they ruled over was in fact their
property in the same sense as a great landowner
regards his estate in the present day — viz. a trust
to be developed and handed on to his descendants
by every means that the legal ingenuity of his
solicitors can contrive. The Chancelleries and
diplomatists stood to their kings in the same
relation that old family solicitors stood to their
employers, and identified themselves with all
royal interests in much the same manner —
believing it to be their duty to remember that
the estate never dies, and to protect its interests
against possible temporary aberrations of the
proprietor for the time being.

Thus Prussia coveted Hanover, while Austrian
and Prussian interests were in direct opposition
to one another in Poland, and at many other
points. Austria could hardly fight Prussia single-
handed ; hence, if Prussia could be induced to ally
herself with France in exchange for Hanover, no
amount of intrigue on the part of Russia would
suffice to force Austria into the field.

BOULOGNE TO THE RHINE in

Therefore immediately after the seizure of
Hanover negotiations were opened with Prussia,
in which the latter was offered the reversion of
Hanover, on the conclusion of Peace, in exchange
for a treaty of alliance with France . The Prussian
Foreign Office rose readily to the bait. But like
sound men of business, realising the importance
of the advantages already held, they began
bargaining for the best terms they could obtain.
Being above all things anxious to keep the Peace
of Europe, at any rate north of the Alps, they
proposed that Napoleon should join them in
guaranteeing the neutrality of the Southern
German States. This however was entirely un-
acceptable to Napoleon because, as he pointed out
to the Prussian Ambassador in Paris, Luchesini
(November 1803), it not only left the Austrians
free to attack him in Italy, but deprived him of the
very roads by which he could most directly deliver
a counter-attack in the event of hostilities on the
Italian frontier. Further proposals were then
put forward, and much time was lost in their
consideration ; but nothing the French could do
would induce the King of Prussia to sanction the
use of the word " Alliance " in any of the proposed
treaties. In fact he could not honourably do so,
because all the time that his agents were negotiat-
ing with France he himself was corresponding

H2 THE MARCH FROM

privately with the Emperors of Austria and
Russia.

Meanwhile rumours of Austrian war prepara-
tions continued to reach Napoleon, who desired
his Ambassador in Vienna, La Rochefoucauld, to
obtain explanations, which were duly furnished
to the following effect.

Owing to the spread of yellow fever introduced
into Italy from the West Indies, the Austrian
Government had found itself compelled to guard
its frontiers against the disease by establishing a
cordon of troops, and these having been moved out
of their cantonments, it had been found necessary
to bring up others from the interior to take the
places thus left vacant. The troops moved had
been almost exclusively infantry and only some.
18,000 in number. This statement being con-
firmed by the Emperor of Austria in his own hand-
writing, in a very straightforward reply to a letter
addressed directly to him by Napoleon, the latter
for the moment accepted the explanation as
satisfactory. He however wrote again to say that
he was so anxious to avoid any possibilities of mis-
understandings in the future, that he proposed to
unite the Italian Republics then under French
dominion into an independent kingdom which
should act as a buffer-state between the two
nations, but he did not state his intentions,

BOULOGNE TO THE RHINE 113

already formed, of placing the Iron Crown of
the new kingdom upon his own head.

This correspondence took place during December
1803 and January 1804, and for the moment did
much to strengthen the hands of the peace party.
Napoleon's negotiations and assurances to Russia
were equally satisfactory, and indeed the War
Party in the latter Empire were hard pressed to
find an excuse for the hostilities so eagerly desired.
Hence the news of Napoleon's coronation at
Milan, followed immediately by his incorpora-
tion of Genoa into the new kingdom, came as a
positive godsend to further the ambitions of the
War Party.

The seizure of Genoa in particular affected
Russian interests, and decisively won over the
Emperor Alexander to the War Party, while the
two events together convinced both Emperors
that peace with France could never be maintained
as long as her affairs were in Napoleon's hands.
This view of the matter seems never to have struck
Napoleon himself, who for the time being devoted
himself entirely to home affairs and the prosecu-
tion of his designs against Great Britain. How
thoroughly in earnest he was as regards the latter
seems to me conclusively established by the fact
that he took no steps whatever to buy horses for
transport or to organise supply trains until a few
H

n4 THE MARCH FROM

days before he commenced his great march to
the Rhine.

The only precautionary measures he adopted
to meet the possibilities which the reports of his
secret agents all over Europe continued to fore-
shadow with increasing intensity was to open a
correspondence with the courts of Bavaria,
Wiirtemberg and Baden with a view to obtaining
contingents from them, and facilities of movement
through their dominions. These bear the stamp of
carelessness, very unusual in anything emanating
from his mind, as the following example will show.

His first idea of Bavarian co-operation was the
suggestion that a Corps of 20,000 men (i.e. practic-
ally the whole Bavarian Army) should take up
a position about Passau to dispute the passage of
the Inn against the Austrians. Let the reader
look at the map and note the line of the Inn in
relation to the Tyrol, all of which district was held
by the Austrians. I think he will agree with the
Bavarian generals, who one and all refused to
accept the responsibility of such a command,
because it was certain to lead to an unconditional
surrender in the open field. For once Napoleon
did not insist, but left the Bavarians free to make
their own dispositions.

Since the trend of all the reports he received
throughout the summer pointed unmistakably to

BOULOGNE TO THE RHINE 115

hostilities in the very near future, it is presumable
that he still relied absolutely on being able to
buy the Prussian Alliance when it became worth
his while to offer what he believed to be a full
price for it— viz. Hanover unconditionally. In
this he would probably have been right had he
only had the Prussian Foreign Office to deal with.
But he did not know, and apparently did not even
suspect, how the King had already pledged himself
to the Emperor Alexander and the Court of
Vienna.

When, therefore, from the reports he received
between the I2th and 2ist of August (in particular
one from Strasburg, dated 2ist, stating that the
Austrians were giving out contracts and filling
up magazines in Suabia), he decided to declare
war against Austria, and thereby renounced all his
schemes against England. He forthwith de-
spatched Duroc, as a special plenipotentiary, to
sign and seal the alliance he desired in return for
his immediate surrender of Hanover, the garrison
of which country — viz. Bernadotte's Corps of
some 20,000 men — he intended to employ more
profitably elsewhere, a point which the Prussians
could hardly have overlooked.

The letter Duroc took with him was frankness
personified, and deserves reproduction as one
of the most characteristic from Napoleon's pen.

n6 ^THE MARCH FROM

"CAMP OF BOULOGNE,

" 2$rd Augt. 1805.

"MONSIEUR MON FRERE, — J'envoie aupres de
Votre Majeste le General Duroc. II est muni de
tous mes pouvoirs pour signer avec la personne
que Votre Majeste voudra designer, le traite dont
nos minis tres sont convenus. Je me rejouirai
de tous les nouveaux lieus qui ressereront nos
Etats. Nos ennemis sont communs. L'acquisi-
tion du Hanovre est geographiquement necessaire
a Votre Majeste, surtout lorsque 1'Europe se
trouve partagee entre de si grandes puissances.

" Le partage de la Pologne a amene un grand
changement ; il a annule la Suede et rendu
Europeenne la Russie, qui ne trouve plus de con-
trepoids ; Constantinople et Ispahan n'en sont
plus un. L'Autriche redouble ses preparatifs;
FElecteur de Baviere est tres alarme. Votre
Majeste n'a pas un jour a perdre pour ordonner
un rassemblement sur la Boheme.

" J'ai ordonne que Tou communiquat a Votre
Majeste tout ce que j'ai fait dire a 1'Autriche ;
si elle ne rentre pas dans ses garnisons et con-
tonnements de paix, je suis resolu a marcher
moi memes avec plus de 100,000 homines en
Baviere. II faudra done se battre encore.

"Dieu, ma conscience, Votre Majeste, et TEurope
me seront temoins que je suis attaque, puisque

BOULOGNE TO THE RHINE 117

je suis menace sur mes frontieres, lorsque toutes
mes troupes sont sur des vaisseaux et sur les
cotes. La maison d'Autriche n'est pas dans le
cas de me faire t£te. Elle s'aveugle. Les
maux de la guerre retomberont sur elle. Je n'ai
rien a redoubter de cette lutte, avec, cependant
Faide de Dieu, de qui tout depend. Monsieur
mon Frere une nouvelle scene se presente pour
F Europe. Nous aurons besoin de nous entendre
et de marcher d'harmonie pour le repos du monde
et le bien de nos Etats. Je me flatte que Votre
Majeste ni moi ne dechoirons, et que nous lais-
serons nos Etats, ceux des princes qui feront cause
commune avec nous, au m£me degre de splendeur
ou ils sont. J'ai trop epargne la Maison de FAu-
triche, elle est encore trop puissante pour laisser
FEurope au repos et ne pas attenter aux libertes
de FAllemagne. Si elle reste armee, la guerre
est imminent e.

"Toutes les occasions qui se presenteront de
vous donner des preuves d'estime et d'amitie
seront pour moi des moments de bonheur.

"NAPOLtON. "

(Corres. No. 9116). l

1 " CAMP OF BOULOGNE,
" 2$rd Augt. 1805.

" MY BROTHER, — I am sending to your Majesty
General Duroc. He is provided with full powers to sign,
with the individual your Majesty is pleased to designate,

ii8 THE MARCH FROM

What the inevitable effect of such a letter upon
a monarch by right Divine must be, it is evident
that he never paused to think, for on the very
day of its despatch, his last hopes of a successful
termination to Villeneuve's manoeuvres having
vanished, he began issuing orders for the march
to the Rhine.

His first step was to write to Dejean, Minister of
Administration for War, to order 500,000 rations
of biscuit at Strassburg, and 200,000 at Mayence
(Corres. No. 9122), and the Inspector General of

the treaty on which our Ministers have agreed. I re-
joice at the new bonds which will draw together our
States. We have enemies in common. The acquisition
of Hanover is a geographical necessity to your Majesty,
particularly when Europe is divided between such great
Powers.

" The partition of Poland has brought about a great
change ; it has cancelled Sweden and made Russia a
European Power to which there is no adequate counter-
poise, for Constantinople and Ispahan no longer count.
Austria redoubles her preparations ; the Elector of
Bavaria is much alarmed. Your Majesty has not a day
to lose in ordering a concentration on your Bohemian
frontier.

"I have ordered the whole of my correspondence
with Austria to be communicated to your Majesty ;
if she does not order her troops back into their peace
quarters I am determined to march at the head of more
than 100,000 men into Bavaria, and we shall have to
fight again.

" God, my conscience, your Majesty, and Europe will
be my witnesses that I am attacked, since I am menaced

BOULOGNE TO THE RHINE 119

Artillery sent out circulars to the Directors of
Artillery at Strasburg, Mayence, Metz, and Neuf
Breisach to have all the rolling material in their
several charges prepared immediately for the
field.1 Marmont was warned to be ready to dis-
embark his troops from the transports at short
notice, and Bernadotte was directed to assemble
his Corps at Gottingen in view of hostilities with
Austria.
On the 24th August Berthier issued instructions

on my frontiers when my troops are on board my ships
or on the coast. The House of Austria is in no position
to make head against me. She is wilfully blind. The
evils of war will fall upon her. I have nothing to fear
from this struggle, with, however, the help of God from
whom all things depend. My Brother, a new scene is
about to present itself to Europe. It is necessary that
we should come to an understanding and work in har-
mony for the repose of the World and the good of our
countries. I flatter myself that neither your Majesty
or I will fail, and that we shall leave our dominions, and
those of the princes who make common cause with us,
in the same splendour to which they have at present
attained. I have spared the House of Austria too much ;
she is still too powerful to leave Europe at rest and not
to attempt to undermine the liberties of Germany. If
she remains armed war is imminent.

" Every opportunity which may arise to give proofs
of my esteem and friendship will be moments of happi-
ness for me. NAPOLEON. "

1 On the same day a letter was received from De Songis in reply
to an inquiry by Berthier, dated the 2Oth inst. , stating that no trace
could be found of any stores of harness in their arsenal.

120 THE MARCH FROM

for various preparatory movements for units
other than those already incorporated in the
Grand Army to facilitate the final concentration
on the Rhine.

Berthier's letter to Marmont deserves citation,
as it shows that there was still a lingering hesita-
tion in the Emperor's mind.

" I would warn you, General, that the Emperor's
squadron sailed from Ferrol in company with the
Spaniards on the I4th August. If these combined
squadrons arrive in the Channel, the Emperor
will immediately undertake the expedition to
England ; but if, by reason either of adverse
winds or of want of audacity in our Admirals,
they do not reach the Channel, the Emperor and
King will adjourn the expedition to another year.
. . . But I must advise you that in the present
state of affairs in Europe, the Emperor will be
obliged to disperse the assemblies of Austrian
troops in Tyrol — hence it is his Majesty's intention
that you should be ready on 'receipt of further
orders from me to disembark and march your
command towards Mayence, giving out that the
troops are moving into cantonments, and keeping
the secret of their destination as long as possible."

On the 24th August the Cuirassiers and Dragoons
are directed on the Rhine and their organisation

BOULOGNE TO THE RHINE 121

modified. Four Cuirassier Regiments from the
interior (i.e. not belonging to the " Army of
England ") are ordered to Landau to make up
a Division under d'Hautpoul, whilst that of
Nansouty marches from Lille to Schlettstadt and
Neuf Breisach. The two enormous Divisions
of Dragoons, one of 9, the other of n regiments,
are broken up, and by the addition of 4 other regi-
ments from the interior are formed into 4 Divisions
of 2 brigades each of 3 regiments, and sent to
watch the Rhine from Schlettstadt to Spire, all
possible precautions being taken to keep their
destinations secret. On the next day the Dragoons
and Oudinot's Grenadiers are warned to march
" to-morrow," the 26th, and their destination
is no longer limited by the Rhine, but may extend
along the road from Strassburg to Vienna, into
Bavaria. Evidently they were intended as an
Advance Guard on which the Bavarians could
rally.

So far the Emperor seems to have had no
doubt that he would be able to reach the Inn
undisturbed, since in his instructions to Murat
and Bertrand, despatched to reconnoitre on the
25th August, he directs their attention particu-
larly to the country between the Lech and the
Inn and beyond. They were to call at Wiirzburg
and Ulm respectively on their way and report

122 THE MARCH FROM

upon each place as points of support to a line of
communications, but not with a view to tactical
operations in their vicinity.

On the 26th August the Emperor dictated the
orders of march for the Corps of Davout, Soult,
Lannes and Ney. The latter was directed on
Schlettstadt, Soult and Lannes to Strassburg,
Davout to Hagenau. Marmont was to march on
Mayence, where he was to arrive about the I5th
September, and Bernadotte was ordered to Gottin-
gen, both the latter being warned that they would
probably have to continue their march on
Wiirzburg.

The heads of the Columns had hardly begun
to march when the Emperor suddenly changed
their destinations. On the 28th August he wrote
to Dejean :

" Landau will be one of the chief points
of assembly. I have told you to have 500,000
rations of biscuit at Strassburg ; it will be con-
venient to divide them as follows, 200,000
Strassburg, 200,000 at Landau, 100,000 at Spire."

Under this new disposition Davout, Soult and
Ney were to lie between Hagenau and Spire,
and only the Advance Guard was to remain near
Strassburg, while Savary was sent out the same
day to reconnoitre three lines of road starting

BOULOGNE TO THE RHINE 123

from Carlsruhe and ending on the Danube
between Ulm and Dillingen.

The explanation generally accepted of this
sudden change in Napoleon's dispositions is that
by this step the troops avoided the difficult
denies of the Black Forest, and were better placed
to execute the manoeuvres which ultimately ended
in the surrender of Mack at Ulm.

But as the French Official History of the
Campaign points out, it is nothing less than
puerile to suggest that Napoleon only heard for
the first time of the difficulties of the Black Forest
between the 27th and 28th August, or could have
planned the manoeuvre of Ulm at a time when
he had not the remotest reason to suppose that
Mack intended to go there.

Up to the night of the 27th all that the French
Emperor knew of the Austrian preparations was
that they were in progress at various points along
the frontier, and he believed that by keeping the
movement of his own troops secret, and using all
possible speed, he could anticipate them between
the Lech and the Inn. But during that night he
appears to have learnt that both the Austrian
and Russian preparations were much further
advanced than he had believed them to be, and
as it was 400 miles from the coast to the Rhine,
and only 300 from the Rhine to the Inn, it suddenly

124 THE MARCH FROM

appeared quite possible that the Austrians would
reach the Rhine first, in which case the concentra-
tion of his whole Army before collision ensued in
the positions first indicated would be doubtful if
not impossible.

Everything pointed to the march of the
Austrians by the shortest and for them most
convenient roads through Ulm to Strassburg,
Memmingen and Freiburg, on which he already
knew they had accumulated provisions. The
revised orders therefore rendered his concentra-
tion on his left secure, and in his further advance
on Ulm and Dillingen he preserved full freedom of
manoeuvre either against the Austrians to the
south or the Russians from Bohemia should they
elect to come that way ; and in case of necessity
he could change his base from Mayence and
Strassburg to Strassburg and Neuf Breisach, as
circumstances might dictate.

THE GRAND ARMY

The great weakness of the Grand Army as it
stood on the shores of the Channel, its units duly
assigned to their respective Brigades, Divisions
and Corps, lay in the want of an adequate General
Staff to combine and co-ordinate its movements.
There were indeed a considerable number of War-
experienced men accustomed to the office work

BOULOGNE TO THE RHINE 125

of the field, excellent as individuals, but not
trained in the same school to view matters from
the same standpoint, or to work in harmony
with one another, and even these were insufficient
in number, whilst no arrangements whatever
existed for the education and subsequent selection
of men to fill its junior ranks. In default of
such a school, selection tempered by favouritism
produced a plentiful crop of typical " brass hats "
—&.0. men who, insufficiently taught to appreciate
the true needs and capacity of the soldiers in the
ranks, issue orders which can only be obeyed at
the expense of the fighting efficiency of the troops,
or circulate them with such carelessness that they
generally arrive too late at their destination.
Such types were not unknown in the British Army
during the first months of Lord Roberts' South
African Campaign.

The actual composition of the Army as regards
rank and file was excellent. From the inspection
returns of the year XI 1 1., preserved in the Archives,
it appears that 50,538 out of 115,582 had already
seen service, though this number was very un-
evenly distributed amongst the different arms.
The Sappers coming first with 77 per cent, of
their strength, then the Light Cavalry and the
Infantry averaging 42*5 per cent.

The number of men over 10 years of service

126 THE MARCH FROM

varied considerably. In the I7th Line there were
918 out of 951, in the isth Light Infantry 540
out of 569, and the I4th Line came lowest with
267 out of 741. Generally 25 per cent of the Army
had fought all through the campaigns of the
Republic, a second quarter had been through
Marengo or Hohenlinden, and the remainder had
been enlisted since 1801.

Nearly all the officers and non-commissioned
officers had seen service, and in each regiment
there were still some sturdy survivors of the old
Royal Army, some with 40 years' service.

The Hussars had been the most conservative,
and retained most of their old traditions ; they
had received very few conscripts, but had kept
up their numbers by voluntary enlistments,
generally from Alsatian or other German families.
One half of their officers were however quite
illiterate, and many did not even know the words
of command in French. Marbot's description of
them as they were in 1799 was still substantially
accurate in 1805, they remained soldiers first
and troubled themselves not at all about political
questions.

The other arms had absorbed the republican
spirit, tempered by an iron despotism in face of
the enemy. Off parade they might argue as they
pleased, in action obedience was absolute, but

BOULOGNE TO THE RHINE 127

on the march a betwixt and between system was
observed, and straggling and marauding, as the
sequel will show, soon reached terrible proportions.
Each regiment had its own traditions, and the
wretched recruits were hazed and bullied unmerci-
fully until they conformed. Hence desertion
during the Camp was very high, from 5 to 8 per
cent, per annum, but all this vanished when on the
march to the Rhine. The men were freely given
furlough on their honour to rejoin at their final
destination, and only some forty men in Soult's
Corps failed to appear before the river was crossed.
The complaints, however, against the want of
physical development in the recruits were ceaseless,
though as yet the drain on the population had
not been at all serious. But these complaints are
common to every Army in which esprit de corps
runs high, and since these men did in fact accom-
plish perhaps the fastest and furthest march in
history under the heaviest floods and over some
of the worst of roads, they must be taken more as
an indication of the pride of the Army than as
an evidence of real shortcoming in the recruits
themselves.

The composition of the Officers present with
the Grand Army is of peculiar interest. The
total number was 5000 ; of these about 100 came
from the new school for Officers at Fontainebleau,

128 THE MARCH FROM

and were between 17 and 21 years of age, 500 to
600 from the original volunteers of 1792 or from
the conscripts raised since the commencement of
the Revolution. These were mostly picked men,
selected for their general standard of instruction
and social position, like de Fezensac, or for
distinguished conduct in action, as Dulong,
commanding a battalion at twenty-five ; but
mostly they were still lieutenants in 1805. The
remainder had all served with the old Royal Army
either in the ranks, or as officers had survived
the general dibdcle.

The average age of the sub-lieutenants 'was
32, and that of the lieutenants 37, whilst
those of the Captains and superior regimental
officers was only 39 ; but there were more than
ninety lieutenants over 50 years of age, and
four over 60.

" Men were already beginning to grumble in the
Grand Army, and it looks as if a few more years
of peace would have destroyed it " (vol. i.
p. 179). "This is not its only fault. It is very
poorly trained to manoeuvres, almost all the old
professional officers of the old Royal Army have
disappeared, and the few who remain have attained
high rank, whence they exercise little influence on
the instruction of their men, and drill has become
exceedingly neglected."

BOULOGNE TO THE RHINE 129

This, by the way, almost inevitably happens
in an Army which has grown up on the Battle-
field, and fought with almost constant success.
Men feel that they are " good enough " and,
having never felt the need of iron discipline
in disaster, object to what they consider merely
unpractical playing at soldiers.

It is the school of defeat that in the long run
turns out the better fighting men and leaders,
and hence the curious swing of the pendulum
that has so often occurred between races of
approximately equal fighting capacity. The
recruits were supposed to be drilled at the depots,
but, as usual, all the most infirm and useless
officers had been relegated to these positions,
and the instruction given appears to have been
very indifferent indeed.

The Cavalry were poorly mounted, and only
here and there in the confidential returns is
an officer mentioned as showing keenness or
knowledge of equitation, proving how low the
standard had fallen since former days.

Next to the Hussars, the Artillery and Engineers
had suffered least from the Revolution. The
Artillery remained to the last the elite of the whole
Army, but the Engineers as a body seem to have
been about the standard of our military foremen
of works, good at estimating and at the drawing-
i

1 3o THE MARCH FROM

board, but with no broad grasp of the principles of
their profession.

The analysis of the ages and service of the 141
General Officers is very interesting. Their ages
vary from one of 29 years to one of 58, but the
mean is 40. One quarter had served as officers
of the old Army, one quarter in its ranks, and the
remainder came chiefly from the levies subsequent
to 1791. That is to say that the men sprung
from the great upheaval of that year had been on
the whole more successful in their career than
the older professional officers, some 4000 of
whom were still in regimental positions.

The most crying need of the Army, however,
was horses, both for Cavalry, Artillery and trans-
port. Many Dragoons, in fact, were organised
in dismounted battalions and marched to the
front on their own feet, trusting to pick up horses
by the way, and for transport only one contract
was given out in May, when possibilities of an
Austrian campaign were first in sight. This was
made with the "Compagnie Breidt" for the
provision of 30 brigades of waggons, of which
however only 6, with 163 waggons, were actually
ready in time.1

Nothing to my mind could indicate more

1 See " Studien zur Kriegsgeschichte und Taktik, part iii.,
note, p. 13. General Staff, Berlin.

BOULOGNE TO THE RHINE 131

clearly than these deficiencies the reality of
Napoleon's determination to invade England, for
no transports, and but little cavalry and artillery,
would be needed for a march upon London, hence
few were provided. But had the intention only
been to prepare an army at Boulogne for employ-
ment anywhere in Europe at large, it is contrary
to everything we know of the Emperor's methods
to imagine it destitute of the chief conditions
favouring the mobility he relied on so thoroughly
and so well knew how to direct.

Nevertheless, whatever the shortcomings in
tactical training, organisation, and so forth, dis-
closed in the above pages, we have generally
been led to believe that such as it was the Grand
Army crossed the Rhine, ready to the last gaiter
button, horse and foot.

Nothing, however, could well have been further
from the truth, for the records now published
reveal deficiencies many times greater than those
which sufficed to paralyse the Imperial Army
during the latter days of July 1870, and one is
often tempted to wonder what might have been
the fate of the German Armies in the Palatinate
had Napoleon I., not his nephew, Napoleon III.,
been in supreme command at that date.

The march across had been almost as trying
as in an enemy's country, for, though countless

132 THE MARCH FROM

orders to secure adequate preparations along the
several roads chosen for the movement had been
sent on in advance, neither time or money was
forthcoming to ensure their execution. On the
whole the men fared well — at least they received
enough to eat and generally a roof to sleep under.
But the civil population, particularly in the north,
was by no means anxious to help them. The
Mayors would assign billets in villages four or
five miles away from the main roads, thus adding
materially to the fatigue of the men, who already
were timed at an average of nearly twenty miles a
day, and when the town of Lille absolutely refused
to receive the ist Division of the III. Corps JDavout
took the law into his own hands and forthwith
quartered his men on the inhabitants as in an
enemy's country.

At Vitry too, the troops having consented to
sleep in the empty barracks if straw was provided,
the town failed to provide the straw, and when the
Officers complained the Mayor refused to furnish
the marching-out certificates of good conduct,
which each marching unit was by law compelled
to obtain. The bad roads in the Ardennes also
played havoc with the shoe leather and many
units reached the Rhine almost shoeless.

As usual, however, the horses suffered far the
most. Forage was scarce, and often green, and

BOULOGNE TO THE RHINE 133

neither men nor horses were in sufficient condition
for long marches, hence sore backs were frequent,
many horses broke down altogether, and had
to be left at the depots along the road.

The Artillery suffered in particular, and Soult
reported a deficiency of 400 in his Corps when it
arrived at its destination, and as these were not
made good when the passage of the Rhine began,
he was compelled to leave his ammunition
waggons behind.

Davout suffered equally, being obliged to
abandon even some of his guns. Probably he pre-
ferred to take fewer complete units fully supplied
with ammunition rather than risk finding such
artillery as he had useless for want of it.

Only open country carts were available for
the Infantry ammunition, and as a consequence
between 200,000 and 300,000 rounds were rendered
useless by bad weather and had to be left behind.

But hard cash was the chief necessity, for the
contractors refused to deliver even such goods
as they had ready until they had received a big
percentage of their price, and many units entered
the campaign deficient of boots, great -coats and
other necessities of equipment which it is the
custom to consider essential.

Fortunately pay for the troops was issued for
a fortnight in advance before German territory

I34 THE MARCH FROM

was entered, and no doubt the men and officers
did what they could to supply their immediate
needs.

The Army transport was in the worst case of all,
for, except for the waggons supplied by the Com-
pagnie Breidt, it had to rely exclusively on country
carts of the most primitive description drawn by
requisitioned horses and men, and the latter
deserted freely whenever opportunity arose,
taking their horses with them when they could.
Soult could only get together 700 horses out of the
1200 he required, and on ist October he
reports that 300 had already disappeared.
The vacancies thus caused had to be filled by
requisition along the line of march through
Baden and Wurtemberg, and this proceeding was
most bitterly resented by the inhabitants. By
the time the concentration was finished the
Cavalry was practically starving for lack of money
to buy such forage as the country still contained,
and had to cross the river forthwith in order to
take it from the people they came in theory to
protect.

Harmon t, coming down the Rhine from Holland,
was in no better case ; indeed, in some respects he
was worse off than the others, for many of his
cavalry and artillery horses had been cooped up
for some time on board the ships waiting to cross

BOULOGNE TO THE RHINE 135

over into England. Agents were sent on in advance
to purchase horses along the Rhine, but, as in
Alsace, people were not very anxious to complete
their contracts, and much of his material had to
be sent on by water and left at Mayence until
there was water enough in the Main to forward
them on to Wiirzburg.

The orders sent to Bernadotte in Hanover
directed him to move to Wiirzburg by the shortest
line, but they were delayed in transition, and
Bernadotte, whose position in the midst of a
hostile population was already sufficiently pre-
carious, had already arranged for a free passage
through the territories of the Elector of Hesse-
Cassel to Frankfurt, on the ground that the
Corps was ordered to rejoin at Strassburg by the
shortest line.

The Elector conceeded his request for thirty-five
days only, but, probably under Prussian influence,
withdrew the concession before this period had
nearly run off, and whilst the heavy baggage of
the Corps was still on Hanoverian territory.
The head of Bernadotte's Corps was already
nearing Frankfurt by the Fulda road from the
north, when his orders to proceed at once to
Wiirzburg reached him, and at the same time
came a notice that Frankfurt and its resources
were reserved for Marmont. He at once bent off

136 THE MARCH FROM

for the valley of the Main by cross-roads to
Aschaffenburg, and ultimately reached Wiirzburg,
with his troops so worn out that the Corps had
to be granted a three days' rest. In Wiirzburg
itself they found nothing of the biscuits, stores,
etc., which had been ordered in advance.

No wonder when the Emperor reached the front
at Strassburg (25th September) he was " little
satisfied by the state in which he found the supply
and transport services of the Army " (vol. ii.
p. 10).

Duroc in the meanwhile had reached Berlin,
where he soon discovered how serious were the
difficulties and how many the delays which must
intervene before Prussia would consent to the
Emperor's proposals. On the 8th September
he wrote at length to his master, diplomatically
hinting that as a road led out of the main valley
from a point to the north of Wiirzburg leading
to Bamberg, it would be well to instruct Berna-
dotte to proceed along it, as it avoided all Prussian
territories. This was as near a warning of dangers
ahead as Duroc could safely venture to ad-
minister to a ruler as impatient of advice as was
Napoleon. It also is of special interest since
it is clear it would not have been written had not
the intention to violate the territory of Ausbach
— i.e. of Prussia— been already a matter of common

BOULOGNE TO THE RHINE 137

knowledge to the inner circle of the Court before
Duroc's departure.

The warning letter arrived during the night of
the I7th September, and its perusal brought on one
of those rare fits of rage to which the Emperor is
reported to have given way. This fact is worth
dwelling upon because it helps to reveal so much
of the working of the Imperial mind, and almost
guarantees the honesty of his convictions at the
moment when he wrote the letter to the King of
Prussia which I have cited above.

It was the first psychological moment of the
coming campaign, marking the first serious
disillusionment as to his capacity to read aright
the riddle of his adversaries' policy. For the
time he found himself between the horns of a
dilemma. Either he adhered to his original
resolutions, and Bernadotte marched through
Ansbach at the risk of adding the still unshaken
Prussian Army (180,000 men) to the lists of the
Emperor's foes, and opening up strategical
possibilities to his enemies which so far at least
had never entered into his original calculations ;
or he followed Duroc's indication, and thereby
compelled himself to risk a concentration within
striking distance of Mack, whose numerical
strength he still overrated by 20 per cent.

His decision, contained in an order to Berna-

I38 THE MARCH FROM

dotte, despatched the same day (i7th), directing
him to march through Ausbach, seems to me to
prove how strongly he was affected by the im-
minence of the second danger which jeopardised
the success of the campaign from the beginning ;
whereas the former evils required time to develop,
and might be averted by the rapid and victorious
advance of his forces as indeed they were. Of
the real nature of the struggle within his own mind
his letters contain no trace ; on the contrary, both
to Talleyrand, Murat and Otto, his charge
d'affaires with the Bavarians, he wrote in his
most enthusiastic vein. But this is a character-
istic of his whole correspondence : the greater
the actual danger, the more he encourages his
subordinates to take a rosy view of things, and,
speaking generally, his despatches on the eve
of great events bear no more relation to the actual
facts of the situation than, let us say, the remarks
of an American financier to an interviewer on the
morning of the day he absconds with all his avail-
able assets, and the motive is the same in both
cases — viz. to keep up confidence amongst one's
subordinates to the last possible moment.

Thus on the 27th September, when the state of
his transport, and mounted services generally,
must have caused him the gravest apprehen-
sions he writes to Bernadotte : " The Emperor

BOULOGNE TO THE RHINE 139

of Germany makes no detachment on the
right hand of the Danube,1 the Russians
have not yet arrived. I am ready to meet

everything.

* * * * *

" If only the Austrians remain asleep for
the next three or four days on the Iller and
in the Black Forest, I shall have turned
them, and I hope only the debris will escape."
This prediction is so far in advance of anything
which the facts actually in his possession justified
him in assuming, and the wording is so careless,
admitting of several interpretations, that one can
only regard it as intended to hearten up its
recipient in view of the consequences which he
doubtless foresaw were likely to follow the viola-
tion of Ansbach territories which Bernadotte
was ordered to carry out.

iaCampagne de 1805.'* Vol. ii., p. 35.

CHAPTER V

FROM THE RHINE TO THE DANUBE

UNDER normal circumstances, at this season
of the year, the march before the Grand Army
presented no particular difficulties. The rise
from the Rhine Valley to the watersheds of the
Neckar and Danube was not excessive, and
beyond, the descent over rolling downs and
through fertile plains in which the harvest had
only just been gathered seemed to suit the new
spirit of French operations to the utmost. Even
the steep and somewhat barren transverse barrier
of the " Rauhe Alp," a continuation of the Jura
Mountains running from Schaffhausen, past Ulm
transversely across the line of advance, was as
nothing to what French troops had frequently
had to deal with in previous years.

Unfortunately, the weather changed every-
thing. Instead of the beautiful Indian summer
which usually ushers in October in these districts,
the month broke cold and inclement. Rain,
sleet, and even snow pelted down incessantly,
and soon the roads became mere watercourses

140

FROM THE RHINE TO THE DANUBE 141

and the fields veritable quagmires. Fezensac's
graphic description will complete the picture.

" This short campaign proved to me a foretaste
of all those others which were to come afterwards.
The extremity of fatigue, the want of food, the
terrible weather, the trouble of the marauders —
nothing was wanting, and in one month I tasted a
sample of what was to be my destiny during the
whole of my career. The brigades, even the
regiments were sometimes dispersed, the order
to reunite arrived late, because it had to filter
through so many offices. Hence the troops were
marching day and night, and I saw for the first
time men sleeping as they marched. I could not
have believed it possible. Thus we reached our
destination without having eaten anything and
finding nothing to eat. It was all very well for
Berthier to write : ' In the war of invasion as the
Emperor makes it, there are no magazines ; it is
for the Generals to provide themselves from the
country as they traverse it ' ; but the Generals
had neither time or means to procure regularly
what was required for the needs of such a numerous
Army. This order was an authorisation of pillage,
and the districts we passed through suffered
cruelly. We were often hungry, and the terrible
weather intensified our sufferings. A steady cold
rain or rather half-melted snow fell incessantly,

1 42 FROM THE RHINE

and we stumbled along in the cold mud churned
by our passage almost up to our knees — the wind
made it impossible to light fires.

" On the 1 6th of October the weather was so
infamous that not a soul remained at his post.
One found neither sentries nor pickets, even
the Artillery remained unguarded, every one
sought shelter as best he could, and never again,
except in Russia, did I see the Army suffer so

much or in such disorder.

* * * * *

" All these causes developed insubordination
and thieves. When in such weather the
troops entered a village, it was hard to get them
out again — hence the number of stragglers roam-
ing about the country became considerable. The
inhabitants were exposed to ill treatment of all
descriptions ; and the wounded officers left
behind, who tried to assert their authority, were
openly defied and threatened by the marauders.
All these details are unknown to those who
read the history of our campaign, one sees only
a valiant Army whose soldiers vie with their
officers for glory, and the price of suffering paid
for the most brilliant successes is forgotten."

In circumstances such as the above no one
man's testimony can ever be taken as conclusive,
more especially when written many years after

TO THE DANUBE 143

the event — one's personal impressions are too
liable to be influenced by any passing affliction.
What seems to a man suffering from fever, and the
terrible depression that so often accompanies it,
as the very limit of human misery, passes un-
noticed by his comrade, for the time being, in the
enjoyment of perfect health and physical vigour ;
and there are always enough invalids still
struggling through their duties in any Army to
supply material enough for the darkest pictures of
human suffering. But in this case de Fezensac
receives abundant confirmation from the letters
of the French Generals published in the official
history of the Campaign.

The whole Army, as we have seen, crossed the
Rhine seriously short of transport and biscuit,
and complaints began to reach the Emperor from
the very first, for on the 7th October he issued an
order reminding the superior commanders that
" one should always have four days' bread in
reserve" ; but the order did not materially im-
prove matters, as the following extracts sufficiently

show l : —

On the gth of October General Bouvier writes :
" It is with the utmost difficulty that my Division
has so far been able to provide itself with sub-

i For originals see " La Campagne de 1805.'' Intro-
duction, vol. iii., p. 5 et seq.

144 FROM THE RHINE

sistence. For several daj^s they have had neither
bread nor meat, and only most scanty supplies of
forage, particularly of oats. The villages I have
had to occupy have been completely cleared out
by preceding columns."

The same day Suchet was still able to issue bread
to his Division (thanks no doubt to the measures
taken by Soult, his Corps Commander) ; but
the remaining Divisions of his Corps (the IV.),
from his own report, had to go without, and worn
out by the awful weather had to halt at Augsburg
to receive two days' rations.

" The troops are exhausted by fatigue/' wrote
Vandamme, " and suffer particularly from want
of food. It is most urgent that we should at
last receive some issue of provisions." For-
tunately a convoy of 4000 rations and a magazine
of corn and oats fell into their hands about the
following day. On the same date (gth October)
Marmont also wrote : " The troops would have
marched at once and should have slept at Porn-
bach if the cruel hunger from which they suffer
had not rendered it indispensable to halt, in order
to distribute to them some provisions. They are
to receive a third of a ration of bread and some
potatoes, after which they will resume their
march and, I hope, make good 9 miles on the
road to Pfaffenhofen." Next day, the loth

TO THE DANUBE 145

October, he writes to Berthier : "I have the
honour to recall to your recollection our want
of food ; it is extreme."

This state of destitution in which most of
the Corps at this date found themselves does not
appear to have astonished the Emperor, for in
answer to Marmont's complaints Berthier writes
on the nth October : " In all the letters which
M. le General writes to me he speaks of ' pro-
visions.' I must repeat to him that in the War
of Invasion now being prosecuted by the Emperor
there are no magazines ; it is the duty of the
Generals commanding the Corps to provide
themselves with immediate subsistence from the
country they traverse. General Marmont has
received the order to provide himself with four
days' bread and biscuit in advance ; he cannot
therefore count on anything but the resources
he can procure for himself, as all the other Corps
of the Grand Army do likewise, and no one knows
better than General Marmont the manner in
which the Emperor makes War."

This letter deserves study, as it reveals in
the clearest manner the driving force Napoleon
knew how to apply. As M. Colin points out :
" It would be indeed a difficult task to reconcile
a satisfactory system of supply with the extreme
mobility absolutely essential to the methods of
K

1 46 FROM THE RHINE

the Grand Army " ; but be this as it may, the fact
remains that the extreme privations undergone
by the troops brought in their train marauders,
pillage and the break up of discipline.

Davout writes on the nth October to Berthier :
" I have the honour to represent to your Ex-
cellency, that it has become absolutely necessary
to take prompt measures to put a stop to maraud-
ing and pillaging, which have reached the limits
of excess ; the inhabitants of the district see with
the keenest anguish that at the moment when their
Prince and Army are making common cause with
us, they are receiving worse treatment than
when allied with Austria against us — I have the
honour to solicit your Excellency to procure
for me the authority of his Majesty to shoot a
few of these scoundrels — terrible examples are
necessary to stop this evil, which is constantly
growing."

To this letter no reply has been traced. It
seems curious however to find this application
for specific authority to make these necessary
examples. This is a detail usually left to the
discretion of a Corps Commander in the field,
where punishment must of necessity be prompt
if it is to be deterrent to others, and for the sake
of the wretched Bavarian peasants one feels
tempted to regret the absence of the " Repre-

TO THE DANUBE 147

sentatives of the People " who in former cam-
paigns would have made short work of these
robbers.

The question then suggests itself whether
it would have suited the Emperor's purpose to
check this pillaging, whether in fact the pro-
bability of such occurrences had not already
presented itself to his mind before the advance
began.

If the men did not plunder it must have been
clear that they could not live at the rate they
were timed to march, and from 1796 the Em-
peror knew what an extraordinary spur to the
marching power of his troops hunger, only to be
satisfied by a forward movement and indis-
criminate pillage, could prove. What matter
if the inhabitants suffered and the weakly men
amongst the troops fell out and died, if the re-
mainder reached their destinations in time,
for time was the all-important factor in the case,
since it could not be reasonably foreseen how the
weather was to play into the hands of the French.
It is not a pleasant idea to contemplate, but it is
necessary to bring it out in order to show how
War in all its nakedness really appears to a
clear-cut logical mind which refuses to consider
anything but the most effective means to the end,
and is troubled by no humanitarian sentiment-

1 48 FROM THE RHINE

ality. To crush Mack finally and completely
before the arrival of the Russians was the first
and best hope of winning the campaign. It was
therefore a justifiable economy of forces, to risk
losing 20 per cent, of his men on the march in order
to avert the probable protraction of the War by
several battles and perhaps many months, which
would have cost him far more in the end — and
when we come to compare the narrow margin of
hours by which the Austrian combinations were
defeated, one can only agree with the accuracy of
his reasoning. Davout given a free hand could
always keep order in his command by the sacrifice
of time, therefore the power to keep order must be
taken away from him, so that he should not be
tempted to delay the forward movement.

The first itinerary for the march from the
Rhine to the Danube was commenced on the
loth September, and aimed at the convergence of
the several Corps by all available roads between
Donauworth and Ulm. Originally the start was
fixed for the ist October and date of arrival
on the river for the gth. Each Corps was allowed
an area for requisitions extending to the left of
its own road up to the next road on which troops
were marching — an arrangement which worked
badly in practice, because the habit of bivouacking
across the line of march in order to save the men

TO THE DANUBE 149

unnecessary fatigue had become fixed in the
French Army, and not even an Imperial order
would induce his subordinates to break with it.

The news of the Austrian advance to Ulm and
the Iller, received on the iyth September, involved
a small alteration in the general plan, Murat
and Ney being now directed to skirt round Ulm
by the roads through Rottenburg and Goppingen,
reaching the Danube at Giinzburg, and the Corps
on the left sent lower down the river to Neuburg and
Ingolstadt instead of Donauworth ; but no sub-
sequent information was allowed to interfere in the
general plan, and, except that the 25th September
was fixed as the date of commencement, it may be
considered that the basic order of the whole
campaign was issued on the 2oth of that month.

According to this document the troops were to
move in the following order from right to left : —

Murat, Ney, Lannes, the cavalry screen of
the former pushed out well to the south, from
Strassburgwa Rottenburg, Goppingen and Giengen
to Giinzburg. Ney, followed by the Imperial
Guard, Carlsruhe, Pforzheim, Ludwigsburg, Aalen,
Minister. Soult, from Speyer by Heilbronn and
Nordlingen to Donauworth. Davout, from
Mannheim, Necker-Oelz, Ottingen, to Neuburg.
Marmont, from Mayence by Aschaffenburg, Wiirz-
burg, Rothenburg-on-the-Tauber, through Ansbach

150 FROM THE RHINE

territory, to Monheim and Neuburg). Berna-
dotte, from Frankfurt via Gemiinden, Wiirz-
burg, Ansbach, Weissenburg, Ingolstadt. The
Bavarians from Bamberg through Nuremberg,
and to follow Bernadotte from Weissenburg on-
wards; the heads of all Columns to march off
simultaneously.

Again, however, human nature proved stronger
than Imperial edicts, and the troops only began to
move on the 26th, and then hardly as combatant
units.

Murat's troops quickly picked up contact with
Austrian light troops in the passes of the Black
Forest, but these were so skilfully handled that
the French failed altogether to take any prisoners.
Whether as a consequence of the feeling of un-
certainty thus induced, or for other reasons not
to be traced, Lannes and the main body of Murat's
Corps now left the road assigned to them through
the Kniebis Pass and marched down the Rhine
valley and through Rastatt to Pforzheim, where
they came into collision with Ney's columns
and changed their order, Lannes moving by the
Aalen road, Ney taking Lannes' place on the
Stuttgart -Goppingen road.1

1 This order was not issued to the Corps Commanders
as a whole, but only by stages as it became evident to
the Emperor that no movement by the enemy en-
dangered its completion.

TO THE DANUBE 151

From the very commencement of the movement
extreme friction developed between the Corps
Commanders and the Chief of the Staff, adding
immensely to the burden of correspondence
borne by the Emperor. As an instance, the
following case may be cited. Berthier had
addressed to Murat certain orders mutually
destructive of one another, and in reply the
latter wrote (see vol. ii., p. 46) : —

' You have instructed me to occupy Goppingen
on the nth, Geislingen on the i2th, to send only
a Division to Heidenheim on the I3th, and to re-
main with my Head Quarters at Goppingen,
whilst in the last paragraph of your letter you
express yourself as follows : ' The position of
Heidenheim being very important for the enemy,
it is necessary that Marshal Murat should hold it in
force, and from the moment that he arrives he
should send news of all that he hears to the
Marshals Soult and Davout, etc/ It is im-
possible in this circumstance to carry out the
orders of his Majesty. I cannot remain at
Goppingen when you order me to arrive in force
at Heidenheim, and I cannot arrive in force at
Heidenheim if you tell me to send only one
Division to that place and to leave my Division
of dismounted Dragoons to follow the Corps of
Marshal Ney, Please, Monsieur le Marechal,

152 FROM THE RHINE

explain yourself more clearly." To this appeal
Berthier only condescended to send the following
reply : —

" The Emperor has received your letter : he
desires that you should follow your instructions
and in consequence that you should carry out the
prescribed movement."

But fortunately the Emperor gave no such
instructions. On the contrary, knowing of the
friction between the two subordinates, he himself
wrote the following illuminating letter to Murat
on the same date :

" You are to flank the whole of my march
which is a delicate operation, as we are moving
obliquely on the Danube. It is necessary there-
fore that if the enemy attempts to interfere, I
should be warned in time to choose my own part
and not be compelled to accept that which the
enemy forces upon me. HautpouTs Division
must not follow your movement, it would only
hamper your manoeuvring power. My intention
is that it should follow my march, reaching Aalen
at the same time that you attain Heidenheim.
The dismounted Dragoons must be very tired ; I
shall keep them back till Marshal Ney has passed.
I want them to be nursed. Marshal Ney will
leave Stuttgart on the 4th October, and will
follow you on Saturday the 5th. The dismounted

TO THE DANUBE 153

Dragoons follow him, thus forming your reserve.
Thus, on this road, you will have 6000 Dragoons
(mounted), Ney's Corps of 20,000 men and the
dismounted Dragoons, in all 30 to 35,000 men. I
shall be with the Corps of Marshal Lannes who
passes by Gmiind ; my Guards and d'HautpouTs
Division are a reserve to Lannes. You see,
therefore, that if the enemy debouches from Ulm
to attack my flank these two corps can be easily
reinforced by a part of Soult's Corps."

In the last sentence there is evidently a
hiatus, and the whole is evidently very hurriedly
written or dictated, but the sense is clear and
reveals the Emperor's intention- exactly ; but
one is tempted to wonder what would have been
the fate of the Grand Army without the astonish-
ing gift of smoothing out difficulties which dis-
tinguished its Commander : would 30,000 addi-
tional men, even 60,000 have made up for his
absence ?

But it was not only Berthier's mistakes which
threw additional work and worry on the Emperor's
shoulders. From the very commencement of
the march, the same jealousy and ill-feeling
between his Marshals, which proved so fatal to
the French arms in the Peninsula, began to mani-
fest themselves. Thus Soult reports Davout
to the Emperor for unpunctuality in following

154 FROM THE RHINE

out the orders he had received, though the matter
had nothing to do with Soult at all. He also
complains that in passing he had taken up more
than his share of biscuits from the magazines,
which was probably true, but no more than
Soult himself would have done had he only had
the chance. Murat complains that Lannes did not
move his troops out of Rastatt on his approach,
and minor acts of interference in each others
areas for requisition were frequent, nearly all
of these requiring one of the soothing personal
letters Napoleon knew so well how to write.

To provide for the contingency of an Austrian
offensive on the left bank of the Danube, before
the convergence of the road should have brought
the columns within supporting distance, the chief
command over the Bavarians, the ist Corps
and Marmont, was given to Bernadotte, the re-
mainder— viz. Murat, Lannes, Ney, Soult, Davout
and the Guard forming a single Army under
Napoleon's own direction as far, that is to say, as
the indifferent nature of the cross-country roads
communicating with the great highways on which
the troops were marching would permit.

On the 3rd of October, the Grand Army reached
the following positions : Bavarians at Forch-
heim, ist Corps (Bernadotte) at Uffenheim,
2nd Corps (Marmont) from Rothenburg to Weikers-

TO THE DANUBE 155

heim — both nearing Ansbach, the 3rd (Davout)
and 4th (Soult) at Langenburg and Hall, the
5th (Lannes) and 6th (Ney) with the Cavalry
(Murat) from Ludwigsburg to Fiissen by Cann-
stadt, Stuttgart and Esslingen. The total front
was about 120 miles, say six long days' marches
over cross-country roads. The Bavarians were
about 30 miles from Bernadotte, who was 14
miles from Marmont. Soult and Davout within
10 miles of each other — Davout 16 miles from
Marmont and 32 from Lannes — i.e. could only
support him after a twenty - four hours'
forced march, assuming favourable conditions.
All the Corps had orders to send repre-
sentative Staff Officers to one another and
to make all possible arrangements, by means of
relays, inhabitants of the district, etc., to ensure
rapid circulation of all information they might
receive.

The Emperor had already begun to forecast
his movements in case the Austrians attacked.
If they issued from Donau worth against Berna-
dotte, Soult and Davout were to march to his
support, if from Ulm, Soult was to march to the
assistance of the right wing, whilst Davout and
Bernadotte continued their march towards the
Danube.

Since the Emperor still believed the Austrians

156 FROM THE RHINE

20 per cent, stronger than they really were, and
Soult and Davout a long day's march from
Bernadotte, Marmont, and the Bavarians, who
hardly counted as combatants, with the country
exceptionally favourable to the Austrian Cavalry,
Bernadotte' s prospects of a victory can hardly be
described as satisfactory. Even the group on
the right wing (supported by Soult, but only at
the close of an exhausting march for the troops
of the latter) would seem to an unprejudiced
observer to have had but small chances of that
absolute numerical superiority at the point of
collision, which it was the whole end and object
of Napoleon's subsequent strategical practice
to bring about.

But in truth this idea of the absolute necessity
of securing the maximum possible accumulation
of force upon a particular fraction of the enemy's
command seems as yet to have hardly occurred
to his mind, for on the same day, with reference
to a possible attack upon the centre of his line, he
writes to Soult (vol. ii., p. 52) :

" My intention is, that when we meet the
enemy, we should envelop him on all sides."
But to envelop an enemy on all sides involves
always the risk of being pulverised by his counter-
stroke at one point — and with the weapons then
in use, the numerical superiority on the whole

TO THE DANUBE 157

theatre of war upon which he could count was
quite inadequate as against the 88,000 men he still
believed the Austrians could bring against him.

On the 4th October, Ney reached Fiissen,
Esslingen and Goppingen. Murat sent Beau-
mont to Weissenstein ; Walther to Gingen, Alten-
stadt and Geislingen ; Klein to Geislingen and
towards Heidenheim. Lannes lay between Lorch
and Waiblingen, followed by the Guard, Imperial
Head Quarters, and d'Hautpoul's Cuirassiers.
; Soult reached Biihlerthann and Gaildorf, 20
miles from Lannes and 18 from Ney; Davout was
at Ilshofen, Marmont Rothenburg, Bernadotte
Dachstetten and the Bavarians about Fiirth.

So far no reliable information as to the enemy's
movements had been obtained, they were known
to be somewhere between the Danube, Iller and
Lech, but whether they had concentrated about
Ulm, Augsburg, Biberach or Memmingen re-
mained entirely uncertain.

Whilst Murat was scouring the plains in vain
endeavours to supply the prisoners1 which the
Emperor always so insistently demanded, and
the remaining columns were closing up and by
degrees assuming a more military formation,
Bernadotte was encountering the critical incident
of the whole campaign.

1 He only succeeded in capturing one.

158 FROM THE RHINE

Nearing Ansbach, he found the gates of the
little mediaeval fortress closed against him by its
Prussian garrison. It was the Fort of Bard (1800)
case over again, but with this distinction that,
whether it held out two hours or a fortnight, a
serious encounter would, we now know beyond
any doubt, have brought a new and formidable
opponent into the field. Fortunately for the
French, the peculiar code of honour which had
developed in the long-service Armies of the
Continent during the last century helped Berna-
dotte over the difficulty. War had become a
matter of rules, like chess ; and the letter of the
code by which it was governed, not the spirit,
sanctioned surrender to greatly superior forces
to prevent the effusion of blood, and Bernadotte's
persuasive tongue, backed by the exhibition of
material force, soon proved sufficient to persuade
the Prussian Commander to open his gates, thus
setting in motion a stream of consequences which
culminated a year later at the surrender of Prenz-
lau. Humanitarians would do well to follow
up the whole chain of cause and effect and note
the full total of suffering on the battlefield, and
outside of it, which flowed from this single applica-
tion of their favourite formula. It is not asserted
that the defence of this little town could have
averted the fall of Ulm under the circumstances

TO THE DANUBE 159

which actually arose — but the appearance of
the Prussian Army on the scene would have
inhibited Napoleon's further advance beyond
Vienna, and it passes the wit of man to see
how the Emperor could ever have fought his
way back to France.

In spite of Murat's activity (and he never spared
himself), the Emperor was still dependent on
his spies for information.

On the 2nd October they reported that works
were being thrown up around Ulm and on the
Iller. But as entrenchments had also been
seen covering the exits from the Tyrol, no special
conclusion could be gleaned from these facts ;
and on the 3rd a vague rumour announced
the retreat of the Austrians towards the Lech.
This also afforded nothing towards elucidating
the situation.

On the 4th, however, more precise and significant
reports arrived. The withdrawal of the enemy
from Stokach, Biberach and Memmingen upon
Ulm was confirmed, and Mack himself was said
to have arrived at the latter place.

Donauworth was unoccupied, but the arrival
of the regiment " Colloredo " was expected, and
six regiments of infantry with much cavalry
had been seen moving from the west towards
Lauingen.

160 FROM THE RHINE

On receipt of this information the Emperor
at once ordered Murat to unite his three Divisions
of Dragoons at Heidenheim, whilst that of Bourcier
moved on Geislingen, where it was to arrive on
the 6th October and scout all the roads leading
out of Ulm.

In his covering letter he wrote : " Bourcier's
Division of Dragoons is to cover the flank of
the Army on the side of Geislingen. With your
three Divisions move on Heidenheim, in order
to search out the whole plain towards Nord-
lingen. I assume that the enemy does not take
up the offensive — in which case you will act
according to circumstances until further orders
can reach you.

" Marshal Soult tells me that the enemy shows
several squadrons between Nordlingen and Ell-
wangen. Whilst the Hussars of the 3rd Corps are
skirmishing with them, it should be easy for you
to cut them off from Donauworth. I assume
that the enemy has no considerable force at
Nordlingen, only an advance guard to observe
the plain — in fact that he still adheres to his plan
of remaining behind the Danube. If this is so,
and he only has a couple of regiments of Infantry
with as many Cavalry, try whether, with your
3000 Dragoons, you cannot cut them off in con-
junction with the Light Cavalry of Lannes and

TO THE DANUBE 161

Ney; if you warn Marshal Soult, all his Light
Cavalry will come to join you. But do not
attempt this if the enemy shows more than
6000 Infantry. What I want is information —
send out agents, spies, and above all make some
prisoners."

Meanwhile the Emperor began his preparations
for the passage of the Danube, and ordered Soult
to hasten the march of the pontoon trains, so that
he could count on finding them there by the 6th
or 7th October at latest.

" Do not tell me that this is impossible, requisi-
tion every horse for the purpose ; mount the
detachments in carriages and drive them night
and day so that I may find at least five or six
boats, if not the whole of them. On the river
Wernitz, you will find timber boats under con-
struction, and small rowing boats — try to surprise
the lot, so that I may have means (in case the
enemy has destroyed the arches of one or two
permanent bridges) to capture it by a surprise
crossing, and then restore it in a few hours.
Get all the information you can and think this
out. I need not tell you that I would prefer
to cross the Danube between the Lech and
Ingolstadt ; nevertheless it will be very con-
venient for me to have means of passage
about Donauworth — partly to occupy the

L

1 62 FROM THE RHINE

enemy; partly to assist the passage of my
right."

To Davout also he wrote in the same strain ;
and though Marmont and Bernadotte were still
far from the river, they too were ordered to lay
hands on all boats and materials ; and the con-
clusion of his letter to the latter deserves notice :
" One way or the other I want to cross the Danube
at three points. Take the opinion of the Bavarian
officers and let me have answers to the following
questions :—

" i. Between Neuburg and Ingolstadt which
is the most favourable point for crossing the
Danube ?

" 2. What means can you dispose of ? Can
you seize some boats on the Danube, or bring
some with you from the little rivers in the neigh-
bourhood ? "

Meanwhile, under cover of the screen thrown by
Murat with his Cavalry, the remaining columns
of the Army pursued their march with only
trifling deviations from the original itinerary,
though they suffered terribly from the exertions
needed to keep their time, and stragglers were
left behind with every mile.

By the morning of the 7th October they were
all approaching the river, but since it would
completely prejudice the mind of the reader

TO THE DANUBE 163

against the conduct of the Austrian leaders to
disclose at this point their exact location these
details are held over until the drama, as it unrolled
itself to Mack and his subordinates, has been
sufficiently indicated.

CHAPTER VI

AUSTRIAN OPERATIONS FROM THE PASSAGE OF THE
DANUBE TO THE BATTLE OF ELCHINGEN

IN the third Chapter the movements of the
Austrians were brought up to the 3rd October,
on which day they occupied a position of readiness
south of the Danube and east of the Iller, with small
scouting detachments well away to their front.
lilt would have been well had Mack left them
there in peace to recuperate after their heavy
marching — but unfortunately his spies and
scouts had by this time convinced him that
the French were moving entirely on the left
bank of the Danube, and that the appearance
of troops in the denies of the Black Forest, south
of the Kinzig, were only feints to mislead him.

His front towards the Iller now seemed to him
superfluous, and on the morning of the 4th
October he ordered a closer concentration north-
ward along the Danube from Ulm to Donau-
worth, to be completed by the 8th. Simul-
taneously also, he drew up a new Order of Battle,
with what precise intention it is now impossible

164

THE PASSAGE OF THE DANUBE 165

to discover. To the modern student, especially
on the Continent, who has generally grown up
amongst Divisions and Army Corps the com-
position of which has been unalterably fixed for
generations, this tampering with the distribution
of units in the field appears as a certain indication
of aberration of intellect on the part of the Com-
mander, and prejudices him against the latter's
decisions throughout the campaign. But in the
Armies of those days such tampering was almost
a matter of daily occurrence, and I only call
attention again to it here to remind readers of
what I have explained at length above, and to
prevent their applying present-day principles to
old-time customs for which there generally existed
good and sufficient reasons. Probably Mack,
knowing the atmosphere of distrust and jealousy
by which he was surrounded, felt that it would
be better to remove certain units from one com-
mand to the other to prevent seditious influences
from spreading.

During the afternoon of the 6th October,
Vandamme reached Harburg, and drove out
the two squadrons of Liechtenstein Hussars
placed there as an advance guard. These gave
the alarm at Donau worth, and the battalion of
Colloredo, garrisoning the place, at once began
to demolish the bridge over the Danube. But

1 66 THE PASSAGE OF THE DANUBE

they were interrupted before their task was half
finished, driven off by superior numbers, and by
daylight Soult and Murat were streaming over
the restored bridge in full pursuit.

Kienmayer, the Austrian General nearest at
hand, fearing to be cut off from the main army,
called in his detachments and began to retreat
on Aichach, thence on Schwabhausen.

Mack rode out on 7th October to Giinzburg,
arriving there about 4 P.M. Here he was met
by the news not only that the French had seized
Donauworth, but that Bernadotte had marched
through Ansbach, and for the moment he thought
of concentrating all available men and forcing
his way through the French in order to rejoin
Kienmayer, and with him to fall back towards
the Inn.

The idea, however, seems to have been but
momentary ; it was impracticable into the
bargain, for the troops were now engaged in
moving into the new positions assigned to them
by the order of the 4th October. Also, as the
weather had broken up altogether during the
preceding forty-eight hours, it was impossible to
locate the many detachments exactly, or to
calculate how long any orders might take in
reaching them.

Against the principle of this move there is

TO THE BATTLE OF ELCHINGEN 167

nothing to be said ; but as events turned out it
would have been better to have had the men
thoroughly rested in their cantonments of the
3rd than worn out, weary and widely dispersed,
in point of time, on the wretched cross-country
tracks they were actually following.

By next morning (8th October) this first
thought had evidently been dismissed because
Mack wrote to Kutusov in the following terms : —

" We have enough to live upon in the district
west of the Lech — more than enough in fact
to last us until the Russian Army reaches the
Inn, and will be ready to move. Then we shall
easily find the opportunity to prepare for the
enemy the fate he deserves/'

This letter is of particular importance because
it establishes a strong prima facie case for the
genuineness of Mack's pamphlet prepared after
the events in justification of his conduct. It
proves at least that he had an idea of the strength
of his position, and was determined to make the
most of it.1 As this pamphlet contains the only
complete account of the working of Mack's
mind, I give the following passages almost
verbatim : —

1 See " Me"moires justificatifs," p. 9 et seq. I quote from
the French Official History, as no copy of the original
can be traced in England-

1 68 THE PASSAGE OF THE DANUBE

" When on the 7th October we learnt of the
march of Bernadotte and the Bavarians through
Ansbach, it would no longer have been possible
to withdraw the Army behind (i.e. to the east-
ward of) the Lech, as it was then on the march
towards the Danube, moving in many small
columns. . . . This led rne to decide for the con-
centration on Giinzburg, to secure communication
with Kienmayer, who was still east of the Lech, and
with him to fall on the heads of the enemy's
columns as opportunity offered — either east or
west of the Lech. But in saying that it was too
late to order the retirement behind the Lech, I
do not mean to imply that I would have given the
order had it been possible. I would not have done
so at any time, even had I been able to foresee
the violation of Prussian territory ; indeed this
very violation in itself made it my duty not to
withdraw the Army. . . .

" To withdraw the Army behind the Inn, to
sacrifice Tyrol, the Vorarlberg and the Army
of Italy, was a resolution only permissible to the
supreme power of his Majesty. The enemy
would have overtaken us in superior numbers,
and we should have been thrown back upon the
Russian columns. . . .

" It would have been still worse to retire beyond
the Inn — to leave the valleys of Salzburg and Upper

TO THE BATTLE OF ELCHINGEN 169

Austria unoccupied. . . . The battle of Auster-
litz would then have taken place before Vienna
—and who can tell with what far-reaching results.

" The situation of the Army was certainly
gravely compromised by the sudden appearance
of an enemy more than twice its superior in num-
bers, but I did not consider it desperate. At the
moment that I became certain that he had
occupied both banks of the Lech at the bridge of
Rain ; that he had compelled the Corps of
Kienmayer to retreat and that he could reach
Augsburg before we could — finally when his
project to cut us off from the Russians became
clearly manifest — from that moment I decided
to fall in turn upon his communications, break
his superiority, and draw him away from the
Russians. It was still open to us to retreat into
Tyrol, but I rejected the alternative because
it would have meant sacrificing our Allies, since
the French would have reached them by the
shortest line, long before we could accomplish
the long detour through the valleys of Tyrol
and Salzburg.

" I believe rather that I deserve praise for my
resolution, suddenly taken, for our communica-
tions would have remained open,1 and we should

1 " Car nos communications s'en trouvaient degag^es,"
in the original.

i/o THE PASSAGE OF THE DANUBE

have had at our disposal behind us Bohemia,
Franconia and Saxony for eventual retreat and
subsistence.

" We could live by requisitions as well as the
enemy, and had a right to expect that we should
be well received by the Prussians of Ansbach
and by the Saxons ; probably the disposition of
Prussia towards us (then so amicable as a con-
sequence of the storm of rage evoked by the
violation of her territories) would never have
taken the unfavourable turn it has since under-
gone.

" These motives would have prevented my
retreat behind the Inn — even had I been able to
foresee the violation of Prussian neutrality ; for is it
possible to imagine a situation more encouraging,
from the military point of view for Prussia, than
to have an Austrian Army covering her frontiers
and those of Saxony, whilst both countries were
mobilising and ready to unite with their forces
against the common enemy ? I affirm that up to
the moment when our concentration on Giinzburg
was rendered impossible, and our existence on
the left, and in Ulm, annihilated, I considered this
violation of neutrality as a good fortune, in spite
of the confusion into which it plunged us, and I
have received two letters, one from Count Cobenzl,
the other from Count Lamberti, proving clearly

TO THE BATTLE OF ELCHINGEN 171

that his Majesty was with them in the same
opinion.

" We were provided with sufficient artillery
and ammunition for some time, certainly for
three battles, for we had with us all our reserves
of artillery, both heavy and light, and could
always have drawn something from Bohemia, as
a glance at the map suffices to show. The re-
inforcements still on the march were indeed lost
to my Army, but not to the common cause, as they
could join our Allies on the Inn — whilst those
coming from Italy could guard the passes of
Tyrol and would indeed be of more use to us
there, because a force of from 35,000 to 40,000
men was best for my purpose — and this is about
what remained after the departure of Jellacic
for the Vorarlberg, and of Kienmayer, destined to
join the Russians.

" The enemy was thus placed between two
adversaries and obliged to divide himself into
two Armies, for he was far more dependent on
his communications than were we, having with
him but the bare minimum of artillery and
ammunition. . . . Whilst we, if we were beaten,
could retire in any direction except the Rhine ;
and our project of drawing off the bulk of the
enemy, and thus gaining time for the arrival of the
Russians, would have been completely attained,

1/2 THE PASSAGE OF THE DANUBE

"If he employed against us forces notably
superior to ours, we could always give way
before him, because except towards the Rhine
we were free to retreat in any direction, and the
further we went the more completely should we
obtain the chief purpose of our design — viz. to
keep the bulk of the enemy's forces away from
the Allied Armies. . . . There cannot be a doubt
that quite different results would have followed
the adoption of this plan ; if they had not been
altogether satisfactory, at least they would have
been less disastrous than those which actually
befeU us."

On the 8th October, whilst Mack was drawing
up fresh dispositions, Aufenberg arrived at Wertin-
gen. It was then about 7 A.M. Here orders
reached him, cancelling his instructions to march
towards the Lech, and directing him to return
to Zumarshausen to cover the road to Augsburg,
and constituting his command the advance guard
of the whole Army.

At the same time he learnt that French troops
marching towards him had passed through the
village of Nordendorf — i.e. were close at hand.
Notwithstanding his orders and this information,
he resolved to canton his troops at Wertingen.

The gates of the little place were defended by
three battalions of infantry. The Grenadiers

TO THE BATTLE OF ELCHINGEN 173

took their rest in the streets and the cavalry
found what quarters they could outside the walls.

About noon, news was brought to Aufenberg
that some French troops had passed through
Pfaffenhofen — about 4^ miles away — and he re-
solved to attack them in the hope of disclosing
the position of the main force.

To this end, he formed a detachment, under
the orders of General Dinersberg, consisting of
2 squadrons of Cuirassiers, 2 companies of Grena-
diers, and 2 companies of Fusiliers, and Diners-
berg in his turn divided this command into two
equal halves, sending one by the right bank of the
Zusam on Thiersheim, the other by the left bank
on Frauenstetten. Probably their commanders
divided their detachments in the same manner,
and so on. Be this as it may, the reconnaissance
found the French near both villages, was at once
overwhelmed by superior numbers, and driven
back in considerable disorder to Wertingen.

As soon as the first fugitives arrived with
tidings of misfortune, Aufenberg drew up four
battalions of Grenadiers on the heights to the left
of the road to Giinzburg ; one before the gate of
Augsburg, and another with two additional com-
panies were detailed to hold the Pfaffenhofen gate.
The remaining three battalions occupied the town
itself, and the two and a half squadrons available

i/4 THE PASSAGE OF THE DANUBE

were formed up in support of the right wing of the
four battalions to the left of the Giinzburg road.

These dispositions had hardly been completed
when news arrived that two whole French corps
were approaching, one on either bank of the
Zusam. A French cavalry regiment drove in
the Grenadiers before the Augsburg gate, and then
fell upon the Cuirassiers stationed upon the
heights, but this attack was checked by the fire
of the Infantry behind them.

Aufenberg, seeing his position untenable, now
decided to retreat on Giinzburg, but his orders
could no longer be carried out. The French
everywhere outnumbered and overlapped his
positions. The troops engaged in the defence of
Wertingen were surrounded and cut off, the
General himself was taken prisoner, and ulti-
mately only 2 guns and some 1400 Grenadiers
reached Zumarshausen, where for the time being
they found safety.

COMMENT. — Altogether this little action caused
the Austrians, according to their own accounts, a
loss of 10 1 killed and 233 wounded ; 1469 prisoners,
3 colours and 6 guns ; about 1000 more men were
missed, but these rejoined their colours after a time.
I have dwelt upon it at some length because it
shows so strikingly the difference between the
tactical tendencies of the two armies. Had the

TO THE BATTLE OF ELCHINGEN 175

roles been reversed, the French General — having
made up his mind that it was his duty to obtain
information — would have moved off with his whole
command in hand, and attacked to hold, thus
forcing the enemy to disclose his dispositions,
and leaving them open to the attack of any other
French troops in the vicinity, who, in accordance
with the traditions of the Republican Armies
not yet broken down by Napoleon, would have
marched at once to the sound of the guns. The
Austrians, thinking only of seeing, not of com-
pelling, divided and subdivided their commands,
thus frittering away their striking force, and when
they found the French at last, it was the old story
over again of the man who caught the Tartar.

Early on the morning of the 9th, Mack, who was
just about to commence his march from Giinzburg
to Zumarshausen, received the intelligence of his
subordinate's misfortune, and being perfectly
certain of encountering very superior forces if he
proceeded on his way, at once ordered his columns
to stand fast.

His counsellors strongly urged upon him the
necessity of retreating by Memmingen to Tyrol.
But Mack had no intention of being guilty of
any such pusillanimous conduct. Instead of
that he decided to cross over the Danube, take up
a position between Giengen and Heidenheim and

1 76 THE PASSAGE OF THE DANUBE

attack the French troops still on the left bank
of the river, thus threatening Napoleon's com-
munications, and compelling him to desist from
his march towards the Inn.

In support of this operation Jellacic was sent
back to Memmingen to make demonstrations
towards the Lech. A flying column was to be
sent from Ulm towards Geislingen to attack the
French convoys about Stuttgart. The Corps of
Klenau, Gottesheim and Werneck were to follow
one another at intervals of three hours along the
road from Ulm to Albeck during the nth and the
ensuing night. Ulm itself was to be abandoned,
as it was impossible to complete its armament,
and no troops could be spared as a garrison.

These were Mack's ideas, when the French
suddenly attacked the detachment under d'Aspre,
who had been sent on to the left bank of the river
to protect the bridge which then crossed it at
Giinzburg. D'Aspre had " hugged " his charge
too closely, and when the French came on with
their usual rapidity his force was cut in half, the
bridge seized and he himself taken prisoner, before
his flanks had time to make good their retreat.

Fortunately a battalion in Giinzburg itself made
a sturdy resistance, and before this could be over-
come, the main body of Mack's command coming
from Burgau appeared on the scene and deployed

TO THE BATTLE OF ELCHINGEN 177

on the heights overlooking the town and the river
—the right at Liepach, the left at Reissenburg —
and holding all the bridges as far as Leipheim.

During the fight the bridge over the Danube
had been broken up, but in the evening orders were
given to the Austrians to repair it. The French
did not interfere with their working parties, but
as soon as the work was completed, a heavy fire
was poured in upon the defenders and the French
troops captured it with a rush, establishing them-
selves securely in some small copses on either side
of the road.

The losses to the Austrians for that day were
about 800 killed and wounded, with about 1000
prisoners.

The direct road to the left bank being thus
closed against the Austrians, the Archduke Fer-
dinand, who had arrived during the course of
the action, proposed to Mack either to march at
once to the bridge of Elchingen or retreat on Tyrol.

Fortunately — for the Elchingen bridge was
also seized by the French a few hours later
during the night — Mack fell in with neither sug-
gestion, but decided to withdraw to Ulm.

But this disappointment hit Mack very hard,
as the following extract from his justification will
show : —

" I must repeat that this event was all the more

M

1 78 THE PASSAGE OF THE DANUBE

unexpected because the detachment sent to
observe beyond the Danube under General
d'Aspre had not sent us the least warning of the
enemy's approach. The Army having encamped
with its left on the Danube close to the bridge, and
having been attacked seven or eight hours later
in the afternoon, it can hardly be said that there
was not sufficient connection with the observing
detachment and an adequate possibility of sup-
porting it at once.

" At the moment I was busy drawing up the
orders for the passage across the river by night,
with all the details that this operation involved.
This order took up eight pages, in the whole of which
it would be difficult to find a superfluous word, and
it will be easily understood that all my attention
and thoughts were absorbed by such a work. More-
over the minor details of the service of security
formed no part of my duties, but should have
been attended to by the detachment commanders
themselves, or better still, by the premier Aide-de-
Camp General. It is not his duty to draw up
projects, but to ensure the execution of those
prepared by the Quartermaster-General which
have been approved by the Commander-in-Chief."

During the night of the loth October the main
body of the Austrian Army marched back to Ulm
and went into camp on either side of the river.

TO THE BATTLE OF ELCHINGEN 179

COMMENT. — To judge by the diary of an Austrian
Staff Officer, on which the authors of the French
Official History place their chief reliance for infor-
mation concerning the state and spirit of the troops,
but which being written after the event seems to me
to need much correction to allow for the " personal
equation," the troops were broken and dispirited,
mere shadows of their former selves. This con-
stant marching in the awful weather, which had
already lasted nearly a fortnight, and the want of
most of the creature comforts to which theAustrians
had always been accustomed (one of the conse-
quences of the attempt to introduce the French
system of requisition) had affected all ranks alike,
and the senior officers openly expressed their doubts
and anxieties.

Probably in the hopes of checking the effect
on the men of this growing spirit of insubordina-
tion, Mack chose this very inopportune moment
to redistribute the regiments amongst the several
commands. It is inconceivable that a man of
Mack's experience would have taken such a step,
even granted that in the old long service organisa-
tions it was not nearly so unusual or serious a
step as at the present day, unless it had been
forced upon him by overwhelming necessity. It
seems to me that nothing gives us a better scale
for judging the difficulties by which he was

i8o THE PASSAGE OF THE DANUBE

surrounded than the fact that he was compelled
to have recourse to it.

Probably this measure was hastened by the
severe differences of opinion which on this very
night broke out between the Archduke and Mack.
During the course of the evening the former
received a letter from the Emperor couched in
the following words : —

" MY COUSIN, — The orders I am sending you
to-day will show how seriously I view the situation.

"When I was at Landsberg, you put forward
the desire (expressed with commendable modesty)
to receive from me an instruction which would
settle completely your line of conduct in the case
of differences of opinion arising between you and
General Mack, as to the operations of the Army
entrusted to you.

" I promised at the time to think over the matter ;
but now when you may be called upon to take
resolutions on which the safety of the Empire
may depend, and which can only be determined
on the spot itself, I consider that I shall be
rendering a true service to you by inviting you to
follow the advice of F.M.L. Mack who has already
rendered such great services to me and possesses
such wide experience. FRANCOIS/

1 " Campagne d'Allemagne." Vol. III., p. 173.-

TO THE BATTLE OF ELCHINGEN 181

The contents of this letter, as in duty bound,
the Archduke communicated to Lieut. Field-
Marshal Mack. There seems to be no record of
what actually passed between them — but in the
end the Archduke formally declared that, having
been deprived of all initiative, he refused hence-
forward to accept any responsibility.

What Mack thought of the matter may be
deduced from the following report of a conversa-
tion, between him and F.M.L. Gyulai, which took
place in the presence of Col. Bianchi, his A.D.C.
This is quoted by the authors of the " Campagne
d'Allemagne " in a note, but with no specific
reference as to its source : —

" His Royal Highness cannot really imagine that
he is charged with the command of an Army.
He is far too young and inexperienced to fill such
a role. His Majesty has conferred on me full
powers for these operations and I am responsible
to him in the fullest degree."

He then went on to assert that the Archduke
had been perfectly aware of the Emperor's
instructions on this point ever since the interview
at Landsberg, and suggested that he had kept
back the Emperor's letter (which it will be noted
is undated) until the present difficult situation
had arisen.

1 82 THE PASSAGE OF THE DANUBE

The Archduke acknowledged the receipt of the
Emperor's letter in a script too long for repro-
duction. The spirit of it was however exactly
what one would have expected from a young and
inexperienced officer, who saw the sufferings and
troubles all around him, but had not experience
enough to trace them back to their proper source
and lay the blame on the right shoulders.

In reading it, one is irresistibly reminded of
the similar screeds poured out by columns from
the fluent pens of our modern war correspondents
in South Africa.

Mack himself in his justification asserts speci-
fically that, in this interview on the night of the
loth October, the Archduke refused to allow
him to read the letter with his own eyes ; and this
statement, if accepted, is enough to put the Arch-
duke out of court altogether. Unfortunately, at
this point the narrative of the " Campagne
d'Allemagne " loses its customary clearness, and
discloses a bias in favour of the young Prince.
This is altogether unaccountable in officers of a
Republican Army, whose sympathies one would
naturally have expected to find on the side of the
experienced " ranker " instead of with an inex-
perienced scion of the aristocracy, and I must
leave it to the context to reveal to which side the
weight of the whole evidence inclines.

TO THE BATTLE OF ELCHINGEN 183

On the morning of the nth October Mack
submitted the following draft of his proposed
reorganisation of the Army for the Archduke's

visa :-

i. The Army to be formed at once in three
Corps, each of which is to have its due proportion
of light troops, line, and reserve — i.e. light troops
one quarter, line or main body one half, Reserve
Corps, one quarter.1

Each Corps Commander to detail permanently
from his advance guard, two battalions with two
3-pdr. guns and two light squadrons well
mounted, under the orders of a picked officer,
ready to be employed at a moment's notice
either as vanguard, flanking party or flying
column. Each will also detail for his special
service, a selected Captain of Cavalry with 4
N.C.O.'s and 40 troopers.

NOTE.— The Corps of Jellacic should have
besides at least six or eight squadrons.

2. These orders to be communicated at once
to the Corps Commanders for immediate action.

3. All important reports received by your Royal
Highness to be sent on to me, so that I can add

i The reader's attention is particularly called to the
extraordinary vagueness with which the term " corps "
is here applied. Compare it with my remarks on this
subject in " Campaign of Leipzig," p. 171.

1 84 THE PASSAGE OF THE DANUBE

my opinion in a few words. Instructions or
orders sent out from your R. Highness's Head-
quarters to be sent to me first for counter-
signature.

COMMENT. — The two remaining paragraphs are
omitted as unimportant ; the above are sufficient
to reveal the possibilities of friction and disaster
between the two men, and the loss of time bound
to ensue unless the two staffs habitually rode to-
gether— but this was by no means their practice.

During the course of the morning the Army
took up a position on the heights to the north
of Ulm — only one brigade of Schwarzenberg's
command remaining on the right bank of the
Danube. About noon, guns were heard from
the direction of Albeck, and a column of French
Infantry was seen issuing from the woods and
entering into Jiingingen. This, as we shall see
hereafter, was part of Dupont's detachment
operating entirely unsupported by the rest of the
French Army.

The nearest troops at hand under Loudon
at once moved against them and, after a pretty
sharp tussle, drove them out of the village.
Meanwhile Schwarzenberg and Klenau, placing
themselves at the head of the Cuirassier Regiments
"Mack" and "Archduke Charles," to which

TO THE BATTLE OF ELCHINGEN 185

some other squadrons rallied, making 18 squadrons
in all, threw themselves upon the French right
and rear, riding over and almost destroying
2 regiments of cavalry and one of infantry, and
bringing in 2 eagles, n guns and some 800 to
900 prisoners..

Mack himself was wounded in this skirmish,
and one is tempted to ask " que diable allait-il
faire dans cette galere ? " It surely formed no
part of his duty, whether as Chief of Staff or Com-
mander in Chief, to allow himself to be involved
in a quite unimportant affair of outposts.

Over and above the eagles, guns and prisoners,
the orders to the 6th Corps (Ney) were captured,
instructing it to attack and carry Ulm from the
left bank, whilst the rest of the Army moved
up against it from the south. This piece of
information was of extreme importance, as it
showed that the road to Bohemia was still open,
but unfortunately circumstances combined to
prevent immediate action from being taken.

Mack's own account in his " Justification "
sheds some light on what these circumstances
were, and reveals again the impossibility of the
situation created by the insubordination of the
Archduke : —

!< When the news of the enemy's attack arrived,
his Imperial Highness at once rode out of Ulm

1 86 THE PASSAGE OF THE DANUBE

with several Generals and their A.D.C.'s without
giving me time to join them, or leaving word where
I might find them. For myself, I went as soon
as possible to Michelsberg, the key of our
position, expecting to find his Imperial Highness
there. I was disappointed, but learnt that he
was in an entrenchment on our right. Events
compelled me to remain where I was for the
five hours during which the engagement lasted,
separated from him by a distance of a couple
of miles, whence resulted the fact that the enemy
was only beaten on his right by our left, whereas
he should have been enveloped and annihilated
had his Imperial Highness been with me on our
left, for I should have begged him to have sent
the necessary orders to ensure this result. But
nothing of the kind was possible. Our right
remained inert, because it was not my place to
send orders to his Imperial Highness, with whom
was Feldzeugmeister Kollowrath, and I had
reason to hope that the latter or some of the
other Generals, or the Adjutant General, with
him, would have given him the necessary advice
to attack."

Mack desired to profit at once by the advantages
his troops had undoubtedly gained in this combat
of Haslach, and the important improvement in
the morale of the men which undoubtedly had

TO THE BATTLE OF ELCHINGEN 187

resulted from it. His idea was to march out by
the left bank of the river towards Ratisbon,
to reach a hand to the Russians whom he had
reason to believe to be in the vicinity. But
Werneck and others represented the fatigue of the
men as so extreme that his project had to be
abandoned for the day.

In his " Justification " he protests against this
view as follows : —

" How is it possible to put forward this plea
of exhaustion as a reason for delaying our de-
parture until the I3th, when it is notorious that
all the troops, including Werneck's command,
had reposed peacefully during the night of the
nth after the fight, and had all the day of the
1 2th to recover from the disorganisation which
the fight had entailed ? F.M.L. Werneck opposed
my proposition with altogether improper violence
before the Prince, and his Imperial Highness
tolerated his protests, although I went so far as to
request that his Imperial Highness would allow
me to start with Werneck's Corps so that I could
prove that my proposal contained no impossibility
either for himself or for his men.

" The Prince, however, would not accede to my
request, although he had thrown the whole
responsibility on my shoulders only two days
before, and had in his possession the Imperial

1 88 THE PASSAGE OF THE DANUBE

Order to decide in my favour when I insisted upon
my point. I only requested his Imperial High-
ness to call the principal Generals together in
order to explain to them verbally my plans. I
had no intention of consulting with them at
all."

The I2th, therefore, was spent as a day of rest,
but when in the evening news came in of the
retreat of the French behind the Brenz, whilst
20,000 to 30,000 were reported advancing on the
right bank towards Weissenhorn, Mack recurred
to his original purpose — with slight modifications.

His " Justification " continues : —

" When the news of the appearance of several
columns of the enemy moving on the Iller reached
me, I acquired the conviction that the main
body of the enemy was turning towards us,
wishing at all costs to secure the possession of
Ulm. It became necessary therefore to leave
some 12,000 to 13,000 men in that town — i.e. the
Corps of Schwarzenberg.

" My first project, drafted during the morning
of the I2th, had been to send Werneck's Corps
on Geislingen, to reach that place on the I3th
and to detach columns towards Stuttgart, possibly
even to the Rhine ; whilst on the morning of the
I3th the two Corps of Riesch and Schwarzenberg
were to attack the Corps of Ney and pass beyond

TO THE BATTLE OP ELCHINGEN 189

the Danube or along the river}- My second project
was, since Ney's Corps had taken position at
Langenau and, it was alleged, had received re-
inforcements, to attack it on the morning of the
I3th. To these two projects I added, that after
the enemy on the left bank had been driven off,
the Reserve Artillery and Convoys should file
out of Ulm towards Heidenheim and further if
necessary ; whilst the Corps of Jellacic occupied
Ulm and acted on the right bank against the
enemy should he approach from Gunzburg. We
still believed the chief efforts of the French to be
directed eastwards against the Russians and
imagined we had only a detachment of observa-
tion to deal with.

" When, however, the news of the approach of a
strong body of the enemy marching towards the
Iller arrived, a third disposition became necessary,
and Jellacic was sent along the left bank of the
Iller in order to withdraw towards the Tyrol
if necessary ; whilst the news simultaneously
received of Ney's retreat beyond the Danube
allowed us to send off the Reserve Artillery and
the Convoys to Heidenheim immediately. In-

1 1 underline these words to direct attention to the
extraordinary confusion of Mack's narrative, which may
perhaps be accounted for by the state of his mind when
these words were written. The same remark may be
reasonably applied throughout his writings.

190 THE PASSAGE OF THE DANUBE

deed we were driven to this resolution by the
apparent desire of the enemy to cross the Danube
above Ulm, which would have compromised
their ulterior departure.

" For their security the Corps of Riesch was
detailed to watch the left bank of the Danube as
far as Heidenheim, and Werneck was ordered to
Heidenheim.

" Hence of the four ' Corps d'AmuSe ' that of
Schwarzenberg alone remained at Ulm, or rather
beyond Ulm on the right bank. It was ordered
to reconnoitre on the I3th the enemy's column
seen near Weissenhorn overnight, and on the I4th
to leave Richter's brigade at Ulm as garrison,
and to follow with the remainder to Albeck on
the road to Heidenheim."

In the meantime, thanks to Werneck's op-
position, the troops were suffering considerably
more from the hunger entailed by their continued
presence in and around Ulm than they would
have done in marching over a fresh area, and the
spirits of the men drooped hourly as they waited
under streaming rain in the muddy bivouacs.
But at length, early on the morning of the I3th,
they moved off. Werneck was on the left, taking
with him all the Reserve Artillery, the pontoons
and heavy trains — Riesch in the centre, along
the Danube towards Elchingen and Langenau,

TO THE BATTLE OF ELCHINGEN 191

and the right under Schwarzenberg on the right
bank of the river towards Weissenhorn to observe
the movements of the enemy on the right bank of
the Danube, and to delay his movements until
dark, then to retreat on Ulm, march through the
town and follow Riesch on the I4th to Langenau.
Jellacic also was despatched up the left bank
of the Iller to remove boats and destroy the
bridges, ultimately to make good his retreat
towards the Lake of Constance and Tyrol. Only
5 to 6 battalions with 4 squadrons were to be
left behind as garrison for Ulm.

As usual, the " order of battle " of the several
commands had been again readjusted, and as
the columns marched off Werneck disposed of
three Divisions, totalling 25 battalions and 3 rifle
companies, together with 16 squadrons — but all
greatly reduced in numbers ; one battalion, for
instance, which had suffered very severely at
Wertingen mustered only 200 bayonets. Riesch
broke up his 32 battalions and 12 squadrons into
two columns, of approximately equal strength ;
the first under Loudon moved between the
main road to Heidenheim and the Danube by.
cross country tracks leading to Gundelfingen ;
the latter under Riesch himself by Thalfingen —
i.e. following the river bank towards Elchingen.
But by this time the roads were so broken up by

192 THE PASSAGE OF THE DANUBE

the continuous rain that in places they were
almost impassable, and the six to seven miles
from Ulm to Elchingen took fourteen hours,
while waggons without number remained behind
hopelessly stuck in the mud. Nevertheless, the
Advance Guards ultimately reached Elchingen
and drove out the French outposts, seized the
bridge, removed some of the planking, and having
prepared it for demolition, settled down for the
night believing themselves perfectly secure against
attack from that quarter at least. The rest of
the troops seem to have slept in the mud
just where darkness overtook them, for day-
light found them still scattered about the
country unable to concentrate against a sudden
attack.

Werneck, on higher ground and better roads,
was between Heidenheim and Herbrechtingen,
and as far as he was concerned the road lay
practically open to him.

Meanwhile Mack, in Ulm, was receiving constant
reports of the approach of larger bodies of French
troops on the roads coming from Leipheim,
Weissenhorn and Pfaffendorf. Deserters and
prisoners declared that the whole army was be-
hind them, and the Austrian outposts were slowly
driven back towards the Iller. Finally, he learnt
that the whole of Ney's Corps, last heard of on

TO THE BATTLE OF ELCHINGEN 193

the left bank of the Danube, had crossed over to
the right bank.1

This intelligence completely mystified him ;
and now there occurred one of those extraordinary
chances of war, which sometimes arise to mislead
even the soundest of intellects. About 10 A.M.,
a report reached him, founded on a conversation
overheard at a table d'hote in a village between
Stuttgart and Ulm, that the British had effected
a landing at Boulogne, and that a revolution had
broken out somewhere in France. The man who
brought the news merely repeated what he had
heard for what it was worth, but the idea seems
to have appealed to Mack's imagination, and this
is what he deduced from the information now
before him : —

" If the enemy wished to secure Ulm, the right
bank was certainly not the side from which to
approach it, since the town itself lies entirely on
the left bank. If he meant to invest it, then he
required to be in at least equal strength on both
banks — but he had withdrawn practically all his
strength from the left bank of the river and was
approaching by several roads on the south side.
This gave me the impression of a retreat, rather

1 This, it will be seen, in the account of the French move -
ments, page 199, was premature by several hours.

N

194 THE PASSAGE OF THE DANUBE

than of an advance ; for an Army on the Lech
wishing to retire on the Rhine and knowing Ulm
to be held by an enemy would have acted in no
other manner. The news brought me by Baron
Steinherr, a credible witness, of the conversation
he had overheard, coincided so well with the
opinions I had already formed on the facts before
me, that I allowed myself to accept it as correct,
all the more so because no more favourable
moment for a British landing, and a revolu-
tionary outbreak could well be imagined than
this one, when Bonaparte at the head of all his
mobilised resources was away beyond the Rhine.
It was further rumoured that Prussia, exasperated
by the violation of her neutrality, was on the point
of declaring War against him. ..."

Buoyed up by this new hope, Mack prepared
a general order announcing to the troops still
lying around Ulm that the French were in full
retreat towards the Rhine in three columns ;
and ordering each command to detail two flying
columns, to pursue and harass the retreating
enemy. We may pass over the details, since
events moved faster than the orders themselves
travelled, and the Austrian Commanders found
quite other tasks to their hands to be dealt
with.

TO THE BATTLE OF ELCHINGEN 195

For a moment, on the receipt of this information,
as Mack afterwards confessed, his first idea had
been to attack the French with all his forces on
the right bank in the direction of Weissenhorn —
but the vision of a pursuit of the retreating
enemy was too fascinating to be foregone, and
in an unlucky moment, like the fox in the fable
he threw away the substance for the shadow.1

COMMENT. — I write this advisedly, for an
attack at this moment would have " held " the
enemy. Their columns converging inwards from
all sides would doubtless have annihilated
Schwarzenberg's command — but Ney's march
towards Elchingen would have been arrested,
and since the Austrians on the left bank, in
consequence of the mud, could not have retraced
their steps in time to intervene, their retreat to
the north-eastward would still have remained
open, and beyond the reach of French molesta-
tion.

14^ October. — During the night of the
I3th-i4th October, the Austrians on the left
bank of the Danube rested in complete security.

1 In defence of the ready acceptance by Mack of the rumour
of a British landing at Boulogne and all the consequences that
would follow such an occurrence, it must be pointed out that Mack
knew that the Austrian Government had made most pressing re-
presentations to the Cabinet of St James as to the desirability of
this diversion, and the British Government were in fact preparing
forces for such a descent all through the autumn.

i96 THE PASSAGE OF THE DANUBE

They knew that Dupont's Division had retired
to the Brenz— and having prepared the bridge at
Elchingen for demolition and arranged to seize
the bridges down stream at Riedheim, Leipheim,
and Gundelfingen at early dawn, there remained
no cause for further anxiety.

Unfortunately for them the French, having at
last straightened out the series of Staff blunders
which had led to the transfer of their whole army
(less Dupont) to the right bank, were marching
with all haste to undo the consequences of their
previous mistakes, and in the morning detachments
of their troops entered Riedheim and Leipheim
immediately before the Austrians came up. A
few moments later Ney himself arrived at the
bridge of Elchingen ; and his leading detachments
attacked with suddenness and impetuosity, indi-
viduals swarming over the road-bearers of the
bridge with such daring and rapidity that the
contemplated demolition of the structure had to
be abandoned, and presently the village from
which the bridge takes its name, together with
the copses and meadows lying between the vil-
lage and the river, was in French hands whilst
flanking columns were hastening up from Ried-
heim and Leipheim farther down stream.

Seeing that the line of the Danube had fallen,
Riesch drew up the troops immediately at hand

TO THE BATTLE OF ELCHINGEN 197

along the track from Ober Elchingen to Oetingen,
and summoned Loudon and all the men within
his call to his aid.

But they had straggled terribly during the
previous days' march, and the roads were still
almost impassable. Hence the French, pouring
over the river at the several crossing places,
penetrated between the converging columns and
began attacking them in flank. The surprise in
fact proved altogether too complete for the
Austrians, and though their closed detachments
fought most gallantly, and their cavalry, in spite
of their exhausted horses and diminished effectives,
charged by squadrons again and again, their
plucky resistance soon broke down, and a general
retreat began. The troops fell back in the usual
manner, by the tracks by which they had come — i.e.
towards Ulm, leaving behind them about 4000
killed, wounded and prisoners — i.e. about 30 per
cent, of their strength.

Nearing Ulm, Riesch found Schwarzenberg
occupying the Michelsberg and Geisberg on the
left of the Danube with his Corps, and by degrees
his shattered command formed up behind this
still intact screen.

As Werneck, who was still pursuing his march
along the Heidenheim Road, had with him all
the Reserve Artillery, no heavy guns were left

198 THE PASSAGE OF THE DANUBE

to strengthen the position, a fact which had an
important influence on subsequent events.

Jellacic's detachment marching in execution
of its orders, south on Memmingen, and well
served by its light troops, on learning that this
town had capitulated to Soult and was now held
by French troops in force, bent off eastward to
Wangen and, passing thus behind the French
columns, made good his retreat to Tyrol.

CHAPTER VII

THE FRENCH MOVEMENTS FROM THE 6TH OCTOBER
TO THE BATTLE OF ELCHINGEN

jth October. — On the night of the 6th October
Soult and Murat lay a short distance from Donau-
worth, which had been seized by the advance
guard of Vandamme's Division (Soult's Corps)
about 8 P.M. — but the Austrians in retreating had
had time to cut the bridge behind them. Immedi-
ately Soult and Murat made their dispositions
to pass the river both above and below it, and
the enemy having no men available to guard
these passages, retreated next morning about
10 A.M. — the 7th October. The bridge was at once
repaired, and the French streamed over in hot
pursuit. Again the Austrians endeavoured to
make a stand and destroyed the bridge at Rain,
on the Lech, but the French dragoons, passing
some miles below the town, threatened their line
of retreat and again compelled a withdrawal.

The Emperor himself arrived at Donauworth
during the morning, and with the passage of the
river thus in his hands, immediately decided to
199

200 FRENCH MOVEMENTS FROM 6th OCTOBER

direct Ney against Ulm by both banks of the
river, securing all the bridges on his way. Ney
should have halted this day at Giengen, but
apparently the order never reached him, for, in
fact, he arrived at Hochstaedt during the evening,
and bivouacked in and around that place, leaving
Dupont's Division at Diesenhofen.

Of Soult's Corps (IV.) Vandamme's Division
bivouacked near Rain. Legrand and Saint
Hilaire only reached Donauworth, ready to cross
early next morning ; Suchet's Division and the
Imperial Guard lay along the road from Nord-
lingen to Donauworth, where the Emperor took
up his quarters. The V. Corps reached the
bridge of Minister, and the Cavalry Divisions
of Bourcier and Baraguey-d'Hilliers lay about
Neresheim, their scouts watching the roads leading
out of Ulm.

Davout, marching on Neuburg, reached Mon-
heim; Marmont was at Pappenheim; Bernadotte
and the Bavarians at Weissenburg, with his
advance guards at the gates of Ingolstadt.

The events of the 7th, however, brought no
fresh intelligence to the Emperor. He knew that
the Austrians had been concentrating around
Ulm, which they were to reach on the 6th, but
he had only a vague idea of what troops Mack
actually had with him about the Iller. Further,

TO THE BATTLE OF ELCHINGEN 201

he was unable to predict whether Mack, on learn-
ing of the appearance of the French at Rain,
would remain where he was or attempt to escape
envelopment by a rapid march by either of the
roads leading to Landsberg or Augsburg.

The working of his mind is best shown by the
following letter which he caused to be sent to Ney
during the night of the 7th-8th October : —

" It is probable that the passage of the Lech (at
Rain) and the occupation of Augsburg, which will
take place during the course of the day, will open
the enemy's eyes. ... It is impossible, when
he hears of the passage of the Danube and the
Lech, together with the terror which must have
seized upon his troops,1 which he had beyond the
Lech, that he can fail to think seriously of retreat.
It is to be expected that he will first try the road to
Augsburg, but learning as he soon will that it is
too late, he will then try Landsberg where if our
troops arrive in time he will stand to fight, or
perhaps continue to retreat on Tyrol. More
probably he will decide to fight.

1 I have italicised the words, " with the terror," etc.,
because neither the Austrian nor the French narratives of the
troops actually engaged on the yth disclose anything ap-
proaching panic on the Austrian side. In fact, at the close
of the day, the cavalry of the latter turned on their pursuers
\vith considerable vigour and effect.

202 FRENCH MOVEMENTS FROM 6th OCTOBER

" His Majesty does not think that the enemy can
be mad enough to cross to the left bank of the
Danube, as his magazines are all at Memmingen,
and he has the greatest possible interest not to
separate himself from Tyrol."

Later on he wrote personally to Ney :

" I cannot believe that the enemy can have any
other plan but to retreat on Augsburg or Lands-
berg, or even on Fussen. Anyhow he may hesitate,
and in that case it lies with us to arrange that
not one escapes."

With this idea in his mind he calculated that it
might come to a battle on the gth, on the Lech.
Accordingly he sent orders to the 2nd, 3rd, 4th,
and 5th Corps to hasten their march so as to have
sufficient men in hand about Augsburg on the Qth.

COMMENT. — We do not know at what hour these
orders were sent out, still less at what time they
actually reached the troops. The fact, however, is
that they were physically beyond their powers to
execute ; for only Vandamme's Division lay south
of the Danube, and the others mentioned had
none of them less than 26 miles to march, while
Marmont and Davout were nearly 40 miles
away from their destination. In fine weather
such a march would have been phenomenal

TO THE BATTLE OF ELCHINGEN 203

even for the Grand Army, and with the roads
in the terrible state they are known to have
presented, one may frankly put such a feat down
as impossible. On the other hand, assuming the
Austrians to have completed their concentration
on the 6th October (as apparently Napoleon
believed that they had done) and given the better
road over which they had to pass, they ought to
have reached Augsburg with about 70,000 men
(including Kienmayer already in the vicinity)
before Soult with his 30,000 — who could only be
supported by driblets from hour to hour. Ulti-
mately of course the victory of five French Corps
over two Austrian ones was assured, and no
doubt Mack was well advised not to make
the attempt, but with the rapid decision still
possible in those days for an Army strong in
Cavalry and trained to attack in " Line/' it is quite
within the limits of probability that the Austrians
should have destroyed Soult and then, deflecting
their march on Landsberg, have made good their
retreat into Tyrol. This, however, though it
would have saved Mack's reputation, would not
have gained time for the union of the Russians
and Austrians on the Inn which it was the whole
purpose of Mack's mission to obtain.1

1 The 4th Division, the last of Soult's Corps, was at Nordlingen
on the 7th and only due to arrive at Donau worth on the 8th.

204 FRENCH MOVEMENTS FROM 6th OCTOBER

Actually, the troops were far from having
attained the destinations assigned to them in
previous orders for the 8th October. Several
delays in the march and in the delivery of orders
kept back Ney's Corps till late at night. The
columns of Marmont and Bernadotte crossed
each other on the march, and neither of them
reached their destinations on the Danube by
several miles. Davout bivouacked with his main
body at Neuburg, his advance guard being some
six miles farther south on the way to Aichach.

Soult's Corps fouled the bridge through Rain in
such manner that Walther's Division of the
Dragoons had to take the rear of the column
instead of the head, and probably as a consequence
of an inadequate Cavalry screen Soult allowed
himself to be drawn aside from the Augsburg
road into a skirmish in the direction of Aichach.
Finally his troops bivouacked at Mainbach, face
to face with Austrian outposts, and a good ten
miles short of his destination.

From these positions a concentration at Augs-
burg on the gth was entirely out of the question.

Murat, with four Divisions of Cavalry very
widely distributed, scouted west towards Wertin-
gen — where, as we already know, they found the
Austrian advance guard about 2.30 P.M. Lannes
hearing the sound of guns, diverted the head of

TO THE BATTLE OF ELCHINGEN 205

his column from Thurheim, about 5 miles south
of Minister, and at once marched to support Prince
Murat. The result of the combat has been already
told (p. 172). It broke off too late for pursuit,
and the French bivouacked for the night in and
around Wertingen, outposts close on the heels of
the Austrians about Zumarshausen and Hausen.
The information collected during these engage-
ments was duly sent to the Emperor, but its
influence on his movements is not to be traced.

Summarised, the result of the day's marching
was to bring Bernadotte to Eichstaedt, Mar-
mont to Nassenfels, Davout to Neuburg,
Guard and Headquarters to Donauworth, Soult
to Mainbach. Walther was between Main-
bach and Muhlhausen. Saint Hilaire (of Soult's
Corps) , Lannes and Murat were between Wertingen
and Hausen, Ney's Corps and Bourcier between
Gundelfingen and Heidenheim.

The following extract from the Memoirs of
Baron Thiebault, gives an interesting sidelight
on the actual execution of orders in the Grand
Army : —

" On the 8th October we resumed our march
on Landsberg. We had 24 miles to cover and
had marched 15 when De Segur (A.D.C. to the
Emperor) overtook us and handed over a letter

206 FRENCH MOVEMENTS FROM 6th OCTOBE

to General Saint-Hilaire — who was riding with
Morand and myself at the head of my brigade.
To my astonishment he read it out aloud as
follows : —

" ' General Saint-Hilaire, I send you this letter
to inform you that the enemy occupies Landsberg.
I think you can give a good account of him, and
I pray God to have you in his sacred keeping.

" ' NAPOLEON.'

" ' Come, gentlemen/ said the General, ' let us
push on and justify the confidence of the
Emperor/ and the troops, informed of the contents
of his Majesty's letter, stepped out singing and
shouting ' Vive 1'Empereur ! '

" Hardly a quarter of an hour had elapsed when
an A.D.C. from Murat, urging his horse as fast as
its exhaustion and the state of the country
allowed, appeared on our right, making signs and
shouting to us to stop the troops. The order to
halt was given, and he informed us that the Prince
was engaged against superior numbers, and ordered
us to rejoin him with all haste. ' Impossible ! '
replied Saint-Hilaire, ' here are the Emperor's
orders.'

'"The decision lies at Ulm/ said the A.D.C.,
' and not at Landsberg ; and besides, what will be

•

TO THE BATTLE OF ELCHINGEN 207

your fate if the Prince is crushed, and Mack
forces a passage ? ' and as these reasons were
backed up by the sound of heavy firing from the
direction of Mindelheim, he insisted we had not
a moment to lose. Saint-Hilaire appealed to us
for advice, and as his eye caught mine I said,
' General, march to the sound of the guns/ and
this old adage, which will re-echo in the ears of
Marshal Grouchy for the rest of his life, decided
him. He at once gave the order ' Heads of
columns right wheel.'

" The A.D.C. hastened to rejoin Murat and we
followed in five columns.

" We had hardly gone another quarter of an hour
when again the command : ' Halt ! ' rang out.
Murat's A.D.C. had disappeared, the noise of
the firing had dropped, and Saint-Hilaire having
nothing before his eyes to hold his attention,
changed his mind. He called us together, and
explained that we were disobeying a written order
of the Emperor's in favour of an order from
someone without authority to issue orders to us ;
that we might cause a superb manoeuvre to mis-
carry, and thus lose an opportunity of distinguish-
ing ourselves, etc., etc.

" Finally he ordered us ' Heads of columns left
wheel.' And so after three quarters of an hour
wasted and a toilsome couple of miles over

208 FRENCH MOVEMENTS FROM 6th OCTOBER

ploughed up country we resumed our march for
Landsberg, in anything but the best of humours.

" Hardly had we struck the high road again,
when the sound of heavy firing was renewed, and
this time it sounded much closer ; in fact we could
distinguish musketry. We might already have
reached the Prince, and our failure to reinforce
him might have gravely compromised him. These
reflections escaped neither us nor the men, who as
infallible judges felt the wrong done in failing to
keep a pledge thus given. A general murmur
arose and poor Saint-Hilaire once more changed
his mind.

" The Division accordingly changed its direction
for the third time within the hour, with the result
that we reached the ground too late to be of ser-
vice, and were very coldly received, found no one
to help us out with food or shelter, and our men
passed a bitterly cold night in bivouac. When at
length the next evening we did arrive in Landsberg;
soaked to the very bones, and utterly worn out, we
discovered that by superior order all our baggage
had been sent back to Augsburg. Thus I found
myself without my second horse, without a ser-
vant, and without even a dry shirt, or a pair of
boots to change into."

gth October. In spite of the testimony of the

TO THE BATTLE OF ELCHINGEN 209

prisoners taken at Wertingen, to the effect that
from 60,000 to 70,000 Austrians lay between
them and the Iller, the Emperor persisted in his
opinion that Mack meditated a retreat on Augs-
burg and Landsberg ; thus he renewed his orders
for the concentration about the former town of
Soult (IV. Corps), Davout (III. Corps), Lannes
(V. Corps), and Marmont (II. Corps). Berna-
dotte (I. Corps) was directed on Munich, to
take over the Bavarian Government and scatter
any Austrian detachments in the vicinity, whilst
Ney (VI. Corps) was directed to continue to
observe Ulm, but to note that there were but
3000 to 4000 men in that place, and that he could
give most essential help by co-operating with the
rest of the Army towards Augsburg. During the
night of the 8th and Qth October, Berthier
amplified this idea by the following letter : —

" Soult is marching on Augsburg ; it is there-
fore essential that you should arrive promptly
at Giinzburg, in order to intercept all movements
of the enemy whether from Ulm to Augsburg,
or from Ulm to Donauworth. Be very careful,
if the enemy manoeuvres on the right bank, to
move rapidly and parallel to him. Throw
Gazan's Division on the right bank. ... In a
word you are charged with the observation of
o

210 FRENCH MOVEMENTS FROM 6th OCTOBER

the Corps at Ulm ; if it marches towards Donau-
worth, you are to follow it ; if it marches on
Augsburg equally you must follow it."

This letter can hardly be cited as an example
of lucidity, and Ney being on the spot was more
impressed with the possibilities of the Austrian
forces around Ulm than was either the Emperor
or Berthier. Hence, instead of obeying the order
literally, he sent Dupont to Albeck, Loison to
Langenau, Malher to Giinzburg, and kept Gazan
on the right bank of the river near Gundelfingen.
The dismounted Dragoons were still scouting to
the north-west about Herbrechtingen. The posi-
tion of the remaining Division is not given, but
it also was kept on the left bank.

In the afternoon Berthier wrote again to Ney
in the same strain, insisting that both Gazan and
the dismounted Dragoons (as to whose where-
abouts he appears to have been entirely misin-
formed), should both march on Augsburg. " As
far as Ulm is concerned/' he concluded, "it is
impossible that it can be occupied by more than
3000 to 4000 men, send a Division to drive them
out. If they prove to be stronger, march yourself
with all your ' army/ capture the post, and make
a nice lot of prisoners. Immediately afterwards
direct your command, according to the move-

:

TO THE BATTI& OF ELCHINGEX 211

ments of the enemy, either on Landsberg or on
Memmingen."

At the moment that Ney received this remark-
able letter, he had just fought a severe engage-
ment at Giinzburg, and had learnt that Ulm
was strongly held and still served as a pivot of
manoeuvre for the Austrian Army.

It was the central column of Malher's Division
which had fought at Giinzburg, and in reporting
to Headquarters Ney stated, " the enemy at
Ulm is stronger than we had supposed. Ulm
appears to form the left flank of his line of
battle."

The V. Corps (Lannes) had been ordered to
march first to Zumarshausen and thence to
Augsburg — but fortunately it could not get
farther than Zumarshausen : hence it lay nearer
to Ulm than the Emperor's orders intended that
it should do. Lannes was in touch with Ney's
patrols throughout the day, and he also, whilst
believing that Mack would eventually take the
road to Augsburg, was convinced that for the
moment he was in force about Ulm, and nursing
the intention of attacking Ney.

The Emperor and Berthier, however, were not
to be persuaded of the danger threatening them
from Ulm, and the latter during the day particu-
larly cautioned Murat to pay attention to the

212 FRENCH MOVEMEfi&S FROM 6th OCTOBER

communication between Lannes and Soult, whilst
Lannes himself was ordered to halt in such a posi-
tion that if Augsburg was attacked at the break
of day, the three Divisions of his command would
be able to march to the battlefield at once.

On the right bank of the Lech Soult reached
Augsburg by noon, followed by the Imperial
Guard, and Davout reached Aichach — but Mar-
mont was compelled to halt at Neuburg in order
to feed his famished men. Bernadotte was still
on the left of the Danube north of Ingoldstadt.

loth October. The Emperor passed the night
of the Qth-ioth October at Zumarshausen, but
the time of his arrival cannot now be fixed.
Here he was more in touch with Lannes, Ney and
Murat, but their information had but little effect
on his plans. Whilst admitting the existence
of a considerable Austrian force on the Iller, he
seems to have abandoned the idea of enveloping
it, since Mack, in his, the Emperor's opinion, was
sure to endeavour to escape to Tyrol, in which
case the occupation of Ulm itself seemed a poor
return for the efforts of some 150,000 Frenchmen.
He therefore decided to divide the Grand Army
into three groups, of which the left, consisting of
Bernadotte and the Bavarians, was to move to
Munich, as already ordered ; the centre, formed
by the 2nd, 3rd and 4th Corps with two Cavalry

TO THE BATTLE OF ELCHINGEN 213

Divisions, was to remain on the Lech, whilst the
right — viz. the 5th and 6th Corps — with the re-
mainder of the Cavalry were left to deal with the
Austrians about Ulm as rapidly and decisively as
circumstances permitted. He himself determined
to go to Munich that he might be at hand to learn
the latest movements of Kienmayer's 12,000 men,
together with the Russians. As this move would
take him too far away from the right wing to
supervise its employment, he gave the command
of it to Murat, ordering the latter to move on
Mindelheim with the Cavalry and 5th Corps.
Though Ney thus came under the direct orders
of Murat, the Emperor gave him special instruc-
tions as to his operations against Ulm. These
were drafted presumably by Berthier: —

" To seize Ulm must be your first care, as it is
important from every point of view. His Majesty
leaves it to you to march in what order you may
consider best. Invest Ulm during the course of
to-morrow. The dismounted Dragoons remain
at your disposal ; place them at Giinzburg, on both
banks of the river, ready to move according to
circumstances. Immediately after you have
taken Ulm, wait for no further orders to act ;
move on Memmingen, or on any other point
which the enemy mayjiold. . . ."

214 FRENCH MOVEMENTS FROM 6th OCTOBER

COMMENT. — It is worth while to interrupt the
flow of the narrative here, in order to call atten-
tion to the extraordinary similarity between the
grouping of Napoleon's Army at this stage of the
campaign, with that of the German Army during
the passage of the Moselle on the I5th August
1870.

Map No. V., at end of book, is merely an outline
of Ulm and the Danube turned north and south
instead of east and west, with German names
substituted for French ones. For Ulm read
Metz ; for Danube, Moselle ; for Ney read Alvens-
leben ; and for Lannes, X. Corps ; the group of
Corps under Napoleon becomes Prince Frederick
Charles's Army ; and Bernadotte's column the
Army of the Crown Prince. Though the distances
and numbers are different, the form is almost
identical, and the point is this, that this identity
of form, as well as the similarity in the mis-
apprehensions under which both Napoleon and
Moltke were operating, is the logical consequence
of the means adopted by both for obtaining
information — viz. the Cavalry Screen pushed
well out to the front. In neither case could the
Cavalry " hold " the enemy. They could, and did,
indeed report where they were at a given hour,
but from that information no certain inference as
to where they would be forty-eight hours later could

TO THE BATTLE OF ELCHINGEN 215

be drawn. Hence both commanders had to work
on " hypothesis " only, and curiously both
accepted the hypothesis of retreat, as being to
their minds the most reasonable. Therefore
Napoleon directed his troops on Landsberg and
Mindelheim, and Moltke sent his to Verdun and
the Meuse. In both cases the conclusion proved
baseless, for both Mack and Bazaine were tied
and hampered by internal difficulties in their
commands which led them to a totally different
line of conduct to that which their adversaries
had thought out for them. So far at least in this
campaign it is clear that Napoleon had not yet
grasped the idea that he subsequently originated.
"On ne manoeuvre pas qu'autour d'un point
fixe."

Gazan's Division was handed over to Lannes,
and directed to follow that Marshal to Mindel-
heim on the nth October.

nth October. It was late in the evening before
Ney issued his orders for the execution of the
task assigned to him. The order to Dupont's
Division (ist) only directed that General to
blockade Ulm on the left bank of the river, but it
was accompanied by an explanatory letter worded
in the following terms : —

" You will surround Ulm as best you can, and

216 FRENCH MOVEMENTS FROM 6th OCTOBER

summon the commandant in His Majesty's name
to surrender. It is very important that your
right should reach the Blau [river], where it will
be supported in due course. You will occupy the
wooded heights in rear of Haslacherhof, and will
concert with General Baraguey-d'Hilliers as to
the best position for his dismounted dragoons,
who are to support your Division, and form its
reserve. . . ."

A further instruction was also sent off during
the morning by Marshal Ney, telling General
Dupont to provide himself with scaling ladders,
with which to scale the walls of Ulm, ending with
the following misleading information as to the
condition of the Austrians : —

" The enemy is struck with terror to a degree
almost unprecedented ; he is retiring on Biberach
in order to escape into Tyrol, his lines of retreat
via Kempten and Fiissen being both intercepted."

The Corps orders further directed the Division
of dismounted Dragoons (Baraguey-d'Hilliers) to
move at once from " Stotzingen by Langenau in
rear of Albeck " where they were to support Du-
pont. This order should have reached Stotzingen
at daybreak, and as it is only 7 miles from
Giinzburg, Ney had every right to expect that

TO THE BATTLE OF ELCHINGEN 217

Baraguey-d'Hilliers would be within supporting
distance of Dupont by noon — but luck was against
him.

The Staff Officer bearing this order was also
entrusted with others to Dupont. His instruc-
tions were, however, definite — to ride direct to
Stotzingen, then to return via Albeck and Dupont 's
Headquarters afterwards. He started about
3 A.M., and, the track that runs across the " Donau
Moos," a wide desolate morass, being difficult to
keep, he mistook his way in the dark, wandered
about all night and finding himself at daybreak
close to Albeck, he thought it best to hand over
Dupont 's order first, and then to ride on to
Stotzingen. This place he ultimately reached
about ii A.M., when presumably the General was
at breakfast or had other pressing business to
attend to, for the order to march was not issued
till the afternoon. Then the preliminary assembly
of the scattered portions of the command took
so much time that the troops did not actually
get under way till past 3 P.M. Then moving by
the shortest way, though not by the best — its
march was so much delayed that it did not reach
Albeck till after dark.

COMMENT. — This is a good illustration of the
old proverb, " More haste, less speed." The roads
across the morass were clear enough in broad

218 FRENCH MOVEMENTS FROM 6th OCTOBER

daylight, and the steeples of both Stotzingen and
Albeck are clearly visible from Giinzburg — hence
there was no necessity to use up a staff officer
by a midnight ride under peculiarly dangerous
circumstances ; a couple of orderlies, one for
each set of orders and one destination only, would
have amply sufficed, and one order at least would
have reached its goal sooner than it actually
arrived, by at least three hours, the other being
received about the same time. The difficulty
would not have been met by sending the same
orders in duplicate, for in the dark both would
have probably lost themselves, and there is a
necessity always to economise in horseflesh.
But the point really was to entrust each order
to a separate horseman.

Whilst Baraguey-d'Hilliers was thus accom-
plishing his leisurely approach, Dupont had
moved off with prompt obedience to his orders at
ii A.M., and before noon, signs of the enemy
became apparent. He had about 5000 bayonets,
ii guns and 1000 sabres, the latter broken up
into screening detachments, but he counted on
early support, and though the Austrians clearly
outnumbered him considerably, he did not hesi-
tate to engage them.

But they were altogether too heavy for him, and
only the deliberate obstructiveness of Prince

TO THE BATTLE OF ELCHINGEN 219

Ferdinand, related in the previous chapter,
saved the French from complete disaster, and
Baraguey-d'Hilliers riding up in advance of his
column with a small escort, found himself met by
a confused horde of broken troops, camp followers
and others. These he promptly rallied, and
eventually the French occupied bivouacs for the
night in much the same position as that of the day
before, a result which was sufficient to give colour
to a somewhat bombastic despatch from Dupont
to Ney announcing a brilliant victory.

Meanwhile, the remaining divisions of the 6th
Corps had crossed over to the right bank of the
Danube, and except for the somewhat dis-
organised detachment under Dupont (they ex-
perienced a bad panic during the next twenty-
four hours) and the dismounted Dragoons, the
whole left bank of the river lay open to the
Austrians for the next forty-eight hours.

COMMENT.— Setting aside the appalling state of
the roads, and the terrible rainstorm to which
previous commentators make little or no reference,
the Napoleonic strategy had completely broken
down. For the Emperor with 200,000 men at his
back was pursuing a phantom Army towards
Tyrol— whilst the real enemy was in a position to
cut clean across his communications, in order to
reach shelter and reinforcements in the north, and

220 FRENCH MOVEMENTS FROM 6th OCTOBER

this hours before Napoleon could have initiated
an effective intercepting movement, containing
even a germ of success.

It must be remembered that the French
supplies were practically exhausted and they
could only exist by moving through country
hitherto untouched by requisitions. The
Austrians, however, still had some supplies in
their baggage waggons, and thirty-six hours
would have carried them into fresh and untrodden
country, whilst the waggons of the second lines
of the enemy's trains would have fallen into their
hands; and the captured horses at least would
have served their captors to live upon, even if
friendly inhabitants had not come to their aid.

Meanwhile the Emperor on reading the reports
he received from Ney, began to modify his
hypothesis of an Austrian retreat on Tyrol.
Already during the night of the loth-nth October
he caused Berthier to write to Lannes :

" All the reports lead to the conclusion that the
enemy intends to fight near Ulm."

And about the same time, Napoleon himself
amplified this idea in a letter to Murat :

"I do not think matters are settled in your
direction. The enemy, shut in as he is, will
fight. He is receiving reinforcements both from

TO^THE BATTLE OF ELCHINGEN 221

Italy and the Tyrol. It is therefore necessary
that your reserve and the Corps of Ney and
Lannes, altogether between 50,000 and 60,000
men, should march as close together as possible,
so that they can concentrate for action within
six hours.

" If the enemy escapes you, he will be stopped
at the Lech " (by Soult and Marmont under the
Emperor himself), " march then upon the enemy
wherever you find him, but with precaution,
and keeping your troops in hand. Take no
chances, for the first rule of all is to have a
numerical superiority."

In order to render this concentration possible,
Murat and Lannes now turned off from the road
to Mindelheim and moved towards Ulm by
Burgau, which brought them shoulder to shoulder
with Ney, whose Divisions on the night of the
nth lay south of Giinzburg and Leipheim.

All through the day, Napoleon's hesitation
increased. Whilst still thinking it possible that the
bulk of the Austrians had escaped via Fiissen,
the evidence pointed to their continued presence
about Ulm in growing strength. Napoleon there-
fore kept Marmont, the Guard and Cavalry in and
around Augsburg, where his Headquarters were
fixed. He allowed Bernadotte to continue his

222 FRENCH MOVEMENTS FROM 6th OCTOBER

march on Munich, and Soult to occupy Landsberg,
from whence he reported several skirmishes with
Austrian troops which probably gave rise to
the idea of " reinforcements from Italy and
Tyrol " referred to in the above letter. From the
direction of Munich, Bernadotte sent in word that
the information he had received pointed to the
presence of some 20,000 Austrians to his front,
and to the arrival of the Russians within
one or two days — but at what point the
Russians were to arrive, he does not state.
The whole tone of the letter was so appre-
hensive, that Napoleon ordered Davout to
move up within supporting distance, and further
sent the Cuirassier Division under D'Hautpoul
to report to him in Munich with all speed.

I2th October. During the day Murat and Ney
had met at Giinzburg, where the firing at Albeck
was distinctly audible. Possibly influenced by
Dupont's too sanguine estimate of his own
success, it was decided to order him to hold his
ground while continuing to observe Ulm with his
reinforced command. This order should have
been despatched at once, but as usual nobody
seems to have troubled about it, and as a fact
it did not leave Headquarters until the morning
of the I2th. However, long before the order
reached its destination a very serious panic had

TO THE BATTLE OF ELCHINGEN 223

broken out, the result of the severe handling
which the troops had undergone during the pre-
vious day, and Dupont's command retreated to
the Brenz. Thither the bearer of the order had
to follow it, and found it in such a condition that
it was impossible to move it again until the I4th.
In complete ignorance that this order had not been,
and could not be, carried out with punctuality,
Murat continued during the day to move the
remainder of his troops into positions for an attack
on the line of the Iller next morning, riding out
himself to reconnoitre the enemy's presumed
position. This determination, however (which
in fact would have been a blow in the air, since
on the i3th practically the whole Austrian Army
was on the left bank of the Danube), was upset
by instructions from the Emperor, who had at
last convinced himself of the impossibility of
leaving the Austrians still at large upon the Iller,
or near Ulm, before turning his attention to
the greater danger threatening from the side of
Munich. He now wrote to say that he was
initiating a concentric advance of his Army upon
Ulm, and that it was necessary to wait for Soult
to reach Memmingen, and wheel in to the right.
His concluding words show how completely his
opinion had swung round during the last thirty-
six hours : —

224 FRENCH MOVEMENTS FROM 6th OCTOBER

" This will be no skirmish, not even the
attack of a column on the march ; it will be
upon an Army which may be more numerous
than you think, and on the success of which,
great results depend. I shall be there in person."

Later on he caused Berthier to write to Davout :

" The Emperor does not think that the enemy
has more than 80,000 to 90,000 men, but he will
attack with 100,000."

At the moment the Austrians could probably not
have paraded 50,000 men, and 100,000 would cer-
tainly have been an ample superiority of force upon
the battlefield, but otherwise 8 or 9 to 10 seems
hardly an adequate factor of safety when " great
results " are at stake. Meanwhile as we now know
the Austrians were free to move off towards the
Saxon and Bohemian frontiers whenever they
pleased. They would have done so but for the
seething discontent and mutiny within their own
Headquarters.

Nevertheless, even at this late hour, the Em-
peror had not quite emancipated himself from his
previous hypothesis, for on the same date and
apparently subsequent to the above-mentioned
letter, we find Berthier writing to Bernadotte : —

TO THE BATTLE OF ELCHINGEN 225

" The presence of Prince Ferdinand at Munich l
causes His Majesty to fear that the enemy who
was upon the Iller has escaped to Tyrol." :

This, however, seems to be the last trace of
Napoleon's indecision and may conceivably have
been due to some confusion in the mind of
Berthier, for during the rest of the day he was
busy sending out instructions to Murat to estab-
lish or repair bridges across the Danube between
Elchingen and Leipheim, so as to be able to
throw troops rapidly across in the case of an
Austrian move towards the north-east. But
assuming his own estimate of Austrian numbers
to have been correct, Ney and Lannes would
have been the only troops that could have got
across in time even had the Austrians only
started on the I4th. We know that in fact there
was nothing at all to have hindered their march
on the I2th except the opposition of Prince
Ferdinand and his party.

Meanwhile Davout was nearing Munich in
support of Bernadotte, and the following letter
was sent to him by Berthier to inform him of the
Emperor's plans and the part to be expected of
him in certain eventualities : —

1 This is not a misprint for " Ulm " as I at first took it to
be, but I cannot trace the origin of the astounding statement.

P

226 FRENCH MOVEMENTS FROM 6th OCTOBER

" On the I4th, there will be a great battle on the
Iller, near Ulm. Marshal Soult with his Corps
is on the march towards Memmingen. General
Marmont, with the two French Divisions of his
command, is also marching to occupy the heights
of Illertissin on the Iller ; Marshal Lannes is at
Weissenhorn, Marshal Ney on both banks of the
Danube near Ulm [rather a sanguine interpreta-
tion of the facts, by the way], and lastly the
Imperial Guard is marching on Weissenhorn.
On the I3th all the dispositions will be completed ;
on the I4th (the day of the battle) the enemy
will be destroyed, for he is invested on all sides.
The Emperor does not think that he has more
than from 80,000 to 90,000 men, but he himself
will attack with more than 100,000.

" This affair settled, his Majesty will at once
return to the Inn ; then Marshal Bernadotte and
you, M. le Marechal, will be two large Corps
for action, and the others will be your auxiliaries.
The Division which you have at Briick, one
march from Augsburg, will remain there, so that
in case the enemy should force his way out over
the Corps of General Marmont, or over any of the
others, you can move on Augsburg, support the
Dutch Division which is there, and defend the
passage of the Wertach, unite your " Army," and
attack the enemy.

TO THE BATTLE OF ELCHINGEN 227

"If one of the wings of the Army on march to
the Iller is beaten, you must still march on the
Lech to defend the other side, and give the
Emperor time to make his dispositions ; but
lastly I must tell you that the bulk of the Army
which will be on the Iller can only be beaten on
the I4th, hence it will only be on the I5th and
1 6th that you can be of use on the Lech ; hence
if to-morrow Marshal Bernadotte has need of
you to attack the enemy behind the Isar, you can
join him with the bulk of your forces ; employ
them on the I3th and I4th and return on the
I5th to be ready to execute the possible move-
ments indicated above."

In view of what I have already written, com-
ment on the above is needless.

i^th October. During the night of the I2th-
I3th October Marshal Lannes wrote the follow-
ing very important letter to Murat, exposing
fully the Emperor's false conception of the
situation : —

" The enemy's army is on the left bank of the
Danube : at this moment there is only a reserve
of from 4000 to 5000 men in Ulm. Everything
therefore points to an attempt to retire into
Franconia, and I have no doubt the movement
will begin to-night.

228 FRENCH MOVEMENTS FROM 6th OCTOBER

' You will no doubt therefore judge it expedient
to march at once to the support of Dupont's
Division, and to carry a great part of your force
over to the left bank of the Danube. Personally
I believe the need to be most urgent. Your
Highness will, I am convinced, consider it advis-
able to inform his Imperial Majesty of the true
state of affairs.''

Unfortunately Murat, less clear-sighted than
Lannes, sent on only a summary of the letters,
with the comment, " Although the engagement
of yesterday in which Dupont's Division was
concerned has shown our weakness on the left
bank and our plans on the right, I do not share
the opinion of Marshal Lannes. At daybreak I
am going to reconnoitre the enemy's position ;
meanwhile I shall impress upon Marshal Ney
the need of informing Dupont of the project
Marshal Lannes attributes to the Austrians,
and order him to exercise the strictest sur-
veillance. . . . Your Majesty will arrive and
will order the movement yourself ; I cannot
decide so easily, knowing as I do about the
movements of General Marmont and Marshal
Soult on my left. Might it not upset your
general plan ? I confine myself, therefore, Sire,
to press the occupation of the bridge at El-

TO THE BATTLE OF ELCHINGEN 229

chingen, and to forward you the information I
have received."

Murat then proceeds to insist on the smallness
of the risk in the direction of Albeck and adds :
" In any case Dupont's Division is there and we
can count upon him, as he has just proved."
He little knew that Dupont was not there, but
miles to the rear on the Brenz, reorganising his
exhausted troops, who were without guns or
ammunition.

Meanwhile the Emperor himself reached the
ground. At Giinzburg, where he expected to
find both Murat and Ney, he was astonished at
the uncertainty which existed as to the position
of Dupont, and after sending a staff officer to
obtain precise information, he went on to Pfaffen-
hofen, Murat' s headquarters.

But not even here could he acquire a precise
idea of the positions of the 6th Corps (Ney). It
was known that the Divisions of Loison and Malher
were, at least in part, in the villages of Leipheim,
Falheim and Nersingen ; also it was believed
that they occupied Elchingen. Moreover, as
Murat had ordered Dupont on the nth to remain
at Albeck, he supposed him still to be there.
The Emperor therefore contented himself for the
moment by ordering Lannes to push on Gazan's
Division to Pfuhl under the walls of Ulm ; then

2 30 FRENCH MOVEMENTS FROM 6th OCTOBER

with the remainder of his Corps to capture at
any cost the bridge of Ober-Kirchberg, and gain
a footing on the left bank of the Iller, thus estab-
lishing direct communication with Soult. Mar-
mont, who had passed at Krumbach, was to
move up to Weissenhorn.

Presently the news arrived that Dupont had
retreated on the Brenz, that the 6th Corps had
only sent a small reconnaisance towards Ober-
Elchingen, which had been forced to return by
greatly superior numbers of the enemy, and that
only three companies remained in observation
of the bridge of Elchingen — i.e. on the right
bank.

Then the storm broke. The Emperor re-
proached Ney with having sent Dupont forward
on the nth without support, with having
evacuated Albeck and Elchingen without orders,
with having failed to establish communications
between his Divisions, and with having left him
in ignorance as to the movements and positions
of his whole Corps. Finally he ordered him to
occupy the passage of the river at Elchingen
the next morning — i.e. i/j-th.

Later, Dupont reported that he was sur-
rounded on all sides by detachments of the
enemy.

At night the troops actually occupied the follow-

TO THE BATTLE OF ELCHINGEN 231

ing positions : — Dupont still on the Brenz ;
Malher and Bourcier at Falheim ; Loison on the
march to Nersingen ; the dismounted Dragoons
at Leipheim ; Gazan, Suchet and Beaumont still
on the Roth in the same positions they had
reached on the previous evening. Oudinot was
arriving at Ober-Kirchberg. The Guards and
Nansouty's Cuirassiers at Giinzburg, Marmont
at Weissenhorn and Soult before Memmingen.

I4th October. During the night of the i3th-
I4th the conviction at last began to wake in
Napoleon's mind that the true decision lay on
the left bank of the Danube. Accordingly, he
ordered Lannes to support Ney at the earliest
possible moment, whilst Marmont relieved
Oudinot at Ober-Kirchberg. Berthier then
wrote to Ney in the Emperor's name ordering
him to capture the heights above Albeck — i.e.
the Ober-Elchingen ridge — and promising full
support if serious resistance was encountered.

Dupont next morning made a faint-hearted
attempt to carry out Ney's orders that he should
reoccupy Albeck, but seeing an Austrian column
moving by his right on the Nerenstetten road,
" he withdrew to the Brenz to cover the com-
munications of the Army by Gundelfingen and
Giinzburg."

At 8 A.M. Ney leading, with Loison's Division

232 FRENCH MOVEMENTS FROM 6th OCTOBER

as his advance guard, reached the Danube and
found the farther side of the bridge held by 300
Austrians and 2 guns. These guns were promptly
crushed by a French mass of 17 guns, and under
cover of this fire, the men raced across the road-
bearers, the roadway itself having been removed,
and soon drove the Austrians away from the
farther bank.

The bridge itself was rapidly made passable
for all arms, and the infantry flowed over it un-
interruptedly, though the passage of the guns was
long delayed. Then followed a typical French
Revolutionary Army attack. They were met
first by flanking parties covering the march of the
main body along the Heidenheim road, but these
were soon driven in by the excessive mobility of
the French, who thus discovered the movement
which flankers had been sent out to cover, and
at once bore down upon the marching columns.
These in turn formed into several big squares, and
still endeavoured to continue their march towards
the eastward. Cavalry, Infantry, and the guns as
they tardily came to hand, combined against these
masses, and though, in spite of their exhausted
horses, the Austrian Cavalry made many brilliant
charges, the whole force was gradually shouldered
off the road, and compelled to retreat towards
Ulm.

TO THE BATTLE OF ELCHINGEN 233

Loison's Division, having borne the whole
weight of the fighting, which lasted for ten hours,
was too worn out to pursue, and went into
bivouac near Albeck, whilst Malher's relieved
it in first line and threw out outposts towards
the ravine of Thalfingen.

CHAPTER VIII

FROM THE BATTLE OF ELCHINGEN TO THE CAPITU-
LATION OF ULM

FROM the date of the battle of Elchingen, the two
opposing armies were so intimately in contact
that it is no longer convenient for readers to
follow them in two different chapters.

After the disastrous termination of the Austrian
attempt on the I4th to force a passage to the
north-east, the Archduke Ferdinand conceived
the situation as entirely desperate. To quote the
French account (p. 205, Vol. III., Pt. I.) :—

" There being no longer any opportunity for
an example, or for devotion which could be of
real utility, the first consideration was to deprive
the French of the glory of capturing a Hapsburger.
If before this he had shown greatness of soul and
resignation, he now showed clairvoyance, wisdom
and resolution in his action.

" Seeing that the complete investment of Ulm
could be but a matter of hours he selected his com-
panions, formed up the troops which he intended

234

ELCHINGEN TO ULM 235

to take with him, and started on the road to
Geislingen, not, however, without paying a visit
to Mack's Headquarters in order to announce his
determination."

Curiously enough Mack altogether failed to
see the necessity for this desertion of the
ship in its extremity. He entirely refused to
respond to the Archduke's suggestion that they
should quit the Army together, and he also denied
him several of the officers whom the Archduke
had selected as his companions in dishonour, stat-
ing that they were indispensable to him (Mack)
in his further operations. This indeed they very
obviously were, for even if the worst came to the
worst, and the place was completely shut in, an
able and vigorous Staff was needed to ensure an
adequate defence of the town and the consequent
retention of a large French force in observation
of the fortress until the Russians and Austrians,
now gathering on the Inn, could march to its relief.

Ultimately the Archduke with his escort, con-
sisting curiously of seven squadrons of Mack's own
Cuirassiers, rode off by the Geislingen road, which
was still open,trusting to pick up the Corps of Wer-
neck, which was still outside, to the north of Ulm.

But he never found Werneck, whose advance
guard had by this time reached Aalen and Nord-

236 THE BATTLE OF ELCHINGEN

lingen, capturing a French battalion besides
picking up some provision waggons, and stragglers
on the way. Meanwhile Werneck's main body
halted at Herbrechtingen to cover the passage of
his convoy, and also to wait for news of his col-
league Riesch. During the night he received the
news of the engagement and learnt that the French
were in possession of Albeck. Seeing that the
latter appeared ignorant of his presence, Werneck
decided to attack them, hoping that the surprise
of his sudden appearance would favour a further
offensive effort on the part of Mack. Accordingly
on the morning of the i5th Werneck formed his
troops in two columns, one of which, under his own
command, consisting of 12 battalions and 10
squadrons, marched on Albeck by Hausen and
Nerenstetten ; the other under Hohenzollern of
ii battalions and 10 squadrons, took a round-
about itinerary via Harben, Hermaringen, Brenz
and Langenau.

Werneck reached Nerenstetten at 3.30 P.M., but
though he heard the sound of firing from Ulm
and his advance guard informed him that they
had actually driven some French troops out of
Albeck, he decided to await the Prince of Hohen-
zollern's arrival. But the latter failing to put in
an appearance, having been delayed by the
appalling state of the roads, when night fell,

TO THE CAPITULATION OF ULM 237

Werneck gave the order to return to Hausen,
sending messages to Hohenzollern directing him
to rejoin with his column, which messages the
latter never received. Early next morning, i6th,
Werneck again set out for Nerenstetten, still
hoping for Hohenzollern's support. But his
advance guard came upon the French under
Murat who charged and routed it, capturing almost
entirely a couple of battalions of the Regiment
Kaunitz. At the same moment Werneck re-
ceived an order from Mack dated the I4th, the
spirit of which he had already obeyed ; a few
minutes later came two couriers from the Arch-
duke bearing his personal appreciation of the
situation, and ordering Werneck to return to
Aalen where the Prince shortly expected to arrive.

Werneck accordingly set his column again in
motion towards Herbrechtingen, and Hohen-
zollern who had missed his orders marched on alone
into the midst of his French pursuers with dis-
astrous results. Presently the French advance
overtook Werneck also, when a parlementaire
summoned him to surrender, but was sent back.

The French then attacked his column which had
scarcely had time to take up a position on the
heights of Herbrechtingen. Though this attack
was successfully repulsed, the Austrians bivouacked
in considerable disorder and were surprised by

238 THE BATTLE OF ELCHINGEN

the French about 9 o'clock that night. There was
a bad defile immediately behind the heights and
some 2000 prisoners fell into French hands. The
bulk of the column however managed to get away
and filed through Niederkocher from 3 A.M. to 9
A.M. on the I7th. Nearing Aalen a fresh order
from the Archduke overtook them, instructing
Werneck to join him at Oettingen by Neresheim
and Trochtelfingen. The exhausted troops, who
had been marching and fighting without cessation
for forty -eight hours, now bent off from the
high road and waded by cross-country tracks to
Neresheim, which they reached between the hours
of ii A.M. and 3 P.M. They were actually at the
end of their tether, the men sinking worn out by
the roadside. Their chance of repose, however,
did not last long. Within a couple of hours the
French Cavalry again appeared, and the tired men
struggled to their feet to resume their march
through Neresheim on Trochtelfingen. But by the
hundred they fell into the pursuers' hands though
the remnant still maintained their discipline, and
beat off repeated attacks of the enemy.

Only some 2000 reached Trochtelfingen, which
place they found under water. Here the famished
and extenuated men again threw themselves on
the muddy ground to snatch if possible a few
moments' sleep.

TO THE CAPITULATION OF ULM 239

Then Werneck learnt the fate of Hohenzollern's
command, and seeing further resistance was hope-
less, he at last consented to receive a flag of truce
and terms of surrender were signed at n P.M.

Actually only 71 officers, 1553 men with 31
horses passed into captivity, for nearly all the
mounted men and officers had slipped away in the
darkness whilst preliminaries were being nego-
tiated, and went to rejoin the Prince about
Oettingen. He, hearing of this final disaster, now
made up his mind to strive for the Bohemian
frontier via Nuremberg, which he eventually
reached in safety.

From Oettingen the Archduke addressed a letter
to the Emperor of Austria, giving his views on the
situation in Ulm, and also his reasons for leaving
the Army. These latter, I imagine no Court of
Honour nowadays would consider as a sufficient
justification, even if one could find a Royal Prince
in Europe capable of such dishonourable conduct
in a similar situation.

To return to the movements of the French
Army. Whilst Loison's Division was fighting at
Elchingen and the rest of the VI. Corps were
moving up in support, Lannes (V. Corps) with the
reserve Cavalry had moved by the right bank of
the Danube up to the bridge-head at Ulm, brush-
ing aside the few Austrian detachments which

240 THE BATTLE OF ELCHINGEN

Mack had sent out for purposes of observation,
his losses for this day being only 8 killed and 50
wounded. Marmont also reached his destination
practically unopposed and stood ready to attack
the enemy should he attempt to escape by the
Biberach road.

Soult continued his wide-flung and profitless
march to cut the Biberach road, leaving Van-
damme's Division behind to overawe the garrison
of Memmingen. These, some 4500 strong, were
so disgusted by the poltroonery of their Com-
mandant that they were threatening to break
the capitulation.

i$th October. During the night of the I4th-
I5th Napoleon made his dispositions to attack
the Austrians in their entrenched positions on the
Michelsberg and Geisberg. Leaving only Cavalry
to watch the bridge-head on the right bank of the
Danube, Lannes was directed to bring his whole
Corps across the river by the bridges of Elchingen
and Thalfingen so as to be at hand to support
Ney on whom the actual assault was to devolve.
The ist Division of Dragoons, Nansouty's Cuiras-
siers and the Imperial Guard were to be held in
readiness as a reserve at the abbey of Elchingen.
All were to be in position by 8 A.M. next morning
(i5th). But there proved to be no bridge at
Thalfingen, and the circulation of orders must

TO THE CAPITULATION OF ULM 241

have been even slower than usual, for though Ney
and part of Suchet's Division attacked about 3 P.M.
and succeeded in occupying the Michelsberg and
Geisberg, they failed to make any impression
upon the enceinte walls of the town itself. The two
Divisions of the V. Corps (Gazan and Oudinot) as
well as the Infantry of the Guard did not arrive
until darkness was setting in.

Ultimately they bivouacked about Elchingen
and Gottingen, and the Emperor's Headquarters
were established in the convent of Elchingen.

Dupont's Division had also been ordered to
co-operate from the direction of Albeck. It left
the Brenz at 6 A.M., but met the Austrians in
considerable force near Herbrechtingen and Gien-
gen, and was attacked in flank near Nerenstetten.
Dupont had only some 4000 men with him, and
though he succeeded in beating off the enemy, it
was only the intervention of the ist Division of
Dragoons, attracted by the sound of the firing, that
extricated him from a very perilous situation.

During the night the troops occupied the follow-
ing positions : — Loison and Malher on the Michels-
berg and Geisberg were in contact with the enemy,
with 15 field guns in action against the walls of
Ulm. Suchet and Bourcier, with the greater part
of the Cavalry belonging to the V. and VI Corps,
had advanced towards SofHingen and Erbach to
Q

242 THE BATTLE OF ELCHINGEN

the south-west of Ulm. Gazan and Oudinot were
in rear near Gottingen, and Nansouty was at
Thalfingen, while the Guard was at Elchingen and
Dupont and Klein were at Albeck. The dis-
mounted Dragoons were distributed (chiefly on the
right bank) between Pftihl, Burlefingen, Thalfin-
gen and Giinzburg. Only slight modification in
these positions took place during the following
day. It was during the night that the bridge at
Elchingen was washed away by a fresh flood.

Marmont's orders were based on contingencies
which did not after all arise, hence he practically
preserved his position of observation to the south
and south-east of the town taken up on the pre-
vious day. Of Soult's Corps — Legrand's Division
lay between Dellmensingen and Achstetten, join-
ing hands with the Light Cavalry under Murat.
Vandamme was at Laupheim and St Hilaire, six
miles in rear of Vandamme.

i6th October. During the night of the I5th-
i6th the Emperor became anxious as to the real
meaning of the several reports which had been
received from Dupont during the previous thirty-
six hours, culminating in the news of his narrow
escape on the previous afternoon.

The country seemed to be swarming with
Austrians, and he was seriously concerned for the
safety of his treasure, parks, convoys, etc., on his

TO THE CAPITULATION OF ULM 243

main line of communications between Ellwangen
and Nordlingen.

He therefore sent his A.D.C. General Mouton to
Dupont to obtain confidential information, and
called up Murat from his Cavalry lying to the west
of Ulm, to receive his, Napoleon's, verbal instruc-
tions, and at the same time he sent orders for the
Divisions Rivaud and Dumonceau to move with
all haste on Donauworth, and to concert measures
with the commandants of that town and of
Harburg and Nordlingen for the most active
surveillance of the roads to the north.

These orders brought about the collisions, al-
ready narrated, with Werneck's Column (p. 237).

As the tactical details are of no special interest,
except as regards the extraordinary vigour with
which the jaded French troops, in spite of the
appalling weather, responded to the presence of
Murat at their head, we can now return to Mack,
whom we left on the night of the I4th at the
moment of the Archduke's desertion.

In spite of this blow, and the bitter animosity
it had disclosed amongst his Staff, Mack was still
very far from owning himself beaten. He had
still some 22,000 men under arms, and though
he was short of provisions, he believed at the
moment that Werneck was well away to the north-
eastward with some further 20,000 men, and by

244 THE BATTLE OF ELCHINGEN

now was on the lines of communication of the
French Army, while Jellachich had got away with
another 6000. Moreover he knew that every
hour he could retain the Emperor before Ulm was
of vital service to the Russian and Austrian forces
now overdue on the Inn. Hence, when in the even-
ing of the I5th Ney summoned Ulm to surrender,
he refused to consider the question, and posted
a notice in the town forbidding capitulation to
be even mentioned either by citizens or soldiers.
COMMENT. — It has been the custom to hold this
production up to ridicule because the events failed
to justify the predictions which it. contained, but
how many of Napoleon's bulletins to his Army on
the nights before his great battles are based on
better foundations of fact ? Ulm, though only an
indifferently repaired, almost mediaeval fortress (no
fault of Mack's by the way), was with its strong
garrison absolutely storm-proof. In addition to
this, in the existing conditions of weather, the
opening of trenches and siege batteries meant a de-
lay of weeks, even if the French had had siege guns
at hand with which to arm them, which seemed
sufficiently improbable. Werneck, with some
Cavalry, at any rate was loose on the French lines
of communication, and Mack, familiar with French
methods of requisition knew that this army could
neither stand still on the ground they occupied, nor

TO THE CAPITULATION OF ULM 245

retreat by the way they had come. If the
Russians had kept their time on the Inn, their
arrival as reinforcements could only be a matter
of days.

Generally the whole execution of Napoleon's
manoeuvre against Ulm, the incomprehensible way
in which he had flooded the whole country to the
south of the Danube with men, leaving the north
side entirely open for days, served to strengthen
Mack's convictions either that the rumours of a
British landing, and a revolution in France were
true, or that the Russians were nearer at hand than
he anticipated, and were giving the French more
trouble than he had dared to hope. In any case
22,000 men were well spent in gaining even a few
weeks in which the Austrian main Army could
return from Italy and join the Russians. Finally,
Mack was constitutionally incapable of subscribing
to the lax code of honour which had crept into the
long service armies in the guise of humanitarianism,
which code justified a commander in surrendering
a fortress without having faced even one assault
in the open breach, in order to prevent the " use-
less effusion of human blood " !

But all these arguments failed to convince the
recalcitrant members of his Staff, and seven of
them — Richter, Gyulai Stopsicz, Riesch, Prince
Maurice of Liechtenstein, Klenau, the Hereditary

246 THE BATTLE OF ELCHINGEN

Prince of Hesse-Homburg, Loudon, Gottesheim—
submitted to him this extraordinary effusion ;—

' We, the undersigned, are of the contrary
opinion. We believe that it will render a greater
service to His Majesty to obtain terms allowing
the troops to march out of Ulm with their arms,
thus saving a considerable contingent, than to
defend this place obstinately, which is far from
being impregnable to assault, and in which we can
make no real resistance, as we are in a position to
prove by documentary evidence."

One can only wonder what weight a French
court-martial under the presidency of Napoleon
would have attached to any amount of such docu-
mentary evidence. Only a year and some months
later even the Prussians tried and condemned to
death men whose positions were far from being as
favourable as those of General Mack's.

Finally, either with or without the consent of
their commander, the three senior officers — Riesch,
Loudon and Gyulai — decided to send Prince
Liechtenstein to Ney's Headquarters to demand
permission for the garrison to leave Ulm as com-
batants and to withdraw behind the Lech. Key
at once referred the matter to Berthier, from whom
he received the reply that the Emperor desired

TO THE CAPITULATION OF ULM 247

that the garrison of Ulm should surrender as
prisoners of war. Liechtenstein returned with
this message into Ulm, and the three Generals now
sent word to Ney that " The garrison of Ulm,
seeing with regret that the Marshal has not ac-
cepted the equitable conditions which it had hoped
to have obtained from his sense of justice is
resolved to await the chances of war."

Again Liechtenstein rode back with this answer
to Ney, and returned at 10 A.M. with the declara-
tion from the latter that he would use his best in-
fluence with the Emperor to obtain the following
terms — viz. a truce until noon, by which hour Ulm
is to be surrendered, all the garrison to be trans-
ported into France. The Officers and Generals to be
allowed to keep their horses and baggage. In case
of refusal, the assault would be delivered at once.

As no reply to this summons was received, about
noon Ney opened fire with his field guns upon the
town, and a certain amount of skirmishing ensued.
Presently a French parlementaire appeared, with
an invitation from Napoleon for Prince Liechten-
stein to ride over and discuss the situation. To
this Mack consented, charging the Prince with
some insincere and flattering message for the
Emperor, but there appears to be no record of the
actual instructions given him. Evidently, how-
ever, from the French accounts of the ensuing

248 THE BATTLE OF ELCHINGEN

meeting, the Prince was to make the most of the
near approach of the Russians to drive a good
bargain for the Austrians.

Napoleon refused to treat the idea of the arrival
of a relieving Army at all seriously. He said that
but for the insalubrious condition of the district
and its probable consequences to the health of
his troops, he would willingly grant even fifteen
days' delay to the garrison, provided that it sur-
rendered unconditionally at the expiration of that
time. Ultimately the Prince obtained the follow-
ing terms.

1. The garrison to be prisoners of war, unless
the Russian Army had appeared on the Lech
during the course of the day (i6th), in which case
they should be free to march out to whatever
destination they might choose.

2. The Officers to return to Austria on parole,
or,

3. If Mack preferred, Napoleon would consent
to leave three or four Divisions before Ulm for
five or six days.

Mack at first declined these terms, and there
ensued an interchange of letters between himself
and Berthier. But meanwhile in all secrecy
Napoleon made every preparation to assault the
place. This was a sufficient indication of the very
real necessity he was under of becoming free to

TO THE CAPITULATION OF ULM 249

devote himself to the Russian danger, which it
will be remembered had already seemed threaten-
ing on the I2th of the month (see p. 222).

In the end, Mack succeeded in obtaining a
delay of eight days on condition that one gate of
the Fortress should be placed in the hands of
French troops, the agreement being signed at
noon on the I7th to terminate at midnight of the
25th.

Accordingly, at 10 A.M. on the i8th, a brigade
of Ney's Corps took over the Stuttgart Gate and
immediately French soldiers introduced them-
selves into the town and began to mix with the
people. At the same time the Emperor ordered
the municipality to cease issuing food to the
Austrian troops, and Ney set at liberty the French
prisoners made during the engagements of the
previous weeks. Presently the wildest confusion
reigned in the city. French officers hustled the
Austrians out of their quarters, French soldiers
stole their horses, and as it became evident to
Mack that his men must starve long before the
expiration of the eight days, he rode out to see
the Emperor on the igth. Finally he agreed that
the garrison should lay down its arms on the
following morning, the officers being allowed free
passage on parole.

The total number of prisoners taken in Ulm

250 THE BATTLE OF ELCHINGEN

amounted to 25,365 — adding to these the numbers
taken at Wertingen, Memmingen, Giinzburg,
Elchingen and Haslach, the grand total of
Austrians captured reached 49,718 men ; a heavy
price indeed to be paid by the Austrian Empire,
but this is inevitable in the case of every lost
cause. The real question to be decided with
regard to this armistice is whether in fact the time
Mack had gained by his manoeuvres was worth the
price he paid for it. But this would open a
series of questions far beyond the limits of the
present book.

Briefly, the essence of the whole matter is this.
By no other means could Mack have gained so
much time, and if his superiors in Austria failed
to employ this respite to the best advantage the
responsibility lies on their shoulders, not on
his.

That Napoleon was thoroughly awake to the
danger of delay is sufficiently established by the
fact that he despatched Soult, Baraguey-d'Hilliers
and the Imperial Guard, less the Emperor's
personal escort, for Augsburg on the morning of
the i8th, the moment he knew that the Stuttgart
Gate was safe in Ney's hands. Then he expedited
the march of his remaining forces towards the Inn,
the moment the necessity for their further delay
before Ulm had ceased.

TO THE CAPITULATION OF ULM 251

Except for Ney, the whole army was con-
centrated about Munich on the 24th October, and
on the following morning the march to Vienna
began.

CHAPTER IX

CONCLUSION

To summarise the teachings of this Campaign and
underline some of its lessons. It will be clear, I
think, from the narrative that the doctrine of
" re-entering and salient frontiers," of which it is
often adduced as an example, had no part in the
formation of the plans of either General.

Primarily Napoleon never attached any signifi-
cance to imaginary lines drawn to delimit the
frontiers of any State, unless a physical obstacle,
or the menace of serious opposition by armed
force, rendered it expedient for him to do so.

He would not have objected to Bernadotte
marching south from Hanover to Wurzburg
had the march been convenient, indeed he would
have welcomed it as tending to relieve the con-
gestion of the Frankfort-Aschaffenburg Wurzburg
road, and thus avoiding the strain on Bernadotte 's
men and the consequent delays. But he attached
no significance at all to the fact that Wurzburg
was on the Main and that this river joined the
Rhine at Frankfort, making a re-entrant angle

252

CONCLUSION 253

relative to the territory his troops actually
occupied, for the fact that at the time he did
not and could not know that Mack intended
to stay on the Iller rendered this relationship
entirely unimportant.

The real truth was that neither Mack nor
Napoleon was thinking of their communications
in the recognised eighteenth-century interpreta-
tion of the word at all, for both proposed in principle
to live on the country they occupied, and Mack had
been busy amassing magazines all over the
districts either belonging to Austria, or over
which Austria claimed certain rights, in order to
keep himself as free as possible of the hampering
conditions which regard for the maintenance of
a rigid line of communications necessarily im-
posed. He was in fact preparing to use the
country round Ulm as a temporary base, pre-
cisely as Napoleon used Leipzig in 1813.

The Emperor on the contrary, having no
organised supply service, was bound to sweep
over the widest area of the most fertile districts
which lay between him and his objective, Vienna,
and he based his converging march upon the
Danube between Gundelfingen and Neuburg on
the assumption that the Austrians would prove as
susceptible to this threat at their direct lines of
communication with Vienna as they had always

254 CONCLUSION

shown themselves to be in previous years. He
had no idea, in fact, how far Mack had actually
succeeded in modifying the accepted views as to
living on the enemy's country and making " war
support war " in the few months during which he
had been at work reorganising the Austrian
armies.

It was this preconceived opinion which led the
Emperor to misinterpret so entirely the informa-
tion furnished to him by his contact detachments
when they drove Kienmayer's troops before them
at Donau worth. His orders for the concentra-
tion on Augsburg and his persistence in regarding
that point as the key of the whole situation, not-
withstanding the warnings he received from Ney,
would be unintelligible on any other hypothesis.

Mack's conduct, on the other hand, on learning
from the reconnaissance sent out to Wertingen on
the Qth October of Napoleon's movement towards
Augsburg, would be equally unintelligible had he
not been prepared from the first to find his
direct communications severed.

As he had written at an earlier date to the
Emperor of Austria, he regarded his Army as the
anvil and the Russian and Austrian main armies
as the hammer between which the French were
to be trapped. The term " anvil " certainly
implies passivity, but similes must not be inter-

CONCLUSION 255

preted too literally, and one may safely assume
from his subsequent action that he was quite
ready to assume the role of hammer — using the
Russians as anvil if the circumstances favoured
the change. Moreover, at the time he wrote, it is
not at all certain that he had any idea how badly
his many instructions for the filling of magazines
had been carried out, and it is at any rate
absolutely certain that he did not anticipate
Spangen's contemptible surrender of Memmingen.

In any case, an Army of 50,000 Austrians
between Memmingen and Ulm, distant from
one another only 35 miles, fully 20 of which
could be rendered unapproachable by artificial
inundations of the boggy peat mosses through
which the Iller runs, and drawing supplies
from the magazines at either extremity and the
district to the westward, must have proved a very
formidable obstacle to the French Army, unpro-
vided as it was with siege artillery.

That Mack resisted its attractions, to which
Napoleon had expected him to succumb, shows
how greatly the latter had underestimated the
character of his opponent, and if he escaped the
penalty for this mistake of judgment, this was
through no fault of Mack. I have related above
the incident of the young Archduke's misconduct
at the battle of Haslach on the gth October — in

256 CONCLUSION

itself sufficient to account for Mack's failure to
force his way out on that occasion, but there
were other conditions fighting against him which
deserve to be taken into consideration.

It has been pointed out that the weather had
been unusually inclement for the time of year,
but as this inclemency was uniform over the whole
theatre of operations, it is generally assumed by
those who have noticed the circumstance at all
that the results must have been equally unfavour-
able to both parties and might therefore be left
out of the equation. Curiously, however, geo-
logical conditions intervened to make matters at
this period of the campaign far worse for the
Austrians than for the French, and as the fact only
dawned on me when traversing the district in
weather of much the same quality, it may very
well have escaped the notice of other students.

The time was in August, it had been pouring
all night and very heavy storms swept over the
country during the day. During the morning I
had been walking over the ground on the right
bank of the Danube, but though much water lay in
pools, and the country roads were sloppy, they
were far from being bottomless, nor did it appear
to me likely that they would become so even under
such traffic as the marching of the Austrian and
French troops as recorded would put upon them.

CONCLUSION 257

Even in the actual alluvial plain, which extends a
couple of miles or so on the left bank of the river,
the going across country was not difficult. But
suddenly, nearing the slopes of the hills which dip
from the convent of Elchingen, south towards the
river and east towards Albeck and Langenau, I
encountered the most viscous and slippery mud
it has ever been my misfortune to meet. I thought
Chatham had taught me the worst that chalk
wash could accomplish, but in less than a mile I
found I had still much to learn, and after the next
two I no longer needed anyone to tell me why the
Austrians had failed to escape — one's feet acted as
suckers and I found my rate of progress came
down to exactly that of the Austrian Infantry —
viz. about one mile an hour.

Now, as explained in the chapter on the Austrian
Army, though the Army as a whole was slow,
owing to defective methods of circulating orders,
etc., the troops themselves were by no means bad
marchers. As the incidents of the 7th and 8th
October after the engagement at Wertingen
showed, they could march as fast and far along
the tracks on the right bank of the Danube as the
French, it was only on the left bank that they
failed to keep reasonable time.

A reference to a geological chart gives the ex-
planation. South of the Danube the whole country

R

258 CONCLUSION

is formed by the moraines left behind by the great
glaciers of the Alps as they retreated southward.
The " floor " of the country therefore is chiefly
sand and gravel, and though the valleys of the
Iller and Lech are abundantly furnished with
peat moors, these are only local, and as a whole
the district will absorb any amount of rainfall.

But an offshoot of the Jura formation stretches
right across Swabia called the Rauhe Alb or Alp,
generally barren and inhospitable, consisting of
cretaceous rock, and layers of deep-sea mud-
finer grained and more clayey than the Eocene
sands which have been deposited upon the lower
slopes of our own chalk formations — which poach
up under traffic into a viscid water-holding
medium of the most aggravating description.
This ridge sends out offshoots which come down
close to Ulm on the left bank of the river and
extend right across country to the East and
North, and it was exactly across this country that
every Austrian sally had to be made. At
Haslach, Mack had got beyond its eastern limit,
and but for the Archduke's withdrawal would
have been on equal terms with the French, but on
the I4th October, the day of Elchingen, the
decisive fighting took place on the very line of
demarcation between the two surfaces, and
whereas the French coming up from Riedheim,

CONCLUSION 259

Leipheim and the Elchingen bridge met with no
special hindrance from the ground, the Austrian
reserves were practically anchored in their posi-
tions and hence could not support their fighting
line in time. In fine weather I have now no
doubt at all that Dupont's Division about
Albeck and Haslach would have been destroyed,
and even the whole of Key's Corps had it been on
the ground, for 50,000 Austrians strong in Cavalry
were at least a match for Key's 30,000 even with
the Division of dismounted Dragoons thrown
in. Similarly I think that but for the delay, due
to the mud in the Austrian march of the 13 th,
the battle of Elchingen would not have been
fought at all, or if fought, then under far more
favourable conditions for the Austrians than those
which actually arose.

In either case it is clear that Mack's main Army
would have got clear away, and the net so cunningly
devised by Kapoleon for the I4th October would
have closed in on an empty nest.

I have already commented on the Strategy —
i.e. the " Art of the Leader " which after marching
200,000 men through a mean distance of some
300 miles only brought some 40,000 men within
striking distance at the place and time of the
decision — let us now see how the system subse-
quently devised by Kapoleon and employed by

260 CONCLUSION

him with such signal results at Eylau Friedlanc
(and many other battles in which not one man,
horse or gun was not available to join in the
battle had the necessity arisen) would have
worked out in this particular campaign.

To begin with, the Emperor would never have
ordered the intended concentrations on Augsburg
and Landsberg on hypothetical deductions drawn
from insufficient evidence.

He would have realised that the direction of
Kienmayer's retreat afforded no certain indication
of Mack's probable conduct and therefore would
have focussed his attention on the main body
of his enemy. Leaving, presumably, Bernadotte
together with the Bavarians to watch the Russians
towards Munich and the Isar, he would, I imagine,
have formed his lozenge, facing west somewhat
in the following order.

Murat — with Lannes and Marmont as General
Advance Guard — moving on Wertingen. Soult
echeloned at a day's march in rear on the left ;
along the Augsburg-Ulm road, Ney with the
dismounted Dragoons and probably a Division
detailed from Lannes' command, between
Giinzburg and Gundelfingen. The Guards in
the centre and Davout in support to close the
square.

Murat, gaining touch with Mack at Wertingen,

CONCLUSION 261

and acting with the vigour Napoleon after Jena
learnt how to impart to his commanders, would
probably never have allowed the Austrians to
get away from him, but would have held them
to their ground for 48 hours until Soult from
the left and Ney from the right had swung in and
cut them off from Ulm, or at least would have
driven them into it and invested the place firmly
by the evening of the xoth October, bringing some
20,000 men to bear at the decisive time and place
and gaining 12 clear days in which to move
against the Russians. Or assuming that Mack
had succeeded in evading Lannes and Murat, as in
fact he did, and then ventured on his sally to
Haslach on the nth, he would have met Ney's
whole command probably about Albeck, whilst
Davout crossed the river by the bridges between
Giinzburg and Gundelfingen to come to his
support and Lannes with Marmont attempted to
join in by the bridges above Giinzburg at Ried-
heim, Leipheim, Elchingen and Thalfingen (the
latter was not carried away until the I3th October),
Soult and Murat meanwhile completing the
investment of Ulm.

This would have given not less than some
60,000 men available against Mack's 50,000 on the
first day, with another 90,000 ready] for action
during the second day, an ample superiority for

CONCLUSION

any opposition Mack was in a position to offer,
even on the assumption that the ground had been
good-going for his Cavalry.

Comparing these possible results with those
actually obtained, the inference appears to me
obvious that at the time the idea of the lozenge
formation had not yet presented itself to the
Emperor's mind, any more than it had occurred
to Moltke on the i4th August 1870 when he
ordered, on a similar hypothetical deduction of
his enemy's movements, the vigorous pursuit of
the French Army towards Verdun and the Meuse.

Napoleon was only saved from the consequences
of his reasoning by the intervention of his fifth
element, " the mud," but nothing of the kind
existed to extricate Moltke, and but for the splen-
did resolution of Von Alvensleben in attacking,
against all rules of prudence, the whole French
Army on the morning of the i6th August, the
results would probably have been as disastrous
to his reputation as the false concentration on the
Iller must have proved to Napoleon.

Now neither of these men were even ordinary
human beings, but on the contrary were far in
advance intellectually of their contemporaries.
Hence if, when both used the same method and
relied on the same hypothetical reasoning, the
results only just fell short of the ridiculous, the pre-

CONCLUSION 263

sumption is to my mind overwhelming that it was
the system, not the men, which was to blame, and
the presumption settles into conviction when, as
time goes on, we find the method devised to replace
it giving better and better results, even when the
material available for its execution had sunk to
the lowest degree of efficiency.

Contrast Napoleon at Liitzen with his con-
script Army, and hopelessly outclassed in Cavalry.
He is surprised by the whole Army of the Allies
in broad daylight — yet he only gives four brief
orders, and before nightfall practically his whole
army is on the ground. Even at Leipzig with
a worn-out army hopelessly outnumbered, his
method still gives him a two-to-one superiority
at the point of his own choice.

That the tactical victory did not in this case
follow the usual rule does not affect the general
question, and we of all races ought to be the first to
appreciate the fact. Plassey, indeed every Indian
battlefield, shows that numerical superiority, to
whatever cause it may be due, is not the last
word in the Art of War. The point is this — other
things being equal, — War becomes a duel between
the will powers of the opposing leaders, and friction
will ultimately wear down the resistance of even
the strongest human being. Hence that Com-
mander who by the exercise of a method which

264

CONCLUSION

needs only to be set in motion in order to deliver
with mathematical certainty the first condition
of victory — i.e. a numerical superiority at the
time and place of his own choice — will reach the
field with a greater amount of will power still in
hand than is held by his opponent, whom we will
assume to pursue a system which forces on him
the onus of decision upon insufficient evidence
many times in the course of a single day, and the
two opponents being considered otherwise equal,
the tired man will always be the one to break
down first.

To follow these operations in detail, consult the
Tffff.Vinr Staff map of Bavaria, noting that the course
of the Danube has been much altered by recent
drainage and canalisation works.

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